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In this dissertation, I examine three questions of relevance to macroeconomists. Chapter
1 investigates how the interconnected production and trade credit networks of firms lead to
the propagation of financial shocks. Chapter 2 documents that conditional moments of the
price change distribution are extremely informative and yield new insights on the dynamics
of price changes in the economy. Chapter 3 offers a detailed investigation of the foreign
exchange risk premium through the inflation-indexed bond market structure.
In Chapter 1, I study the transmission of firm-level shocks in the economy. Firms are
connected through the production network. At the same time, the production linkages
coincide with financial linkages because of delays to input payments. Idiosyncratic shocks
can spillover in the network through production and financial linkages among firms and
generate aggregate economic fluctuations. Chapter 1 investigates how these interconnected
production and financial linkages lead to the propagation of financial shocks both upstream
and downstream. First, I show that financial shocks can propagate upstream if there are
financial linkages of firms and financial frictions in trade. Second, I find, based on the
input-output matrix and the bond yield data in the U.S., upstream propagation of financial
shocks is stronger than downstream propagation. Third, I elaborate a DSGE model that can
capture this pattern of shocks and generate quantitative predictions. Fourth, I demonstrate
that credit policies would have a stronger impact if liquidity were transferred to downstream
sectors after aggregate liquidity shocks.
The second chapter documents the price setting behaviour of firms. The effectiveness
of monetary policy depends both on the presence and the forms of nominal rigidities in
price setting. Understanding the dynamics of price changes (when and how price changes)
is necessary to determine the true degree of monetary non-neutrality. Chapter 2 shows that
conditional moments, which have been seldom used, are extremely informative and yield
new insights on the selection effect of price changes. It documents the predictions of a broad
class of existing price setting models on how various statistics of the price change distribution
change with the rate of aggregate inflation. Notably, menu cost models uniformly feature the
price change distribution becoming less dispersed and less skewed as inflation rises, while
in the Calvo model both relations are positive. Using a novel data set, the micro data
underlying the U.S. CPI from the late 1970’s onwards, Chapter 2 evaluates these predictions
using the large variation in inflation over this period. Price change dispersion does indeed
fall with inflation, but skewness does not, meaning that none of the existing models can fit
these patterns. It then presents a model that does, in addition to matching the price change
moments that existing models do. The model features random menu costs. With a menu cost
distribution that gives a significant probability to free price changes, and a high probability
to very high menu costs, the model predicts a flat inflation-skewness relation. This menu
cost distribution moves the model close to a Calvo model, and the model therefore exhibits
a much higher degree of monetary non-neutrality than the Golosov and Lucas (2007) model,
and higher even than in the subsequent menu cost models such as Midrigan (2011).
Finally, the last chapter investigates an important input in firms’ and households’ in-
vestment decisions process - risk premium of the foreign exchange market. Risk premium in
the foreign exchange market has been a prominent research topic in international macroe-
conomics for decades. For example, it plays an important role in explaining the well-known
interest parity puzzle and in investigating the foreign exchange market structure. Chapter
3 offers a detailed investigation of the foreign exchange risk premium using a novel struc-
tural relationship in the inflation-index bond market, firstly introduced by Clarida (2012).
Unlike the conventional VAR approach, this approach estimates risk premium through the
non-arbitrage relationship between investing inflation-indexed bonds from two countries and
works on the market information set. There are two main findings. First, the estimated
risk premium is able to forecast subsequent exchange rate changes. Second, contrary to the
original finding of Meese and Rogoff (1983) that, even given the ex post realizations of fun-
damentals, exchange rate changes are difficult to explain, there are in fact periods in which
exchange rate movements are driven largely by the fluctuation in the fair value.
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Chapter 1
Propagation of Financial Shocks in an
Input-Output Economy with Trade
and Financial Linkages of Firms
1
1.1 Introduction
An economy is an entangled network of specialized productions that are interconnected
through inter-firm trade within and across sectors. In the course of this trade, the products
of one firm may be purchased and consumed by another firm as inputs. In addition, there is
often a waiting period between the moment in which a cost is incurred and the later point at
which cash flow materializes. In this way, the production network also creates and sustains
a trade credit network. An idiosyncratic financial shock may therefore spread through the
production and financial linkages of firms. It is necessary to determine how the interaction
between the production network and the trade credit network affects the propagation of
financial shocks.
The automotive industry crisis of 2008-2010 offers an example of how a financial shock to
one firm impacts its suppliers and customers. First, a financial shock to a firm may reduce
its demand for the goods and services of its suppliers. For example, General Motors Co.
significantly reduced its demand owing to a severe liquidity problem.1 Consequently, Amer-
ican Axle & Manufacturing Holdings Inc., one of the major suppliers of GM, experienced a
net loss of $112.1 million in the fourth quarter of 2008.2,3 Second, when a firm experiences a
financial shock, it may postpone repaying trade credit to its suppliers and reduce the provi-
sion of trade credit to its customers.4 For example, General Motors Co. and Chrysler Group
1A combination of tight credit and declining sales caused the crisis in the U.S. auto industry from 2008
to 2010. This chapter focuses on the impact of credit contraction in the production network.
2“American Axle CEO: ‘2008 Is the Year From Hell’.” 30 January 2009, Dow Jones International News.
3Similarly, in the 1997 Korean financial crisis, Kia Motors suffered liquidity problems that affected its
16,000 domestic suppliers. Source: “South Korea’s Kia Buckles, And Suppliers Begin to Break.” 22 August
1997, The Wall Street Journal .
4Trade credit is the single most important source of external finance for firms (Boissay and Gropp (2007)).
Trade credits are short-term loans that a supplier provides to a customer upon purchase of its product, and
that thus constitute a form of deferred payment. A discussion of trade credit is provided in Appendix A.1.
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LLC. had in excess of $21 billion in domestic trade payables as of September 30, 2008.5 The
failure to meet these payments soon crippled GM’s suppliers during the crisis.
This chapter builds an input-output model with trade credit to facilitate the study of
the propagation of financial shocks. To begin with, a simple network model is presented in
an effort to explain the mechanism behind the propagation of financial shocks, specifically
a static model with a vertical production network structure and financial linkages among
firms. To capture financial frictions, I assume that firms have a working capital requirement
on inputs, and thus need to pay wages and intermediate input costs in advance of production.
To satisfy this requirement, firms acquire loans as well as trade credit from suppliers. Ac-
cordingly, firms are financially interlocked through trade: suppliers can use payments from
customers as working capital, while at the same time the balance sheets of trading parties
become interlocked through accounts-payable and accounts-receivable.
My model shows that the production and financial linkages among firms serve to prop-
agate financial shocks both upstream and downstream. A positive borrowing cost shock to
loans increases the input cost, reduces intermediate input demand and affects intermediate
input suppliers. This is upstream propagation. The same shock increases the production
price, which creates supply impact and affects product consumers. This is downstream
propagation. The mechanisms behind these processes are as follows.
Two countervailing effects determine the extent of upstream propagation following a pos-
itive borrowing cost shock: the income effect decreases intermediate input demand, since
production falls on account of the financial distress; the substitution effect, on the other
hand, increases intermediate input demand. Because of delays to intermediate input pay-
5“US CREDIT - A GM failure risks more debt losses, default chain.” 11 December 2008, Reuters News.
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ments, the marginal cost of intermediate input is less sensitive to borrowing cost shocks than
is the marginal cost of labor. Consequently, firms will substitute labor with intermediate in-
puts after the shock. An important aspect of trade credit is that it amplifies the substitution
effect and attenuates upstream propagation of a shock.
In like manner, two countervailing effects determine the extent of downstream propagation
following a shock: the cost effect increases product price, while the discount effect decreases
product price. Products are sold to downstream firms, which make early payments, and to
households, which make late payments. Because producers value early payments, there is a
price discount for downstream firms. Here again, trade credit plays a significant role, this
time by weakening the discount effect and amplifying downstream propagation. The relative
strength of upstream versus downstream propagation therefore depends on the level of trade
credit.
Next I examine whether upstream or downstream propagation of financial shocks is re-
vealed in the data, which in my analysis suggests that upstream propagation of financial
shocks is stronger than downstream propagation. Using changes in sectoral bond yields as
an indicator of idiosyncratic financial shocks to each sector, I find that sectors are more sen-
sitive to financial shocks that hit their customers than to shocks that hit their suppliers. A
1% change in the bond yield of the customers of a sector generates a negative 0.17% output
change in the focal sector. The same shock hit the sector’s suppliers, by contrast, has no
significant impact on the focal sector.
Afterwards, I use a DSGE model to numerically examine the transmission of idiosyncratic
financial shocks. The input-output structure is standard (and follows that of Long and
Plosser (1983) or Acemoglu et al. (2012)). In the economy, firms issue claims in order to
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purchase capital and acquire loans in order to satisfy their working capital requirements.
Financial intermediaries supply liquidity to firms and face balance sheet constraints that are
endogenously determined, in keeping with the framework developed by Gertler and Karadi
(2011). Moreover, firms share liquidity with other firms through trade credit, just as in my
static model, while they retain some flexibility for adjusting the level of trade credit.
By analyzing the model, I find the following results. This model indicates that the up-
stream propagation of financial shocks is stronger than the downstream propagation. It also
demonstrates that trade credit increases the output correlation of firms. Furthermore, com-
pared with a representative firm model, aggregate variables in the network model are more
responsive to shocks of all kinds. The input-output structure generates a strong amplification
effect on the aggregate impact of shocks.
Finally, the policy implication of my model is that credit policies would have a stronger
impact if liquidity were transferred to downstream sectors after aggregate liquidity shocks.
According to Gertler and Karadi (2011), the severity of a recession could be mitigated if
policymakers were to supply liquidity during extreme economic conditions.6 Such was the
thinking behind the policy whereby Federal Reserve loans to private entities and other central
banks reached $1.5 trillion by the end of 2008 in the wake of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy
(Price (2012)). However, which types of sectors or institutions should policymakers supply
6There are well-documented instances when just this policy was implemented. Thus, for example, the
Federal Reserve granted the Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company access to the discount
window from May 1984 through February 1985 despite the company’s effective insolvency, and in an earlier
instance, in 1970, it indirectly channeled credit to the commercial papers market in order to relieve the
financial stress on the Penn Central Transportation Co. (Price (2012)). The bailout of General Motors Co. in
2009 undoubtedly saved that firm’s suppliers from bankruptcy. Nonetheless, during the 1997 Korean financial
crisis, Kia’s suppliers complained that the liquidity injected into the banking system by Korea’s central bank
had failed to reach them. Source: “Auto Suppliers Turn Around: New Credit, Quick Restructurings of GM
and Chrysler Sustained Parts Makers.” 26 December 2009, The Wall Street Journal. “South Korea’s Kia
Buckles, And Suppliers Begin to Break.” 22 August, 1997, The Wall Street Journal .
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liquidity to? The implications of credit policies that channel liquidity to specific sectors
or firms cannot be well studied by means of a representative firm model, though they can
be investigated using my model.7 My findings here suggest that it would be optimal if
policymakers target liquidity in downstream sectors following an aggregate liquidity shock,8
since the financial condition of downstream sectors is more important systemically, given
that financial shocks mainly propagate upstream. For example, credit policies that supply
liquidity to the construction sector would have stronger impacts than those to the utility
sector after a uniform liquidity contraction across sectors.
Literature review. To my knowledge, this is the first paper that studies the input-output
structure and trade-credit network in a general equilibrium framework. This project fits
into three strands of literature, namely (1) production networks; (2) trade credit; and (3)
financial frictions. Long and Plosser (1983) inaugurated the study of sectoral co-movements
using a network model, sowing the seeds of a rich literature that has focused on the aggregate
volatility generated by idiosyncratic shocks.9 As presented by di Giovanni et al. (2014), there
are two effects that are at work. First, idiosyncratic shocks have sizeable aggregate effects
if there are strong input-output linkages between firms, which is the linkages effect (Bak
et al. (1993), Horvath (1998, 2000), Dupor (1999), Shea (2002), Conley and Dupor (2003),
Foerster et al. (2011), Acemoglu et al. (2012, 2015b), Jones (2011, 2012) etc.). Second,
idiosyncratic shocks can directly contribute to aggregate fluctuations, which is the direct
7Using a heterogeneous agent model, Reis (2009) suggests that providing credit to traders in securities
markets can restore liquidity with fewer government funds than extending credit to the originators of loans.
8Naturally, political barriers could complicate supplying liquidity to specific firms or sectors, though the
fact is that policymakers do provide liquidity in this way during extreme economic conditions (such as the
examples provided in footnotes 5 and 6).
9There is also a branch of literature on the propagation of shocks in financial networks, e.g. Allen and
Gale (2000), Acemoglu et al. (2015c). The focus of this chapter is the propagation of shocks in production
networks.
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effect (Jovanovic (1987), Gabaix (2011), Carvalho and Gabaix (2013)). Of particular note
here is the study by Acemoglu et al. (2015a) of the propagation of supply and demand shocks
through input-output and geographic networks. My predictions for the propagation of these
types of shocks are consistent with their work. My emphasis, however, is on the transmission
of financial shocks in the input-output structure.
In research on the production network, financial frictions were not considered until the
study by Bigio and La’O (2013), following which Su (2014) and this chapter represent con-
tributions to network-based approaches to the amplification of financial shocks. Aside from
the questions these three papers focus on, the nature of the financial friction in these three
papers is also different. Unlike Bigio and La’O (2013), my approach takes into account finan-
cial linkages of firms and establishes a micro foundation for the financial sector. And while
Su (2014) presents a network model that accommodates financial frictions in the capital
input, he does not account for financial frictions in trade, for which reason his model is allo-
cationally equivalent to a horizontal one and can only describe the downstream propagation
of financial shocks.
Second, several theories have been put forward to explain why suppliers provide trade
credit to customers (e.g. Peterson and Rajan (1997), Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), Cunat
(2007)). My analysis follows that of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in emphasizing the role of
trade credit in the propagation of shocks. Regarding the third strand of inquiry, financial
frictions have been extensively studied in the literature on the 2008 financial crisis (e.g.
Gertler and Karadi (2011), Cúrdia and Woodford (2011)). This chapter builds on these
previous approaches in order to elaborate a heterogeneous firm model for the study of the
impact of idiosyncratic and aggregate financial shocks.
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In what follows, Section 1.2 presents a simple static model to illustrate the propagation of
shocks in a chain economy. In Section 1.3, I discuss my empirical findings on the propagation
of financial shocks. Section 1.4 presents my DSGE model, and Section 1.5 calibrates the
model and forms quantitative predictions. Credit policy implications are the subject of
Section 1.6. Section 1.7 concludes the chapter with a summary of my findings and a discussion
of their implications.
1.2 A Simple Model
In this section I consider a simple economy in order to study the mechanism of the propa-
gation of financial shocks. In my model here, firms are connected vertically in a production
chain. The interconnected production and financial linkages among the firms lead to the
propagation of financial shocks both upstream and downstream.
Figure 1.1: Horizontal versus network economy
Firm	  1	  Firm	  2	  Firm	  3	  
Final	  Output	  







1.2.1 A horizontal economy with financial frictions
Before proceeding with this discussion, it will be useful to consider a horizontal economy
as the benchmark. In this simple economy, three firms produce three types of specialized
intermediate products {m1,m2,m3} with prices {p1, p2, p3} correspondingly. The flow of
goods in this economy is illustrated in Figure 1.1 panel a. Under these circumstances, there
are no connections among the firms, and labor li is the sole input of Firm i. Intermediate
sectors thus have the following production functions,
m1 = z1l
α1
1 , m2 = z2l
α2
2 , m3 = z3l
α3
3 ,
where zi denotes technology. To capture financial frictions, I assume a working capital
requirement on labor exits. Firms in this case need to borrow in order to pay for their labor
cost at the beginning of each production period. I further assume a small open economy in
which firms obtain credit from the rest of the world with a fixed interest rate R. Policymakers
in addition impose a borrowing tax ei on each unit of the credit obtained by firm i.
10 Thus,
the borrowing fee of firm i is Ri = R + ei. For simplicity, I assume that R = 1. The
tax revenue, which equals to the total borrowing cost, is distributed to households through
lump-sum transfers.








10The borrowing tax comes through the banking system implicitly. This assumption provides one jus-
tification for idiosyncratic borrowing costs. In the general model presented in Section 1.4, I will provide a
micro foundation for the firm specific interest rates.
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where Ξ is a constant, ζhi denotes the final share of product i. A representative household




s.t. C = wL+ Ψ,
where Ψ represents the tax revenue distributed to households, and w is the wage rate.
Households make choices of consumption C and labor supply L subject to their budget
constraint. The market clearing condition of goods follows Y = C. The labor market
clearing condition follows L =
∑3
i=1 li.
Given {zi, Ri} for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, a competitive equilibrium in this horizontal economy is
represented by a group of endogenous variables {mi, li, L, Y , C, Ψ, pi, w} for i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
such that (1) each firm maximizes its own profits, (2) each household maximizes its own
utility, and (3) goods and labor markets clear.
The equilibrium results are presented in Appendix A.2.1.
1.2.2 A network economy with financial frictions
Unlike in a horizontal economy, firms in a network are interconnected through trade. Thus,
consider a production network in which three firms are vertically linked. The input-output
structure is illustrated in Figure 1.1 panel b. For the sake of simplicity, Firm 1 is the
furthest upstream, while Firm 3 is the furthest downstream. All three firms supply input
that figures in the production of the final goods. Each firm produces output using Cobb-
10
Douglas technologies production functions given by the following,
m1 = z1l
α1









where mi+1,i denotes the intermediate inputs of Firm i+ 1 for i ∈ {2, 3}, and α1 = 1. Firms
have a working capital requirement on labor and intermediate inputs. Again, firms pay an
exogenous borrowing fee Ri on each unit of the borrowed funds. Producers could, however,
defer a proportion of their intermediate input payments using trade credit. A proportion θi
of intermediate input payments is paid after production without borrowing cost. Let pi+1,i
denote the price of product i paid by Firm i+ 1 for i ∈ {2, 3}.
The final output of the economy is,











where yi represents output i used in the final production, and ζi represents the share of
production i in the final product. Unlike intermediate firms, final producers pay input
payments at the end of the production period with price pi.
Households under these conditions solve the same problem in like manner as they do in the
horizontal economy (Equation 1.2). The goods market clearing conditions are: m1 = m21+y1,
m2 = m32 + y2, m3 = y3, and Y = C. The labor market clearing condition is L =
∑3
i=1 li.
Given {zi, Ri} for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, a competitive equilibrium in the network economy is a
group of endogenous variables {mi, li, yi, pi} for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and {m21, m32, L, Y , C, Ψ,
p21, p32, w}, such that, (1) each firm maximizes profits, (2) each household maximizes its
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utility, (3) goods and labor markets clear.
Financial linkages of firms
In this economy, firms pay a proportion (1− θi) of their intermediate input purchases at the
beginning of the production period and pay the balance at the end. Therefore, each firm i
has accounts-payable that equal θi of its total intermediate input costs, and has accounts-
receivable that equal θj of its sales to firm j. When θi = 0, intermediate input costs have
to be paid fully before production; when θi = 1, there are no financial frictions in trade.
Early payments received by suppliers can then be used to pay their input costs. Thus, firms
are interconnected through both the production network and the trade credit network. The
financial linkages of these three firms are presented in Table 1.1. Obviously, upstream firms
provide additional credit to downstream firms, compared to which upstream firms naturally
have more working capital.
Table 1.1: Financial linkages of firms in the network model
Accounts-payable Accounts-receivable Net working capital from trade
Firm 1 0 θ2p21m21 (1− θ2)p21m21
Firm 2 θ2p21m21 θ3p32m32 −(1− θ2)p21m21 + (1− θ3)p32m32
Firm 3 θ3p32m32 0 −(1− θ3)p32m32
Financial linkages among firms play important roles in the sensitivity of these firms to
shocks. On the one hand, the working capital of upstream firms is more sensitive to economic
fluctuations, which finding is consistent with those of Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012). A shock
to a downstream firm would impact the early payments to its upstream firms, which would
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in turn cause fluctuations in the working capital of these upstream firms. Working capital
increases relatively more for upstream firms during booms and declines relatively more for
upstream firms during recessions. On the other hand, trade credit increases the correlation
of firms; firms share liquidity with surrounding firms through trade credit. Thus Raddatz
(2008) shows empirically that trade credit increases sectoral output correlations. A detailed
theoretical explanation is provided in Section 1.4.
Solve the problem









21 ≥ m32 + y2
The first term represents the benefit of selling products to Firm 3. The marginal benefit of
selling one unit of m32 is [p32 + (R2 − 1)(1 − θ3)p32], where the second term represents the
benefit derived from borrowing cost saving. Through first order conditions, I find that
p32 = p2/[θ3 + (1− θ3)R2]. (1.3)
Close reality, price and trade credit are bundled together in the contract. The price is low
when θ3 is small.
The equilibrium results of this economy are presented in Appendix A.2.1.
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Proposition 1. (a) If there are no financial frictions in trade (i.e. θi = 1 ∀i), the network
economy can be allocationally equivalent to the horizontal economy. In either economy, the
aggregate output follows,











if Ξ = Θ and ζhi = Vi.




(b) If there are financial frictions in trade (i.e. θi ∈ [0, 1)∀i), the network economy cannot
be allocationally equivalent to the horizontal economy. In the network economy, the aggregate
output follows,











[θ2 + (1− θ2)R1]
[θ2 + (1− θ2)R2]
)V1−ζ1 ( [θ3 + (1− θ3)R2]
[θ3 + (1− θ3)R3]
)V2−ζ2
.
The labor allocation is given by Equations A.7-A.9 in Appendix A.2.1.
In the absence of financial frictions in inter-firm trade, an economy with input-output
connections is isomorphic to a horizontal economy with a certain construction of param-
eters.12 However, when there are financial frictions in inter-firm trade, an economy with
input-output connections cannot be isomorphic to a horizontal economy. The labor allo-
cation under these circumstances depends on the financial condition of other firms in the
network economy, while in the case of a horizontal economy it depends only on the firm’s




2 (1− α2)(1−α2)(1−α3)]ζ3 , V1 = ζ3(1− α2)(1− α3) +
ζ2(1− α2) + ζ1, V2 = ζ3(1− α3) + ζ2, V3 = ζ3.
12This result is close to the finding by Bigio and La’O (2013) that, without frictions, an economy’s network
structure is irrelevant. Baqaee (2015) presents a similar result. Notably, I show that the network structures
are irrelevant provided that there are no frictions in inter-firm trade.
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own financial condition (according to Equations A.7-A.9). Moreover, idiosyncratic shocks in
a network economy spill over from one firm to another along the production chain; output
sensitivity to shocks differs according to the network locations of these firms, as is discussed
in next subsection.
The propagation of financial shocks
Having established the network model, I will now discuss how financial shocks propagate
through the economy. Specifically, given that production processes are sequential, it is crucial
to determine whether shocks propagate upstream or downstream. Propagation is upstream
if a firm-specific shock spills over to the firm’s suppliers. Propagation is downstream if a
firm-specific shock affects the firm’s customers. In terms of the model just elaborated, the
question becomes whether a borrowing cost R2 shock will impact Firm 1 or Firm 3.
Proposition 2. (a) Financial shocks generate strong upstream and downstream propagations
in a network economy with trade credit. The elasticity of output i with respect to the borrowing





= fi(R1, R2, R3),
with fi ≤ 0 (refer to Appendix A.2.2). If θi = 0 ∀i, there is no downstream propagation and
f3 = 0. If θi = 1 ∀i, there is no upstream propagation and f1 = 0.
(b) The upstream propagation of a R2 shock is more likely to dominate the downstream
propagation as trade credit decreases. Suppose that
(i) All firms face the same borrowing cost: Ri = R̄ ∀i.
(ii) All firms use the same amount of trade credit: θi = θ ∀i.
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Upstream propagation is stronger than downstream propagation if,
θ <
(1− α2)ζ2R̄
(1− α2)ζ2R̄ + α2(1− α3)[ζ1 + (1− α2)(ζ2 + (1− α3)ζ3)]
.
The proof of Proposition 2 is presented in Appendix A.2.2.
Upstream propagation. Two factors affect the intermediate input demand of Firm 2 after
a positive R2 shock, which factors are in turn related to the upstream propagation and the
sensitivity of m1 to R2. On the one hand, the income effect decreases intermediate input
demand, since production falls on account of the financial distress. On the other hand, the
substitution effect increases the intermediate input demand. Trade credit defers part of the
intermediate input payments. The marginal cost of labor for Firm 2 is wR2. The marginal
cost of intermediate inputs of Firm 2 is p21[(1 − θ2)R2 + θ2], which is less sensitive to R2
shocks. Thus, Firm 2 will substitute labor with intermediate inputs after a positive R2 shock.
The substitution effect attenuates the negative impact to m1. Notably, as θ2 increases, this
substitution effect becomes stronger and the upstream propagation effect is diminished. In
the extreme case that θi = 1 ∀i, there is no upstream propagation because the income and
the substitution effect cancel each other out in the Cobb-Douglas production structure.
Downstream propagation. Two factors affect the product prices of Firm 2, which factors
are in turn related to the downstream propagation and the sensitivity of m3 to R2. On
the one hand, the cost effect increases product price p32. On the other hand, the discount
effect decreases p32. When R2 is high, Firm 2 gives a large discount to Firm 3, which
pays in advance (Equation 1.3). The discount effect attenuates the negative impact to
m3. It is again notable that, as θ3 decreases, the discount effect becomes stronger and
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the downstream propagation effect is diminished. In the extreme case that θi = 0 ∀i, the
downstream propagation effect disappears.
The relative strength of upstream versus downstream propagation depends of course on
parameter values. With a moderate amount of trade credit, the upstream propagation effect
is stronger than the downstream effect. Moreover, trade credit takes the form of external
loans that firms receive from their suppliers, and this kind of credit relaxes the financial
constraints of the firm to which it is extended. On the one hand, accounts-payable alleviates
the financial constraint on the firm and attenuates the transmission of financial shocks. On
the other hand, accounts-receivable amplifies the financial stress of the firm and strengthens
the transmission of financial shocks.
The importance of firms - the influence vector
The propagation of shocks is closely related to the systemic importance of firms in the









and (1 − αi)ωij captures the direct use of product j for the production of i. All the other
conditions in the network economy are the same as before. The equilibrium level of the output
of firms is a log-linear function of the productivities and borrowing fees in the economy.
Again, the financial shocks propagate both upstream and downstream. Refer to Appendix
A.2.3 for detail.
Let z denote a vector of the log productivity deviation from steady state level (z̃i). Let
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R denote a vector of the log borrowing fee deviation from steady state level (R̃i). Let ζ
denote a vector of the final share (ζi). Let Ω denote the direct input-output matrix with
entry (1− αi)ωij, i.e.
Ω =

(1− α1)ω11 (1− α1)ω12 · · · (1− α1)ω1N





(1− αN)ωN1 (1− αN)ωN2 · · · (1− αN)ωNN

. (1.5)
Proposition 3. Assume that the labor shares of all firms are equal αi = α∀i and the steady
state borrowing costs of all firms are R̄. Then, in the competitive equilibrium of the network
economy, the log deviation of the aggregate output (GDP) from its steady state is given by
Ỹ = v′z + (vR)′R,
where v and vR are N-dimensional vectors given by
v ≡ (I − Ω′)−1ζ, (1.6)
vR ≡ −(I1 − I2Ω)′v, (1.7)
where I1 and I2 are constants.
13
Hence, the equilibrium value of the aggregate output is a log-linear function of the pro-
13I1 is a diagonal matrix with diagonal values α + (1 − α) (1−θi)R̄[(1−θi)R̄+θi] . I2 is a diagonal matrix with
diagonal values (1−θi)R̄
[(1−θi)R̄+θi]
. Refer to Appendix A.2.3 for detail. The log deviation of the firm output (mi)
from steady state level is also presented in Appendix A.2.3.
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ductivities and borrowing costs in the economy. The coefficients for these shocks are the
influence vectors . The influence vectors capture how firm-level changes in productivity and
borrowing costs propagate to other firms and ultimately affect aggregate output. The in-
fluence vector of productivity is v, which is similar to the influence vector presented in
the existing network literature (e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Bigio and La’O (2013)).14
Nonetheless, the influence vector of the borrowing fee is vR, which is different from the con-
ventional influence vector v. Moreover, each element vi of v corresponds to the well-known
notion of Bonacich centrality (e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2015b)), which captures the systemic
importance of a firm’s productivity. Accordingly, I define each element vRi of v
R as financial
centrality , which captures the systemic importance of a firm’s financial condition.
Notably, the last term in the bracket (I2Ω) attenuates the impact of the borrowing con-
dition of upstream sectors on the aggregate output; the term is positive when θ 6= 1 ∀i,
and disappears when θ = 1 ∀i. This term exists because of the financial frictions in trade
and financial linkages among firms. It is a decreasing function of θi, and is maximized at
θi = 0. In economies with small θi, the financial condition of downstream sectors has a
stronger impact on the aggregate economy and is more important systemically than that of
the upstream sectors. This feature is also related to the fact that the upstream propagation
of financial shocks is strong in the network model.
14Remarkably, the influence vector cannot be equal to the vector of equilibrium shares of sales when there
is market imperfection, i.e. vi 6= pimi∑N
j=1 pjmj
. This result is consistent with Hulten (1978) and Bigio and La’O
(2013).
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1.2.3 Conclusions to be drawn from the simple model
In the case of a simple network model with financial frictions and trade credit, then, it
is to be noted that financial constraint generates a strongly negative impact on aggregate
output. Moreover, depending on the level of financial frictions in trade, the propagation
of financial shocks could be either upstream or downstream.15 In particular, I want to
call attention to the fact that financial frictions in trade and financial linkages of firms
can generate strong upstream propagation of financial shocks. Supply shocks, by contrast,
always propagate downstream, and demand shocks always propagate upstream, regardless
of the level of financial frictions in trade (as discussed in Appendix A.2.2).
While my prediction of the propagation of supply and demand shocks is consistent with
the empirical findings in the existing literature (like Shea (2002), Acemoglu et al. (2015a)),
the question remains regarding which propagation pattern of financial shocks is actually
revealed in the data, so I will take up this question in the next section.
1.3 Empirical Findings
In what follows, I present my primary empirical findings on the propagation of financial
shocks.
1.3.1 Upstream versus downstream
A theoretical model could offer a precise prediction for the form of the propagation of shocks,
though the direction taken by shocks would remain unclear in the data, because firm i could
15Effects propagate only downstream when there are no financial frictions in trade, and only upstream
when there is a working capital requirement on all intermediate inputs; propagation occurs in both directions
when trade credit is between 0 and 1.
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be both a supplier and a customer of firm j. The concepts of the upstream and downstream
propagation, as well as the relative upstreamness and downstreamness of a firm, therefore
need to be defined within the context of a more general network structure.
To begin with, (1 − αi)ωij captures the amount of j used as an input in producing $1
worth of i output as mentioned in the Section 1.2.2. Thus, the input-output matrix Ω (in
Equation 1.5) only captures the direct use of inputs in the production network. Instead, the
n-step indirect use of inputs can be captured by Ωn. Thus, the geometric summations of Ω
reflect both the direct and indirect use of one product for the production of another product.
I define this quantity by
H ≡ Ω(I − Ω)−1, (1.8)
with entry denoted by hij. It also equals Ω times the Leontief inverse of the economy.
Therefore, hij presents the total use (or demand) of j for the production of i. It is closely
related to the downstream impact from j to i. hij is used in the next subsection to construct
a measure of shocks transmitted downstream.
Meanwhile, Ω̂ is the matrix with entries (1 − αi)ω̂ij, where ω̂ij ≡ ωij pimipjmj , that denotes
sales from j to i normalized by sales of industry j. The matrix
Ĥ ≡ Ω̂(I − Ω̂)−1 (1.9)
has entries ĥij, which variable captures the total supply from j to i. It is closely related to
the upstream impact from i to j. ĥij is used to construct a measure of shocks transmitted




j hij captures the total usage of intermediate inputs for the production
of i. The larger the value of hi, the further downstream the firm is in the network. ĥi =
∑
j ĥji
captures the total supply of intermediate input i. The larger ĥi is, the further upstream the
firm is located in the network.
1.3.2 Empirical approach
The propagation of financial shocks is assessed using a method that compares the relative
strength of upstream versus downstream propagation in a manner similar to the method





mm̃it−1 + εit, (1.10)
where i indexes sub-sectors, εit is an error term. ∆mit is sectoral output change. UPit
and DOWNit stand for shocks working through the network. Specifically, UPit measures
the shocks to an industry’s customers that flow up the production chain, while DOWNit
measures the shocks to suppliers of an industry that flow down the production chain. These








hij · shockjt. (1.12)
Thus, UPit is a measure of shocks to the customers of industry i that is weighted according
to the entry of Ĥ. DOWNit is a measure of shocks to suppliers of industry i that is weighted
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likewise according to the entry of H. shockit is the idiosyncratic part of the financial shock.
The focus of this regression is βup and βdown.
I lag variables related to financial shocks on the right hand side of Equation 1.10 in order
to avoid concerns about contemporaneous joint determination.16 In my baseline results, I
allow only a single lag of the dependent variable. I controlled for additional lags in robustness
checks.
1.3.3 Data sources
The industry-level data for manufacturing was obtained from the Industrial Production Index
by the Federal Reserve Board of the United States. This index reports the level of production
for the period 1986-2015 on a monthly basis. Changes in industrial production (∆mit) are
measured at different frequencies (such as monthly, quarterly or biannually). Here I utilize
the data at the 4-digit NAICS level.
To measure the linkages among industries (hij, ĥji), I use the Input-Output Table created
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This table reports the usages of industry i’s output
in industry j’s production, as well as the direct usage of industry i’s output in the final
consumption.
TRACE (the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine) collects corporate bond tick data
from 2002 to 2015, and this dataset is used to measure idiosyncratic financial shocks at the
sectoral level (shockit). The first step in doing so was to normalize the data to a monthly
frequency tied to the last observation of each month. Industry-specific financial shocks are
calculated using TRACE data of bond yields that are measured as the mean of bond yield
16The bias in the panel regression is not strong in this case, given my sample size.
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changes by industries. In the second step, I regress monthly sectoral bond yield changes on
Federal Funds rate change and Aaa bond index change; the residual of this regression is the
instrument of sectoral idiosyncratic financial shocks.
1.3.4 Empirical results
My primary empirical results are presented in Table 1.2. Regression (1) reports the results
of Equation 1.10 at the biannual frequency. Regressions (2) and (3) are event studies of
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, carried out as cross section regressions. Notably, regression
(3) controls for demand and supply shocks to each sector.17 εdemand2008 represents demand
side shocks that came from sectoral output changes of an industry’s customers in 2008.
εsupply2008 represents supply side shocks that come from sectoral output changes by an industry’s
suppliers in the same year. Regressions with different frequencies and robustness checks are
reported in Appendix A.3.2.18
Clearly, upstream effects that come from financial shocks to an industry’s customers
strongly influence the output of the focal sector. Downstream effects that come from financial
shocks to an industry’s suppliers, on the other hand, are less significant.19 According to
regression (3), a 1% increase in one sector’s bond yield generates a -0.45% change in that
17Ideally, supply and demand side shocks should be controlled in the regression. However, sectoral level
supply and demand side shocks remain unavailable for all sectors in the economy or at frequencies higher
than yearly. I constructed εdemandit =
∑
j hij∆outputjt as instruments for supply shocks and ε
supply
it =∑
j ĥji∆outputjt as instruments for demand shocks. ∆outputjt is constructed based on the yearly change
in sectoral output at the 4-digit NAICS level using the total commodity output in the BEA Input-Output
table.
18Regression 1.10 with different frequencies is presented in Table A.3. Also, cross section regressions with
dependent variables that have been measured at different horizons are reported in Table A.4. Lastly, as an
index of robustness, Table A.5 reports the regression results with additional lags of independent variables.
19On the financial side, Hertzel et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence that firms’ equity price returns
respond to events affecting their customers and suppliers, such as bankruptcy filings. Specifically, customers
of firms that file for bankruptcy generally do not experience a contagion effect, while suppliers of such firms
do. This result is in line with my empirical finding on the real activities.
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Table 1.2: UP vs. DOWN
Panel Cross Section
biannual (2003.01-2014.12) 6 months after Lehman Bankruptcy
(1) (2) (3)
UPi -0.0929** -0.3042*** -0.1724**
[0.0441] [0.0733] [0.0695]
DOWNi 0.1645 -0.1969 -0.0635
[0.1687] [0.2715] [0.2550]






∆mit−1 0.0891* 0.6062*** 0.5047***
[0.0502] [0.0543] [0.0607]
Time Fixed Effect X
Sector Fixed Effect X
Observations 1357 61 61
# of sectors 59 - -
Note: ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
respectively. (1) Panel regression reports standard errors clustered by sector and
are unweighted. Independent variables are lagged by one period. Two sectors are
dropped due to high serial correlation between UPit and DOWNit. In cross section
regressions (2) and (3), dependent variable is the sectoral output change 6 months
after Lehman’s collapse (i.e. from 2008.09 to 2009.02). Independent variables are the
respective changes of each variable 3-month after Lehman’s collapse (i.e. from 2008.09
to 2008.11). εdemandi,2008 and ε
supply
i,2008 are measured using commodity output changes from
the end of 2007 to the end of 2008.
sector’s output. A 1% increase in the bond yield of one sector’s customers would impact the
focal sector’s output by -0.17%.
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1.4 A General Network Model With Trade Credit
Section 1.2 explains that financial shocks can propagate both upstream and downstream
in an economy with production and trade credit networks. Notably, financial frictions in
trade and financial linkages of firms are key elements in my model to generate upstream
propagation. However, the relative strength of upstream versus downstream propagation
depends on parameters. In Section 1.3, I find that the upstream propagation of financial
shocks is stronger than the downstream propagation in reality. In this section, I am ready to
build a general network model that can capture this pattern quantitatively, and then use it as
a laboratory to understand the credit policy. Specifically, I consider a DSGE model with an
input-output structure in which firms are linked financially. This section illustrates one way
to incorporate financial frictions and the trade credit network into a dynamic input-output
model that can be used to calibrate and study the U.S. economy in Section 5.
The input-output structure of the model follows that of Long and Plosser (1983) and
Acemoglu et al. (2012). The financial friction is introduced through the working capital
requirements of the production sector. The financial intermediaries that face endogenously
determined balance sheet constraints follow the framework of Gertler and Karadi (2011).
Furthermore, firms are connected financially through the trade credit network, as discussed
by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Figure 1.2 illustrates the economic structure assumed by
this chapter. The solid grey arrows represent the flow of goods while the dashed red arrows
represent the flow of capital. Different from a representative or horizontal economy, the
economy studied in this chapter has an input-output structure and financial linkages of
firms (represented by the thick grey arrow and the thick red arrow).
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1.4.1 Intermediate goods firms.
There are N sectors in the economy. Each sector produces one type of product. Firms
within each sector are homogeneous and competitive. The intermediate goods are consumed
by other firms within and across sectors, and are used by wholesalers. Each sector produces













where zit denotes technology, ξit denotes the quality of capital. mij,t denotes the amount
of product j used by sector i. The exponent ωij denotes the share of good j in the total
intermediate input use of sector i. Assume constant returns to scale αi + βi + γi = 1 and∑
j ωij = 1. Up to now, I have presented a standard input-output network model. I will now
introduce the working capital requirement and financial frictions into this model.
At the end of period t, an intermediate goods firm acquires capital kit from the capital
market i for the production in period t+1. The firm issues Sit claims equal to kit, and prices
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each claim at the capital price of Qit in order to acquire funds for capital from financial
intermediaries at the beginning of the period. Thus, the total amount of funds obtained for
the capital purchase is Qitkit, which equals QitSit. Given that firms earn zero profits, firms
resell the capital to the capital market and pay out the ex-post return to capital and the
sales of capital to the financial intermediaries at the end of period t+ 1. Accordingly, the
stochastic return of a given financial intermediary’s investment on a capital asset of firm i
is,
Rik,t+1 = ξi,t+1
ui,t+1 +Qit+1 − δ
Qit
, (1.14)
where ui,t+1 is the capital utilization rate at period t+1, δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
Assume that the replacement price of the depreciated capital is unity, so the value of the
capital stock after production is (Qit+1 − δ)ξit+1kit.
Furthermore, I assume that firms dealing in intermediate goods face a working capital
requirement on labor and intermediate inputs. In particular, the labor expenditure and the
intermediate input purchases need to be paid in full in advance of production. Firms therefore
need additional banking credit. They do so via loans Lit from banks at the beginning of
period t, which pays a non-contingent interest rate RiLt at the beginning of period t. I
simplify the model by further assuming that there is no friction in the process of obtaining
funds. There is no information friction or moral hazard problems between firms and banks.
Additionally, suppliers provide liquidity to their customers in the form of trade credit.
Firms in sector i only need to pay (1−θi)pjtmijt to their suppliers in sector j at the beginning
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of period t and to clear their accounts payable θipjtmijt at the end of period t.
20
Moreover, I introduce a flexible trade credit adjustment feature into the model. Firm i
could adjust its level of accounts-payable θij while supplier j takes θij as a given.
21 Nonethe-
less, there is a quadratic trade credit adjustment cost
C(θij, θ̄i) = ς(θij − θ̄i)2 (1.15)
per dollar unit of input purchases, where θ̄i is the steady state trade credit of firms in sector
i. The cost is zero when θij = θ̄i. ς controls the size of the cost. Trade credit adjustment is
more flexible when ς is small (i.e. ∂C/∂ς > 0).


























Φit is the Lagrangian multiplier and corresponds to the marginal benefit of producing one
unit of product. The total working capital requirement for intermediate inputs is
∑N
j=1(1−
θijt)pijtmijt. Equivalently, firms in sector i also receive (1− θjit)pjitmjit from their customers
20As discussed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), a supply contract and a debt contract between two trading
parties are bundled together. The deferment of part of the purchase can be considered as customers borrowing
from suppliers. Alternatively, the suppliers borrow from customers because they are paid something in
advance of product delivery. In this model, I simply assume that all firms are produced simultaneously and
that products are delivered simultaneously in the network. The distinctions between borrower and lender
are not important for my argument.
21It is well observed in reality that customers have stronger bargaining power on trade credit.
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in sector j at the beginning of t and have account receivables θjitpjitmjit. The total working
capital gain from trade is
∑N
j=1(1 − θjit)pjitmjit. Firms are linked through production and
trade credit networks.
Managers make two-step decisions. Initially, they decide the level of trade credit for each
intermediate input purchase, θijt. They then choose {lit,mijt,mjit, yit} given {θijt, θjit}. A
firm’s problem is solved through backward induction.
The first-order conditions of the problem that occurs in the context of the second choosing
step are,
∂mjit : pjit[(1− θjit)RiLtθjit] = Φit (1.17)
∂lit : αiΦitmit = wlitRiLt (1.18)
∂mijt : [(1− θijt)RiLt + θijt] pijtmijt = Φitγiωijmit (1.19)
∂yit : Φit = pit (1.20)
Notably, pijt = pjt/[(1− θijt)RjLt + θijt]. The price of product j purchased by sector i, pijt,
depends on θijt. The higher the trade credit, the more expensive the product price becomes.
Producers naturally value early payments, and a manager, recognizing this, chooses trade
credit level θijt in the first step so as to minimize the unit intermediate input cost. The trade-
off for adjusting trade credit is as follows. The benefit of increasing θijt is the reduction of
banking loans and interest costs. The cost of increasing θijt is the increase in intermediate
input price pijt given that ∂pijt/∂θijt > 0. There is moreover a trade credit adjustment cost
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per dollar purchases, C(θijt, θ̄i). Thus, the manager solves the following problem,
min
θijt
[(1− θijt)RiLt + θijt] pijt + C(θijt, θ̄i)pijt
s.t. pijt = pjt/[(1− θijt)RjLt + θijt]
Therefore, the optimal level of trade credit is,





θijt = θ̄i, when Rit = Rjt.
Further, trade credit is more sensitive to the relative financial condition of the two trading
parties when ς is low. In the extreme case that ς = 0, trade credit becomes fully flexible.
Under these conditions, θijt = 1 when RiLt > RjLt and θijt = 0 when RiLt < RjLt.
Proposition 4. Trading parties share liquidity through the trade credit mechanism. θijt is
an increasing function of RiLt and a decreasing function of RjLt. Sectoral correlation is high
when trade credit adjustment is flexible.
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When firm i finds that bank loans are becoming costly, it increases trade credit. When its
suppliers are suffering financially, firm i shrinks its accounts-payable. This finding provides
a theoretical foundation on the fact that financially distressed firm may postpone repaying
trade credit to its suppliers and reduce the provision of trade credit to its customers as
discussed in the introduction. This response consistent with the finding by Gao (2014) that
trade credit plays an important role as an inter-firm financing channel by allowing firms
to share liquidity with each other. It is also in line with the empirical finding that an
increase in the use of trade credit along the product chain that links two sectors results in an
increase in correlation between them (Raddatz (2008)). In addition, this model predicts that
sectoral correlation is even higher when trade credit adjustment is flexible. An idiosyncratic
liquidity shock could thus spill over to surrounding firms vigorously. If one firm has a
liquidity problem, its accounts-payable would increase. Consequently, the financial stress is
transmitted to its suppliers.
1.4.2 Retailers and wholesale firms.
Wholesale firms in the economy produce wholesale product Ywt, which is a composite of the












where yit is the amount of products produced by sector i and used in the production of
wholesale goods. ζi governs the share of output i used in the production of final goods.
Consumption goods are sold by a set of monopolistically competitive retailers uniformly
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distributed from 0 to 1, who can costlessly differentiate the single final good assembled by
wholesale firms. One unit of wholesale output Yw is required to make a unit of retail output











where Yrt is the retail output of retailer r. Retailers face nominal rigidities following Calvo
model. They could freely adjust their price with probability 1− γ each period; the problem























Thus, the innovation of the aggregate price level is,
P 1−εt = (1− γ)P ∗1−εrt + γ(Pt−1)1−ε. (1.22)
1.4.3 Capital producer.
At the end of period t, competitive capital producers in each sector buy capital from their
respective capital markets, and repair and build new capital. Capital producers make new
capital using input of final output and are subject to adjustment costs. They sell new capital















Thus, the price of capital goods is equal to the marginal cost of investment goods production
as follows,


















The capital innovation is:
kit = e
ψit(1− δ)ki,t−1 + Iit.
1.4.4 Households.
There is a continuum of identical households with a fraction 1−u of workers and a fraction u
of bankers. Over time, an individual switch between a worker and a banker with probability
(1− τ). In other words, a banker at time t stays as a banker at time t+ 1 with probability
τ .
Workers supply labor lt to the production sector and return their wages to households.
Bankers manage financial intermediaries and transfer profits back to households. Households
consume Ct and save. They save by depositing funds in banks or by purchasing government
debt. Both deposits and government debt are one-period riskless assets that pay the real
return of Rt. I consider these two assets perfect substitutes and denote them by Bt. The













The budget constraint they face is,
Ct = wtlt + Πt + Tt +Rt−1Bt−1 −Bt, (1.25)
where wt is real wage, lt denotes the aggregate labor and equals
∑
i lit in equilibrium, Πt
represents profits distributed from bankers and capital producing firms, Tt represents gov-
ernment transfers. Let %t denotes the marginal utility of consumption. Denote the stochastic
discount factor Λt,t+1 ≡ %t+1%t .
1.4.5 Financial intermediaries.
The structure of financial intermediaries generally follows that of Gertler and Karadi (2011),
but with the following modifications. Financial intermediaries (banks) are segmented into
N groups. Each production sector i is connected to a unique banking group i. Hence, banks
of group i cannot finance firms in sector j 6= i.22 I further assume that there is no lending
among banks. Each period, banks use their own net worth Nit and the deposit Bit from
households in order to finance their purchases of financial claims Sit and loans Lit. The
intermediary balance sheet of banks in group i is,
QitSit + Lit = Nit +Bit. (1.26)
The return of Sit is realized by the end of period t+ 1 with a stochastic return Rikt+1. Lit is
matured by the end of period t with a non-contingent return RiLt . Also, banks pay a non-
22This is consistent with the finding by Chodorow-Reich (2014) that bank-borrower relationships are
sticky.
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contingent return Rt to households at period t+ 1. Their net worth then evolves according
to
Nit+1 = Rik,t+1QitSit +RiL,tLit −RtBit (1.27)




(1− τ)τ jβj+1Λt,t+1+j(Ni,t+1+j), (1.28)
given that the probability of a banker becoming a worker in the next period is (1−τ). For the
intermediary to operate, the risk premium must be positive, i.e. Etβ
iΛt,t+1(Rikt+1+i−Rt+i) ≥
0 and Etβ
iΛt,t+1(RiLt+i−Rt+i) ≥ 0. However, in order to prohibit intermediaries expanding
their assets indefinitely when risk premium is positive, I introduce the following incentive
constraint,
Vit ≥ λi(QitSit + Lit). (1.29)
Bankers will lose their expected terminal wealth Vit if they divert assets, while their gain
from such an action is λi(QitSit + Lit).
The binding incentive constraint in equilibrium implies that the leverage ratio (QitSit+Lit
Nit
)
denoted by φit equals,
φit =
ηit
λi − ditνkit − (1− dit)νlit
, (1.30)
with
νkit = Et[(1− τ)βΛt,t+1(Rik,t+1 −Rt) + βΛt,t+1τxkit,t+1νkit+1],
νlit = Et[(1− τ)βΛt,t+1(RiLt −Rt) + βΛt,t+1τxlit,t+1νlit+1],
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the gross growth rate in assets between t and t+j, and zit,t+j ≡ Nit+jNit is the gross growth rate
of net worth. νit is the expected discounted marginal gain that a unit enjoys by expanding its
assets, when net worth remains constant, and is an increasing function of the risk premium.
ηit is the expected discounted value of having an additional unit of net worth, when the asset
remains constant. As derived in Appendix A.4.3, the first order conditions of the problem
facing banks imply the no-arbitrage condition,
Et(Ht,t+1Rik,t+1) = Et(Ht,t+1)RiLt,
where Ht,t+1 = βΛt,t+1[(1 − τ) + τ(νkit+1dit+1φit+1 + νlit+1(1 − dit+1)φit+1 + ηit+1)]. The
evolution of bankers’ net worth can be expressed as,
Nit = [(Rikt −Rt−1)dit−1φit−1 + (RiLt−1 −Rt−1)(1− dit−1)φit−1 +Rt−1]Nit−1. (1.31)
Notably, the sensitivity of Nit to the excess return is increasing in the leverage ratio φit−1.
Therefore, φi is an important factor affecting the sectoral sensitivity to financial shocks.
The total net worth of bankers in group i includes the net worth of existing bankers Niet
together with the net worth of new bankers Nint,
Nit = Neit +Nnit,
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where Neit = τ [(Rikt − Rt−1)dit−1φit−1 + (RiLt−1 − Rt−1)(1 − dit−1)φit−1 + Rt−1]Nit−1. A
financial shock represents an unexpected contraction of the existing bankers’ net worth.
Assuming further that a fraction of ωi/(1 − τ) of the total assets of exiting bankers
((1− τ)(QitSit−1 + Lit−1)) is transferred to new bankers, I have
Nnit = ωi(QitSit−1 + Lit−1).
1.4.6 Monetary policy and government expenditure
Monetary policy follows a simple Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing. The nominal
interest rate follows,
it = (1− ρ)[i+ κππt + κy(log Yt − log Y ∗t )] + ρit−1 + εit, (1.32)
where i denotes the steady state nominal rate, πt represents inflation and Y
∗
t is the natural
level of output.
Government expenditure G is financed by lump sum taxes.
1.4.7 Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium in the general model is defined as follows:
A competitive equilibrium consists of a collection of quantities {mit,mijt, yit, lit, lt, kit, θijt, Ywt,
Yt, Iit Ct, Gt, Sit, Nit, Neit, Nnit, Lit, } and a sequence of prices {Rik,t, RiL,t, Rt, it, Qit, pit, pijt, Pwt,
πt, wt, } for i ∈ {1, ..., N} and j ∈ {1, ..., N}, such that
1. Intermediate firms maximize profits (1.16). Capital producers maximize profit (1.23).
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Wholesalers and retailers maximize profits.
2. Households maximize utility (1.24).
3. Financial intermediaries maximize expected wealth (1.28).
4. Goods, labor, capital and credit markets clear.




I have calibrated the general model using the U.S. data at the 2-digit NAICS level. I exclude
the governmental sector, as well as the finance and insurance subsectors from the FIRE
(finance, insurance and real estate) sector.23
Conventional Parameters. Conventional parameters (such as the discount factor and the
Calvo parameter) follow the calibration by Gertler and Karadi (2011) and are listed in Table
1.3.
Input-output Structure, Labor, Capital, Intermediate Input Share, and Final Output Share.
The input-output structure ωij is calibrated using the BEA input-output table. Labor share
αi, capital share βi and intermediate input share γi are listed in Table 1.4. αi and βi are
23The objective of the government is not profit maximization. The finance and insurance firms cannot
be formulated by the production problem presented in Section 4 because their investment strategies and
balance sheet composites are complicated. Moreover, the trade credit of these two types of firms is not the
same as that of goods producers.
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calibrated using the BEA GDP by Industry Value-added Components Table (1998-2013) and
the calibration method follows Su (2014) (refer to Appendix A.4.5).
Banking Parameters. ωi (the proportional transfer to the entering bankers) and λi (the
fraction of capital that can be diverted) are calibrated to match φi (the leverage of each
sector) and RiL (the banking lending rate). I assume the steady state RiL to be identical
across sectors.24 It is calibrated to hit the steady state credit spread. The leverage level of
each sector is measured using the Compustat Data, which is listed in Table 1.4. The survival
rate of bankers τ adopts the value set by Gertler and Karadi (2011), which hits the average
horizon of bankers within a given decade.
Trade credit. The trade credit level θij corresponds to accounts-payable over cost of
goods sold.25 Table A.1 in Appendix A.1 presents accounts-payable over cost of goods sold
from all sectors, based on Compustat data (measured as the median of each sector in each
time period, and averaged from 2000 to 2014).26 Additionally, the Quarterly Financial
Report (QFR) collects quarterly aggregate statistics on the financial results and positions
of U.S. corporations. QFR is more comprehensive than Compustat, but it only covers four
industry sectors, mining, manufacturing, wholesale and retail. All four of these measures
of the standardized trade credit are relatively stable over the QFR sample period (2000q4-
2014q4) as presented in Table A.2 in Appendix A.1.27 Moreover, these measures using QFR
data approximate the measures using Compustat data (compare Table A.1 and Table A.2).
24No strong empirical evidence shows that sectoral interest rates differ significantly in the long run.
25Although accounts-payable is a stock variable, it is close to its flow value because the length of the
trade credit period is generally less than a quarter. I obtained accounts-payable and cost of goods sold from
quarterly financial reports.
26The financial and insurance sectors have accounts payable over cost of goods sold at a level of 60. The
balance sheets of these financial sectors are complicated, and the definition of accounts-payable in those
sectors differs from that used in other production sectors.
27I standardize accounts payable and accounts receivable based on total sales and total assets.
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Therefore, I calibrate θ̄i using the Compustat measure. The trade credit adjustment cost
ς is estimated to match the standard deviation of accounts payable over total sales in the
QFR data.
1.5.2 The propagation of financial shocks
Before calibrating the model completely, I would like first to compare the propagation of
financial shocks predicted by the model with my empirical findings.





Factors that are specific to certain firms, such as intermediate input share, capital share,
leverage and trade credit, all have strong impacts on the sensitivity of these firms’ output to
shocks. In order to focus on the propagation effect along the production chain, I simulate a
9-firm circle network model. Firm i uses intermediate inputs i − 1 (as illustrated in Figure
1.3). The only difference among the firms is their relative location along the supply chain.
A symmetric network model allows me to focus on the propagation effect of shocks in the
model. I calibrate the economy using the parameters in Table 1.3 and the average labor
share, capital share, trade credit and leverage ratios in the U.S. economy (as presented in
the last row of Table 1.4).28
I impose an unexpected banking net worth shock to bankers linked to Firm 5, εNe5,




β 0.99 discount rate
h 0.815 habit parameter
φ 0.276 inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply
χ 3.4108 relative utility weight of labor
ηI 1.728 investment adjustment cost
γ 0.779 probability of keeping price fixed
κπ 1.5 inflation coefficient of the taylor rule
κy 0.5/4 output gap coefficient of the taylor rule
G/Y 0.2 steady state proportion of government expenditures
unconventional parameters
θ 0.972 survival rate of bankers
ς 0.1 trade credit adjustment cost
Table 1.4: Sectoral level parameters
sector labor share capital share intermediate share final share trade credit leverage
αi βi γi ζi θ̄i φi
Agriculture 0.24 0.18 0.58 0.01 0.43 1.70
Mining 0.23 0.39 0.37 0.01 1.00 1.53
Utility 0.17 0.41 0.42 0.02 0.49 3.24
Construction 0.39 0.13 0.48 0.07 0.43 2.35
Manufacturing 0.20 0.16 0.64 0.21 0.49 1.50
Wholesale 0.37 0.33 0.31 0.04 0.44 2.30
Retail 0.41 0.27 0.32 0.10 0.42 1.99
Transportation 0.35 0.16 0.50 0.02 0.30 2.33
Information 0.25 0.30 0.45 0.04 0.64 1.58
real estate 0.24 0.48 0.28 0.15 0.64 2.27
PBS 0.50 0.13 0.37 0.06 0.37 1.53
Education 0.53 0.08 0.40 0.17 0.25 1.77
Arts 0.38 0.18 0.44 0.07 0.21 1.92
Other services 0.49 0.13 0.38 0.04 0.37 2.33
Average 0.33 0.45 0.22 - 0.45 2.00
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namely a contraction of the existing bankers’ net worth Ne5; specifically, I assume that their
net worth declines by one percent and that the decline is transferred to households. One
immediate consequence is a rise in the cost of borrowing (R5Lt) for Firm 5. The borrowing
costs of other firms in the economy are also affected. This negative financial shock impacts
the outputs of all firms, 5 included.
Table 1.5: Model vs. data: the propagation of financial shocks
Data Model
UPi,t=0 -0.1724** -0.1979***
DOWNi,t=0 -0.0635 -0.1294 ***
Shocki,t=0 -0.4469** -0.4360***
Notes: ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1% levels. The
dependent variable is the first 6-month output change m̃i,t=6m
after the shock. Shocki,t=0 is the borrowing cost RiL change
upon the impact of εNe5. UPi,t=0 and DOWNi,t=0 follow Equa-
tions 1.11 and 1.12. The first column copies regression result
(3) in Table 1.2.
I run regression 1.10 using the simulated data. The primary result is presented in Table
1.5. In the regression, the dependent variable represents the change in each firm’s output six
months after the shock.29 The independent variables are the loan rate change at the moment
the shock is felt Shocki,t=0 = R̃iL,t=0, the shocks transmitted from customers UPi,t=0 =∑
j ĥjiR̃jL,t=0 and the shocks transmitted from suppliers DOWNi,t=0 =
∑
j hijR̃jL,t=0. In
general, my model performs reasonably well with respect to the impact of the interest rate
shock and the propagation of shocks in the production network.
29Regression results of the simulated data at different horizons are presented in Table A.6 in Appendix
A.4.6.
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1.5.3 The role of trade credit
As discussed in Section 1.4, there is evidence that firms share liquidity with surrounding
firms through trade credit in the real economy. Consequently, trade credit increases output
correlation among firms in the production network. The general model captures this pattern
in the following way. Figure 1.4 plots the output correlation among firms against the level of
trade credit adjustment cost using data simulated from the circle model with idiosyncratic
banking network shocks εNei . The output correlation of firms and the level of trade credit
adjustment cost vary inversely to one another: the more flexible the trade credit adjustment,
the higher the output correlation among firms. The trade credit adjustment mechanism
therefore amplifies the propagation of idiosyncratic financial shocks.
Figure 1.4: Firm output correlation
Trade Credit Adjustment Cost Index &







1.5.4 Amplification effect of the network structure
After confirming that the general model could capture empirical patterns presented in Section
1.3, I proceed to calibrate the model fully using the 14-sector data in Table 1.4. I begin by
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comparing the network model with a representative firm model. Consider a representative
firm model with the same type of financial frictions described in Section 1.4. The parameters
in this economy are calibrated using data in Table 1.3 and the last row of Table 1.4. As
illustrated in Figure 1.5, the sensitivity of aggregate variables to shocks is very different in
these two types of economies. Figure 1.5 plots the impulse responses of aggregate output
Y , consumption C, investment I and premium (E(Rik)−R) after an aggregate banking net
worth Ne shock, an aggregate technology shock z, a capital quality shock ξ and monetary
policy shock i.30 Ne shock is an unanticipated negative 1% reduction in the existing banker’s
net worth within each sector. The technology z shock is a negative 1% innovation in TFP
of each sector, which is an AR1 process with autocorrelation 0.95. ξ shock is a negative 1%
change in capital quality of each sector and is AR1 with autocorrelation 0.66. Monetary
policy i shock is an unanticipated 10 basis-point increase in the short-term interest rate.
Remarkably, the input-output structure generates an amplification effect on the aggregate
impact of shocks. Compared with a representative firm model (indicated by the dashed black
line), a network economy (indicated by the solid red line) is more responsive to all manner
of shocks. Consider, for example, an aggregate banking net worth shock: the responses of
the premium (E(Rk) − R) in these two types of models are not significantly different from
each other. Because the financial intermediaries have the same type of horizontal structure
in these two models, a uniform contraction of Ne impacts the interest rate Rk and RL
through the same mechanism within each banking sector. Consequently, the responses of
the premium are similar. Nonetheless, the response of Y in the network model is more than
30(E(Rk) − R) is calculated as the average premium across sectors; I is the total investment in the
economy.
45
two times stronger than it is in a representative firm model. Unlike bankers, firms in the
network economy are interconnected. The input-output linkages among firms amplify the
negative impact of the high borrowing cost and the liquidity shock. Similarly, the technology
or capital quality shocks propagate upstream and downstream in the production network and
ultimately affect aggregate output. The network structure amplifies the aggregate impact of
the shock.
1.6 Credit Policy Implication
Suppose that, during a severe financial crisis, a policymaker is willing to facilitate lending.
Let Spit and L
p
it be the value of assets intermediated by the financial intermediaries, and let S
g
it
and Lgit be the value of assets intermediated by the government. Under these circumstances,











To facilitate lending, the policymaker issues government debt to households that pay the
riskless rate Rt, and it lends funds to non-financial firms at the banking credit rate RiLt.
For the policymaker, unlike for the financial intermediaries, there are no frictions on issuing
debt and purchasing private assets. Whereas there are N types of assets according to the
issuing sector, the policymaker is flexible in targeting liquidities. The policymaker could
then either lend funds to all sectors proportionally (according to their market size), or could
target liquidity to specific sectors. The total value of assets intermediated by the government
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Figure 1.5: Aggregate variables response to banking net worth (Ne), technology (z), capital
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Suppose the credit policy follows that




t = −ϑεNet , (1.34)
where ϑ is a constant and εNet is the banking net worth shock. Accordingly, the total value
of assets intermediated by the policymaker would be proportional to the contraction of the
banking net worth, and CPt follows an AR1 process. Moreover, following Gertler and Karadi
(2011), this central bank intermediation involves the loss of efficiency; specifically, there is
an efficiency cost of o for every unit of central bank credit that is supplied.
I compare credit policies by targeting liquidity to different sectors. Let ỸCPoni denote the
aggregate output change after an aggregate financial shock (Ne shock) and a sector-specific
credit policy shock (i.e. CPt = CPit, CPjt = 0,∀j 6= i). The comparison of ỸCPoni across i
makes clear which sector i the central bank should target with loans during the crisis.
I simulate the model with ϑ = 5% and o = 0.01. Figure 1.6 plots the response of the
aggregate output and the premium after a -1% Ne shock and a credit policy targeting
the real estate sector. Compared with an economy that lacks credit policies, this economy
experiences less output contraction and a smaller premium increase.
Given that government has the ability to target liquidity to different sectors, the question
arises as to which sector or sectors should be treated as priorities following aggregate financial
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Figure 1.6: Aggregate variables response to banking net worth (Ne) and credit policy (CP )
shocks

















Ne shock is a negative 1% change in the banking net worth of each sector. Credit policy is a 5% of the Ne
shock targeting real estate with a quarterly autoregressive factor of 0.8.
Figure 1.7: Responses of sectoral output, YCPoni
(a) Contemporaneous response
Upstreamness




















(b) 2-year cumulative change
Upstreamness




















In panel (a) contemporaneous response, each red dot represents YCPoni upon the impact of the Ne
and credit policy shocks. The real estate dot corresponds the cross point of the red curve with
the y-axis in the left panel of Figure 1.6. In panel (b) 2-year cumulative change, each red dot
represents
∑t=8
t=0 YCPoni,t. The real estate dot corresponds to the size of the pink area in the left
panel of Figure 1.6.
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shocks.31 Figure 1.7 plots ỸCPoni in the short run and in the long run against the relative
upstreamness of each sector.32 It turns out that credit policies have greater impact when
liquidity is supplied to downstream sectors, which is not surprising, given that financial
shocks propagate upstream. Moreover, this result is consistent with Proposition 3 that the
financial condition of the downstream sector is more important systemically.
1.7 Conclusions
This chapter investigates how the interaction between the production network and trade
credit network affect the propagation of financial shocks. Using the U.S. input-output ma-
trix and the bond yield data, I find strong upstream propagation of financial shocks. A 1%
increase in the bond yield of one sector’s customers (weighted by their input-output linkages)
could impact the focal sector’s output by -0.17%. To capture this pattern in an input-output
model, it has been shown to be important to introduce financial friction in trade and inter-
locked balance sheets of trading parties. I have incorporated financial frictions and the trade
credit network into an input-output model and have thereby been able to generate quanti-
tative predictions consistent with my empirical findings. In addition, I have demonstrated
that credit policies have a greater impact when liquidity is supplied to downstream sectors
after an aggregate liquidity shock. For downstream sectors are more important systemically,
given that financial shocks propagate upstream.
31I focus on the credit policy implications after those of aggregate financial shocks, where the liquidity
contraction across sectors is uniformly distributed. In the case of unbalanced financial shocks across sectors,
it is obvious that the policymaker should supply liquidity to sectors that have experienced the strongest
liquidity shock.
32Different measures of the long run change of ỸCPoni have been examined. For example, the scatter plot
of the 10-year cumulative change of ỸCPoni and the upstreamness of sectors behaves in a manner qualitatively
similar to that found in Panel (b) of Figure 1.7. The 2-year cumulative change of ỸCPoni corresponds to the
total size of the pink and green areas in the left panel of Figure 1.6.
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This chapter represents the first theoretical study to introduce a trade credit network
into an input-output model within a general equilibrium framework. Financial market loans
and trade credit are the two most important sources of external finance for firms. Through
the trade credit mechanism, each firm shares liquidity with surrounding firms, and as a
consequence idiosyncratic shocks spread through trade and financial linkages of firms.
My findings here may serve to stimulate further research. Thus, for example, interesting
results might be observed in a model based on a micro-founded trade credit structure. If one
were to allow a trade credit default, a strong liquidity shock to one firm could cause a cascade
of defaults throughout the trade credit network, setting off an avalanche of production failure
and generating a persistent aggregate output contraction. The work discussed here also
suggests that inter-bank lending could play an important role in recovery from idiosyncratic
shocks. In reality, there exists both a complicated production network and an entangled
financial network. An idiosyncratic financial shock not only transfers through the input-
output network, but also spills over in the banking network. It is my hope that this chapter




The Skewness of the Price Change
Distribution: A New Touchstone for
Sticky Price Models
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2.1 Introduction
The dynamics of price changes (when, how, and why firms change the prices of the goods
and services that they sell) have been a major focus of the study of monetary economics for
the past several decades. It is indeed well known that monetary variables have no influence
on real economic activity (monetary neutrality) if all prices can be freely re-set at any point
in time. This has drawn attention to the study of frictions in the price-setting process for a
long time: Barro (1972) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) characterized the pricing behaviour
of a firm that faces a fixed price adjustment cost, while Calvo (1983) did so for a firm facing
the random opportunity to change its price. What has also become well established is that
the distinction between these two approaches in modelling price change dynamics matters
greatly for monetary non-neutrality. While central banks have widely adopted Calvo-style
staggered price setting into the models that they use to evaluate the effects of their policies,
much of the literature has highlighted how this considerably over-states the effectiveness of
monetary policy, compared to what it would be if prices are set based on adjustment (or
menu) costs.
The literature has emphasized that monetary non-neutrality depends not only on how
often prices change, but also crucially on which prices change. Caplin and Spulber (1987)
and especially Golosov and Lucas (2007) demonstrated this by showing that if prices are
sticky because of menu costs, money is close to neutral. These seminal studies showed that
in the presence of menu costs, only relatively large price changes will justify the payment of
the cost and occur at all, which makes the aggregate price level considerably more responsive
to nominal shocks than in the Calvo model. This mechanism came to be known as the
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selection effect, and much research has been devoted to re-evaluating the results of Golosov
and Lucas (2007), and the strength of the selection effect, in light of new empirical findings
established with price micro data sets (most notably, Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) and
Midrigan (2011)).
Understanding the selection effect, and to what extent it plays an important role, is
necessary to determine the true degree of monetary non-neutrality, but this mechanism
cannot be observed directly. It would be very difficult to observe whether the prices that
change are those predicted by the selection effect, so its presence and strength must be
inferred indirectly from observable price change statistics. The existing work in the field has
done this primarily by bringing quantitative price setting models together with the price
data that has become available in the past decade. However, an important limitation with
these studies is that they have, for the most part, only used unconditional moments of the
price change distribution (such as the frequency or size of price changes, averaged over time)
to discipline the models used. In this chapter, we show that conditional moments, which
have been seldom used, are extremely informative and yield new insights on the selection
effect. In particular, we find that the selection effect makes very strong predictions about
how the shape of the price change distribution should change with aggregate inflation. Using
a new data set, the price data underlying the U.S. CPI from 1977 onwards, we show that
these predictions are not supported empirically. Finally, using a flexible model in which the
strength of the selection effect can be freely set, we show that the selection effect has to be
much weaker than assumed by the existing menu cost models to match the empirical facts
that we present. This, in turn, indicates that monetary non-neutrality is higher than these
models predicted, and similar in magnitude to what is predicted by the Calvo model.
54
In menu cost models, the presence of a fixed adjustment cost induces a selection effect:
only price changes that are large enough to justify the cost occur, leaving an inaction region
of changes (centered at zero) that are too small to be justified. A positive monetary shock
(raising nominal demand) will induce prices that were otherwise already strongly mis-aligned
to change, meaning that average price changes would respond relatively strongly to such a
shock. This implies, in turn, that the aggregate price level will be very responsive to monetary
shocks, eliminating much of the effect of the monetary shock on real activity (money is close
to neutral). We exploit the fact that this logic also has strong implications for how the
distribution of price changes responds to such shocks: an inflationary shock will push more
price changes out of the inaction region to the positive side, and into the inaction region from
the negative side. There will therefore be more price changes concentrated on the positive
side of the inaction region, leaving a price change distribution that is less dispersed and
more asymmetric (negatively skewed). Indeed, all existing menu cost models, because of the
selection effect created by the presence of an adjustment cost, imply a very strong negative
correlation between inflation and both dispersion and skewness of price changes, and these
are implications that can be empirically tested.
The literature on sticky prices has faced thus far been unable to test these types of
predictions because the kind of price data that is necessary has only been available for
periods of low and stable inflation. Although some studies (such as Alvarez et al. (2011a);
and Gagnon (2009)) have used price data from countries that experienced high inflation,
they used this data to determine how the frequency of price change behaves at high inflation,
without considering the higher moments of the price change distribution. For the U.S., the
main source of price data in this line of work, the micro data underlying the Consumer
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Price Index, was, until recently, only available going back to 1988 (while other commonly
used data sets go back even less far). However, we use the data set recently presented
in Nakamura et al. (2015), which extends the C.P.I micro data back to 1977, to evaluate
whether the dispersion and skewness of price changes do indeed fall with inflation. Since the
newly recovered period includes the highest inflation episodes in the post-war U.S., as well
as the disinflation period initiated by the Federal Reserve under Paul Volcker, our data set
is particularly well suited for the tests that we propose.
We find that while the dispersion of price changes does go down considerably in high infla-
tion periods, the skewness does not, contrary to the strong predictions of menu cost models.
Since the counter-factual predictions are driven by the mechanism behind the selection ef-
fect, we modify the menu cost model in a way that weakens this mechanism: introducing
random, heterogeneous menu costs that add randomness to whether the firm will have an
opportunity to change its price. We find that if the probability that firms face a very high
menu cost (such that it would almost never choose to change its price) is high, the model
no longer predicts the negative inflation-skewness correlation, while still matching all the
facts matched by previous models. In addition, such a model features a much higher level of
monetary non-neutrality than any of the existing menu cost models: around six times higher
than in a standard menu cost model, and 70% as high as in a Calvo model.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In what remains of the introduction we
provide a more detailed overview of the work done in this branch of the literature. In section
2.2, we present the predictions of a large class of sticky price models, and explain why time-
and state-dependent models give such different predictions. Section 2.3 describes the data set
that we use and evaluates the predictions of the different models based on the data. Section
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2.4 presents the generalized menu cost model, comparing predictions to what is observed in
the data and shows the degree of monetary non-neutrality exhibited by the different models.
Finally, Section 2.5 provides some concluding remarks.
Literature Review
While a few empirical studies of price stickiness in certain industries have been around
for some time (e.g. Cecchetti (1986); Carlton (1986); Kashyap (1995)), it is only starting
with Bils and Klenow (2004) that monetary economists have been able to start measuring
statistics related to price stickiness for the economy as a whole. The facts established by Bils
and Klenow and the subsequent empirical studies on price stickiness (most notably, Klenow
and Kryvtsov (2008); and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008)) have enriched the discussion
on monetary non-neutrality by providing the models that evaluate monetary non-neutrality
with a standard by which to be measured.
Caplin and Spulber (1987)had used a very stylized model to show that if prices are
sticky, state-dependent pricing implies that monetary shocks can still have little or no effect
on economic activity. Golosov and Lucas (2007) then incorporated this mechanism into a
quantitative menu cost model that was calibrated to match the new empirical facts of the
sticky price literature, and they confirmed that under state-dependent pricing, monetary
policy is close to neutral. The model matched the fraction of prices that change (frequency
of price change) estimated by the empirical papers, but also the observation that when prices
do change, the changes tend to be large. Since, under menu costs, firms will only change
their prices when they really need to, and so will not bother incurring a menu cost for a
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small price change, this latter fact in particular lent credibility to the adoption of a menu
cost as the foundation of price stickiness.
Since then, the literature has continued to combine quantitative, micro-founded, price set-
ting models with empirical facts from micro price datasets, and in this way the non-neutrality
debate has advanced. While the Golosov and Lucas model matched the frequency and av-
erage size of price changes, much subsequent work has modified the model to match other
aspects of the distribution of price changes, generally finding that the degree of monetary
non-neutrality predicted ends up being much larger than in the original model (for exam-
ple, Nakamura and Steinsson (2010); Midrigan (2011); Alvarez et al. (2014)). In a slightly
different style, Vavra (2014) showed that the frequency and dispersion of price changes are
counter-cyclical in the U.S., and introduced counter-cyclical dispersion shocks to match this.
With the exception of Vavra (2014), however, the papers mentioned thus far match mo-
ments that are price change statistics averaged across time. Yet all the statistics that they
consider can be computed period by period, as they pertain to a distribution of price changes,
which is observed period by period. Obviously, focusing on averages across time abstracts
from the time series variation in these statistics, which is observed to be quite significant in
the data, and this misses out on potentially informative patterns. Our chapter departs from
most of the existing literature by focusing on the variation of price change statistics over
time to evaluate sticky price models. These models are aimed at understanding how the
dynamic pricing behaviour of firms aggregates up to the response of aggregate inflation to
monetary shocks. A natural way to use the time series variation of price stickiness statistics
is therefore to see how they co-move with inflation, both in models and empirically. How-
ever, as mentioned earlier in this section, most existing studies have faced the limitation of
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working with price data sets that only cover periods of low and stable inflation. It is in this
way that our data set is novel, as it makes it possible to measure price stickiness statistics
at high and low inflation.
Nevertheless, evaluating sticky price models with this kind of time series variation is not
unprecedented. For example, Gagnon (2009) and Alvarez et al. (2011a) use price data from
high inflation episodes in Mexico and Argentina, respectively, to show that the frequency of
price change rises with inflation. This fact is consistent with menu cost models, but it goes
against the core assumption of the Calvo pricing model, that firms face a constant probability
of changing their prices over time. Our chapter confirms this result, but documents more
patterns based on other statistics that paint a more nuanced picture. While the relation
between the frequency of price change and inflation provides strong evidence against the
strict assumptions of the Calvo model, changes in the shape of the price change distribution
(measured by its dispersion and skewness) are also informative to distinguish between the
models.
Ultimately, we find that neither menu cost nor Calvo models are able to match all the
patterns in the data that we present. In particular, the menu cost model makes very strong
predictions about the shape of the price change distribution: the dispersion and the skewness
fall sharply with inflation. In the data the dispersion of price changes does fall with inflation,
but the skewness does not. We are not the first to find empirical failures of this model:
Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) and Midrigan (2011) had already pointed out problems
with some of the predictions of the Golosov and Lucas model, and shown that changes to the
model that corrected these problems overturned the result of low monetary non-neutrality.
However, we show that even these modifications to the Golosov and Lucas model, though
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they reconcile the menu cost framework with the data in some ways, are also inconsistent
with the facts that we present. Finally, we also consider models of imperfect information in
which firms adjust their prices infrequently (Alvarez et al. (2011b), Woodford (2009)), and
find that these also fail to match the data, although each in different ways.
Based on these findings, and in search of a model that is consistent with our empirical
results, we present a generalized menu cost model in which the size of the menu cost (the cost
paid to change one’s price) is random, and changes across firms and time. This generalizes
a common theme in the approach taken by Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) and Midrigan
(2011): to incorporate heterogeneity of menu costs, and in so doing making the firm’s decision
of whether to change its price more exogenous to the firm. These models therefore include
some of the features of the Calvo model, and can be thought of as hybrids between state-
and time-dependent models. Our model builds on this by introducing a distribution of menu
costs that gives it the flexibility to behave like a Calvo model, a menu cost model, and to
cover the spectrum in between. By working with random menu costs, we follow the example
of Dotsey et al. (1999), and our generalization of the Calvo-menu cost dichotomy is closely
related to Caballero and Engel (1993)’s approach. They proposed modelling sticky prices
with a continuous probability of price adjustment, as a function of the gap between the
firm’s current and optimal price. Our random menu cost model maps naturally into their
price adjustment hazard function approach. We adjust the distribution of menu costs in
our generalized model to fit the new correlations that we report, and find that, especially to
match the non-negative inflation-skewness correlation, the distribution of menu costs needs
to feature a positive probability of price changes being free, and a high probability of menu
costs being very high. These correlations allow us to restrict the menu cost distribution
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in a way that neither Dotsey et al. (1999) nor Caballero and Engel could, with important
implications for monetary non-neutrality. Indeed, the real effects of monetary shocks in our
model are considerably higher than in the Golosov and Lucas model, and higher even than
in Midrigan (2011).
2.2 The Skewness of Price Change in Sticky Price Mod-
els
We begin by presenting the models that we will be evaluating, and describing the predictions
that we will focus on testing. Our analysis will consider the models that have been used
in the sticky price literature, including the Calvo model, the Golosov and Lucas menu cost
model and the variants of it that have appeared since. First, we describe the set-up of the
various models, both the common framework and the differences that set them apart, before
explaining how we derive the predictions, and we finally summarize the predictions.
2.2.1 General set-up
All the sticky price models that we consider have certain features in common, that are also
used in the sticky price literature in general. First, households maximize expected discounted




βτ−t [logCτ+t − ωLτ+t] .
All our analysis will focus on the firm’s dynamic price setting, so the set up of the household
problem matters for our purposes insofar as it determines the relationship between aggregate
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consumption and the real wage, which will be the firm’s main cost. There is then a continuum
of monopolistically competitive firms, indexed by z, producing a differentiated product, and
aggregate consumption is given by a constant elasticity of substitution aggregator, meaning







where θ is the elasticity of demand, and Pt is the CES price aggregator. Firms produce
output based on a linear production function, with labor as the only input:
yt(z) = At(z)Lt(z).
Productivity is subject to idiosyncratic shocks, which have been an important feature of
sticky price models since Golosov and Lucas (2007). Large idiosyncratic shocks make it
possible for such models to match the large heterogeneity and high average size of price
changes observed in the data, which was documented notably by Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008). These shocks are typically modelled as first-order
autoregressive processes with normal innovations, but Midrigan (2011) argues that such a
process yields a distribution of price changes with tails that are too thin, relative to what is





ρlogAt−1(z) + εt, P robability = pε
logAt−1(z), P robability = 1− pε
, εt
iid∼ N(0, σ2ε ).
This set-up nests the standard AR(1) productivity, which can be obtained by simply setting
the probability of a shock occurring (pε) to 1. Since we will consider various models with
AR(1) productivity, as well as Midrigan’s model with Poisson shocks, we maintain this set-
up, and cover the different models by adjusting the relevant parameters.
In order to generate aggregate fluctuations, the sticky price models that we look at incor-
porate a stochastic process for nominal aggregate demand. Again, we stick to what is most
often used in the literature by modelling nominal output as a log random walk with drift:
logPtCt = logSt = µ+ logSt−1 + ηt, ηt
iid∼ N(0, σ2η).
This process stands in for monetary policy in these models: nominal output is determined
exogenously, and firms’ price responses to these shocks determine how inflation, and how
real output respond. We will use the same parameter values for this process (to match the
behaviour of US aggregate activity) across the different models, and we define monetary non-
neutrality as the variation in aggregate real consumption induced by the nominal shocks.
This has become the main way of introducing monetary variables in the menu cost literature
because it lends itself much more easily to the global solution methods that are used for such
models than explicitly incorporating systematic monetary policy. Although Blanco (2015)
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developed a menu cost model with a Taylor-type policy rule, we do not attempt this for the
models in this section. Our goal is to show how the price change distribution changes with
inflation under different sticky price models, and the aggregate demand process that we use
enables us to do this. Next, we describe the price setting problem faced by firms, which is
the main dimension along which the different models vary.
2.2.2 Price-setting
In the standard Golosov and Lucas (2007) menu cost model, firms must pay a fixed cost (in
units of labor) whenever they change their price. The period profit function therefore takes
the following form:
Πt(z) = pt(z)yt(z)−WtLt(z)− χWtI{pt(z) 6= pt−1(z)}.
The menu cost (χ) can then be calibrated to match the frequency of price changes, while the
standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shocks can be set to match the average size of price
changes (we also set the probability of an idiosyncratic shock occurring, pε, to 1 to make the
process an AR(1), as in the original model). This is, in a way, the most “state-dependent”
model, as under the fixed menu cost firms are fully in control of the decision of when to
change the price for each good (subject to the constant menu cost). It is this feature that
makes prices very responsive to aggregate demand shocks, and that famously yields very low
monetary non-neutrality.
The first extension to the menu cost model that we consider is the Nakamura and Steinsson
(2010) multi-sector menu cost model. The only change here is that firms are separated into
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sectors, with firms in different sectors facing different menu costs, and a different variance
of idiosyncratic shocks. This reflects the fact, documented in the chapter and in Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008), that the frequency of price change varies considerably across sectors,
as does the average size of price changes. Golosov and Lucas (2007) calibrated their model
to match the average frequency of price changes across sectors, and Nakamura and Steinsson
show that calibrating sector by sector makes a major difference for the degree of monetary
non-neutrality in the models, as the multi-sector model predicts much higher non-neutrality
than the standard model.
Midrigan (2011) modified the standard menu cost model in two ways: first by changing
the idiosyncratic shock process so that it would feature fat tails (which we described above),
and giving firms a motive to make small price changes. In the standard model, since a firm
always has to pay a fixed cost to change its price, there will be a threshold for the size of
the price change, such that changes below a certain size are not profitable and do not occur.
Midrigan (2011) models multi-product firms that can change the prices of all their products
for the payment of the menu cost. Because of this, a firm might choose to pay the menu
cost to change the product of a particularly mis-aligned product price, and then also take
the opportunity to change the price of another product by a small amount. This enables
the model to match the considerable fraction of small price changes that are observed in the
data, but it also makes the model much more difficult to solve. We therefore follow Vavra
(2014) in simplifying the Midrigan model by assuming that, instead of producing multiple
products, firms each period are randomly given the possibility of changing their price for free
(with a low probability), or by paying a menu cost. This adds, as an additional parameter
to calibrate, the probability of drawing a zero menu cost (free price change): pz. With the
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additional parameters in this model, we target the fraction of price changes that are small,
as in Midrigan (2011).1
We also consider a Calvo model, which has the set-up described above, except that firms,
instead of facing a menu cost, have a fixed probability every period of receiving the op-
portunity to freely change their price (otherwise, they do not get to change price). This is
equivalent to the simplified Midrigan model that we describe, but with the high menu cost
set to infinity, and the probability of a free price change set to equal the average frequency of
price change in the data. This model includes idiosyncratic shocks to obtain a distribution
of price changes, and we also set the variance of these shocks to match the average size of
price changes. The variance needs to be higher than in menu cost models, because menu
costs induce the selection effect that naturally leads to large price changes to be more likely.
Finally, we also include two models involving imperfect information: the Alvarez et al.
(2011b) model of observation and menu costs, and the rational inattention model of Wood-
ford (2009). In the former, firms must pay a fixed cost to observe the relevant state (or
conduct a “price review”), and a menu cost to change their price. Facing such costs, firms
conducting a price review choose the date of the next review, and a price plan until that date.
Woodford (2009) considers the same type of price-setting problem, but within the rational
inattention framework proposed by Sims (2003): firms face a cost based on how much infor-
mation they process, and therefore choose to receive limited information based on which they
1Midrigan (2011) defines a small price change as a price change that is less than half, in absolute value,
of the average size of price change. Due to the variation in the average size of price changes over time and
across sectors, we prefer to use an absolute measure, and focus instead on the fraction of price changes that
are smaller than 1% in absolute value. Finally, Midrigan (2011) also emphasized the failure of the Golosov
and Lucas model to match the kurtosis of the price change distribution, and the introduction of Poisson
idiosyncratic shocks helps to get the kurtosis in the model closer to what it is in the data. However, it turns
out to be very difficult to match (it seems to be very high in the data), and Midrigan (2011) does not achieve
it completely. We therefore do not match the kurtosis either.
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choose when to review prices. In this model, the cost of processing information is a crucial
parameter, and both the Calvo model and standard menu cost model are nested as extreme
cases of the information cost in this set-up (infinite and zero, respectively). Furthermore,
intermediate values of the information cost result in what is described as a “generalized Ss
model”: while a simple Ss model involves a threshold rule for price adjustment, a general-
ized Ss model features a probability of price adjustment as a function of the degree of price
mis-alignment. This is the kind of model that we work with in Section 2.4, and we view the
rational inattention framework as a potential micro-foundation for this.
2.2.3 Solution and simulation
We solve each of the models mentioned above by value function iteration, mostly with the
parameter values used by the original authors, which were set for the models to match
various features of the micro price data. One difficulty in solving these models is that in all
of them the price level (Pt) is an aggregate endogenous variable whose evolution depends on
the behaviour of all firms. This means that, in principle, every firm’s relevant state should
include the state of every other firm, which makes for an infinitely large state space. As
done elsewhere in the literature, we use an approach analogous to Krusell and Smith (1998)
to solve the model assuming a relationship between the price level and a small number
of variables, and to then verify that the resulting solution is consistent with the assumed
relationship. In the appendix, we provide more details about the procedure, as well as the
calibration of the different models. The parameters of the process for nominal aggregate
demand, described above, are calibrated to match the average growth and volatility of U.S.
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nominal GDP, and the same values are used for all the models.
The first aim of our chapter is to document what these different models imply for the
price change distribution at different inflation rates. Our approach is to simulate each model,
for 1,000 periods (months) and 40,000 firms. From these, we obtain a simulated series
for aggregate inflation (determined by the endogenous response of prices to the nominal
aggregate demand shocks) and a distribution of price changes for each period. Since the
models are calibrated to match the frequency of price change that is observed empirically,
the vast majority of prices do not change every period. Our analysis is therefore based on the
distribution of price changes, conditional on a non-zero price change, and this applies for the
rest of the chapter, including in our empirical work. We compute various moments of each
period’s price change distribution, giving us a time series for each moment, and compute
correlations between inflation and each of the moments, and this is how we determine how
the price change distribution changes with inflation.
As mentioned in the introduction, the studies that have examined price change statistics
in high inflation environments have mostly focused on whether the frequency of price change
rises with inflation, as the menu cost model predicts. We present the correlation between fre-
quency and inflation in the models, but also consider other correlations with other moments:
the standard deviation of price changes, and the skewness of price changes. As we will show,
the menu cost models have very strong and clear implications for these correlations that
are markedly different from those of the Calvo model. Furthermore, as seen in Midrigan
(2011), the shape of the price distribution can be very informative about the importance or
presence of the mechanisms that weaken the role of monetary shocks, and it is therefore to
be expected that the way in which the shape of this distribution changes (as described by the
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dispersion and skewness) with inflation would also be informative about these mechanisms.
We present a summary of these theoretical results in Table 2.1, indicating whether each
correlation is positive (+), close to zero (0), or negative (-) in the different models:
Table 2.1: Moments correlation with inflation
Model corr(π, frequency) corr(π, std. deviation) corr(π, skewness)
Calvo (1983) 0 + +
Golosov and Lucas (2007) + - -
Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) + - -
Midrigan (2011) + - -
Alvarez et al. (2011b) + 0 -
Woodford (2009) + 0 +
In order to further illustrate these results, we present scatter plots between inflation and
the different moments from the simulations (in which one point represents one period in
the model simulations). Figure 2.1 shows the correlations for the frequency of price change,
while Figures 2.2 and 2.3 do so for the dispersion and skewness of price changes, respectively.
These bring out the fact that in the menu cost models, the relationships between inflation and
dispersion and skewness are very clear and strong (especially in the Golosov and Lucas model
for the dispersion). In contrast, the same relations in the Calvo and imperfect information
models are not so strong.
Although the relationships come out very clearly in these simulations, it could be a concern
that the higher moments that we are estimating might not be well defined in the distributions
that we are working with. In addition, estimates of higher moments are very sensitive to
outliers, which would be of concern particularly when we estimate from the data. That is
why we also consider alternative measures for the dispersion and skewness of price change:
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the inter-quartile range (for dispersion) and Kelly’s coefficient of skewness2(as opposed to
“moment skewness”, which is what we have been estimating so far). Since these statistics are
quantile-based, they are well-defined for any distribution, and they are also less sensitive to
outliers. The correlations are similar for all the models (inter-quartile range compared with
standard deviation, and moment skewness with Kelly Skewness). Figure 2.4 shows scatter
plots of Kelly Skewness in the different models.
Another concern could be that these simulations all assume that the value of steady-state
inflation is held constant throughout the simulated time period. This could be problematic
in terms of testing the predictions on data, as the U.S. clearly went from a moderate to a
low inflation regime over our sample period. To address this, we also conduct the following
exercise: we solve each model for different values of the trend inflation parameter (µ), and
for each solution compute the average dispersion and skewness of price change (either from
the stationary distribution of price changes, or averaging over simulated time periods; they
are almost the same). In Figure 2.5, we plot the results.
What the scatter plots show is that, as in the “short-run” analysis, the dispersion and
skewness of price changes fall with trend inflation in the menu cost model (we are only
plotting results for the Golosov and Lucas model, but the same pattern holds for the other
menu cost models). Here too, the Calvo model predicts weak positive relations for both
moments. This will be important when comparing the skewness of price change between the
low and high inflation periods in the data.
To conclude our theoretical analysis, we emphasize that the correlations that we consider
2These statistics are defined as follows, with Qi representing the i
th percentile. Inter-quartile range
= Q75 − Q25. Kelly Skewness = (Q90−Q50)−(Q50−Q10)Q90−Q10 . Kelly skewness essentially measures the degree of
asymmetry in a distribution, comparing the size of the right and left tails.
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Figure 2.4: Simulated Kelly skewness and inflation from different models
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Figure 4: Kelly Skewness & Inflation
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Figure 2.5: Simulated long run statistics from different models
7






















Dispersion, Golosov and Lucas
7




















Skewness, Golosov and Lucas
7













































Figure 5: Steady-State Correlations


















































all have the same sign in the four menu cost models (Golosov and Lucas, Nakamura and
Steinsson, Midrigan, and observation costs). The scatter plots show that the values taken by
moments we report do vary across the models (for example, in the Golosov and Lucas model
the skewness of price changes takes a wider range of values than in the other models), but the
fact that the sign and strength of the correlations across the models are similar is notable.
Indeed, the Nakamura and Steinsson and Midrigan menu cost models were developed as
extensions of the Golosov and Lucas model to make it match new empirical facts, and the
changes made considerably weakened the selection effect that reduces the importance of
monetary shocks. However, what we find here is that, despite the important changes made
to the baseline menu cost model, they all have the same implications along the dimensions
that we are considering. Next, we discuss the intuition behind these theoretical results.
2.2.4 Intuition for the menu cost model
Menu cost models are often also known as “Ss” models, due to the fact that they tend to
feature an inaction region for price changes (the edges of which can be labelled with “S” and
“s”), and this makes it easier to understand the theoretical correlations between inflation
and the moments of the price change distribution that we find in this section. Price change
dynamics in the menu cost model can be thought of in the following way: both idiosyncratic
and aggregate nominal shocks give a distribution of desired price changes (the price change
a firm would choose if it changed its price, or in the absence of price change frictions).
The presence of a menu cost means that only desired prices above a certain size (positive
and negative) will actually occur, as only those will yield a benefit to the firm big enough
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to compensate for the menu cost. The realized price change distribution in this model is
therefore the underlying distribution with a band containing 0 removed, as illustrated in
Figure 2.6 below.
Figure 2.6: Intuition for the menu cost model
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The presence of idiosyncratic shocks yields variation in firms’ desired prices, and nominal
aggregate shocks move the position (average) of the underlying distribution. For example,
a positive aggregate shocks moves the distribution to the right, which also leads to realized
prices being higher on average, resulting in higher inflation (the reverse is true for negative
aggregate shocks). Such shocks also result in a higher fraction of price changes being pos-
itive, which are separated from the negative ones by the inaction region. This reduces the
dispersion of price changes because a bigger fraction of them are on one side of the inaction
region, and therefore relatively close to each other. It is when the share of price changes on
either side of the inaction region is equal that the dispersion is highest, and by the same
logic, higher than when inflation is negative (when more price changes are decreases), which
is what we see in the dispersion plots (Figure 2.2) for the menu cost model: dispersion de-
creasing with inflation in the positive region, and increasing in the negative region, with the
maximum attained at zero inflation.
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The logic for why the skewness falls with inflation is related. The skewness, as a statistic,
measures the asymmetry of a distribution, or the relative sizes of the right and left tails. As
a positive aggregate shock raises the average desired price change, and the average realized
price change, some negative price changes (to the left of the inaction region) remain and
form the left tail. This makes the skewness negative: the resulting distribution has a left
tail (price decreases relatively distant from the average price change, which is positive),
without a corresponding right tail (as price increases are to the right of the inaction region
and relatively close to each other). Furthermore, for the range of values that inflation takes
in our simulations (which corresponds roughly to the historical range for inflation since the
late 1970’s), there is always a significant proportion of negative price changes. This means
that as inflation rises (due to larger positive aggregate shocks), these negative price changes
form a left tail in the price change distribution that is further and further (to the left) of
the average of the price change distribution, leading to a skewness that is more negative.3
What this also implies is that the relationship between skewness and inflation is monotonic,
decreasing for positive and negative values of inflation.
It is important to emphasize that these correlations have to do with the central mechanism
of the menu cost model: the selection effect. When firms face a fixed cost to changing their
price, only relatively large price changes will occur, leading to the presence of the inaction
region. As the average of the underlying distribution rises (moved by aggregate shocks),
there is a large response of inflation because there is a large share of price increases that
3This also means that if the aggregate shock were so high that all price changes were positive (to the right
of the inaction region), the relationship would break down, as price decreases would no longer be separated
from price increases. However, this would also mean that all prices would change, and that inflation would
be extremely high. This kind of situation, or anything resembling it, never occurs in the period we are
considering.
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are marginal: without the shock they would not occur, but are pushed outside the inaction
region (and many marginal price decreases do not occur with the shock), leads to a relatively
large rise in inflation, muting the real effect of the aggregate shock. This is the logic for why
state-dependent models are known to imply low levels of monetary non-neutrality.
However, what we show is that this same mechanism leads to predictions that are in
principle observable: the presence of an inaction region means that positive aggregate shocks
should lead to not only more price increases, but to a distribution with price changes more
concentrated on the right, leading to a declining dispersion and skewness. This does not
occur in a Calvo model: in such a model every desired price change has a fixed probability
of being realized, so as the desired price changes rise, the shape of the realized price change
distribution does not change in a meaningful way.
The intuition for this theoretical result is easiest to explain in the case of the “standard”
Golosov and Lucas model, or in general any menu cost model with a single fixed menu
cost. The other menu cost models that we consider feature a richer structure of menu costs
that led to some very different empirical predictions. However, we have shown that these
models also imply negative correlations for the dispersion and skewness of price changes,
and the intuition for this is the same as for the standard model. In the multi-sector menu
cost model, different sectors face different menu costs, and this can be thought of as sectors
facing different inaction regions, with each sector behaving as described for the standard
menu cost model. Therefore, the aggregate price change distribution behaves similarly to
how each sector’s distribution does.
The Midrigan model involves firms randomly facing either a positive or zero menu cost.
This weakens the selection effect, because there is now a positive probability that a firm
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will change its price even if it will be a small change, so that price changes are no entirely
“selected” based on how out of line the original price is. However, the selection effect is still
present to a certain extent, because it is only relatively large price changes that will happen
with certainty (as those will be the only ones for which a firm will be willing to pay the
positive menu cost, when it faces the positive menu cost). It is this difference between small
and large price changes that makes the same mechanism present in this model and drives
the correlations, even though small price changes do occur (as they do in the data, but do
not in the Golosov and Lucas model).
We have shown that menu cost models, under the assumptions commonly made in the
literature, make clear, consistent predictions about how the shape of the price change dis-
tribution changes with inflation, and that these do not change much based on the type of
menu cost model in question, and that the predictions are strikingly different from those
of the Calvo model. Furthermore, these are predictions that can be tested with the price
data available to us, which enables us to evaluate this broad class of sticky price models. In
the following section, we do this by presenting the empirical counterpart to the correlations
presented in Table 2.1, and we discuss how each of the models falls short of matching the
data.
2.3 Empirical Evidence from High Inflation Periods
In the previous section, we documented the predictions made by various sticky price models
on the behaviour of price changes at different inflation rates. In this section, we describe
the data set that we will use to test these predictions, and report that while the inflation-
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dispersion correlation is consistent with the empirical evidence, the inflation-skewness cor-
relation is not.
2.3.1 Previous empirical work
The micro data that underlies the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI), gathered by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, is one of the most widely used data sets in the literature on monetary
price-setting models. Bils and Klenow (2004) were the first to use this data set to provide
estimates for the frequency of price change. Since then, other studies have documented
additional features of the price change distribution using this data set (e.g. Nakamura and
Steinsson (2008); Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008)). The availability of a large, representative
data set that makes it possible to observe the price changes of very specific products has
lead monetary economists to develop models that match the behaviour of price changes as
closely as possible.
The data set that has been used in this line of work covers the period 1988 to the present,
as 1988 marked a major revision of the structure of the CPI. However, a limitation of the
data used thus far is that throughout this period, aggregate inflation has been relatively low
and stable, especially compared to the years before. Since 1988, the maximum twelve month
change in the headline CPI has been 6.2% (4.6% for the Core PCE), and the average has
been 2.8% (2.2% for the Core PCE). Partly because of this, most research on sticky price
models up until now has focused on matching moments of the price change distribution that
are averaged over time (the main exception being Vavra (2014), who uses the CPI micro data
to investigate the cyclicality of price change moments). But as we showed in the previous
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section, the models imply that these moments would change over time, and in a way that is
closely related to aggregate inflation, with implications that differ strongly across models.
Motivated by this, a few studies have used data from other countries that experienced
episodes of high inflation, such as Argentina (Alvarez et al. (2011a)) and Mexico (Gagnon
(2009)). These studies also used the micro data that underlies the CPI’s of these countries,
and reported how various price change statistics change as inflation goes from low, to mod-
erate, to high. They find that the frequency of price change is fairly constant, and not very
responsive to inflation, at low levels of inflation (below 10% annual). Once inflation rises
even higher, however, the frequency of price change begins to rise sharply with inflation. In
addition, they show that a standard menu cost model matches this relationship very well.
What this shows is that, first, the Calvo (1983) assumption of a constant frequency, while
possibly approximately valid for low inflation, becomes problematic when inflation rises be-
yond a certain level. Second, the evidence presented in these papers is shown to be consistent
with standard menu cost models, suggesting that they better explain the behaviour of price
changes when inflation is high. However, Alvarez et al. (2011a) and Gagnon (2009) do not
look at the higher moments of the price change distribution that we emphasized in the
previous section, which is what we do in this chapter.
2.3.2 Data set and construction of statistics
The CPI Research Database collected and maintained by the U.S. BLS contains about
80,000 monthly prices collected from around the U.S, classified into about 300 categories
called Entry Level Items (ELI’s). As mentioned before, the data going back to 1988 has
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been available for a little over a decade. The data going back to 1977 has recently become
available, and this is the novel part of the data set that we use extensively. This new data
set has thus far only been used by Nakamura et al. (2015), and that paper also describes
in detail just how the data set was made available. As explained in the BLS handbook of
Methods (BLS, 2013), there were several changes made to how the BLS samples prices and
computes the CPI. While there are many variables present in the post-1988 data set that are
not available for the older period, we are able to study the price change distribution in a way
that is consistent throughout the whole period, and with the theoretical framework that we
are testing. First, we have access to the variables that identify specific products, and that
reveal when a substitution has occurred (when a new version of a product has replaced the
old one). Second, the data set contains information on when any given price is a temporary
sale, or imputed (or not properly collected). Because of this, we are confident that we are
observing the price changes of identical products and services, with the price being actually
observed; and all of this with the same standards throughout the sample period.
The empirical literature on price setting has emphasized the importance of identifying
“pure” or regular price changes, as opposed to price changes coming from temporary sales
or substitutions. The reason is that sales and substitutions have features that make them
different in terms of their relevance for the study of the role of monetary policy and aggregate
shocks. Indeed, when a product goes on sale, its price will change, but it is not clear that
this happens in response to any changes in aggregate conditions. What’s more, products
on sale tend to revert back quickly to their pre-sale price. This distinction was pointed out
notably by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), and Anderson et al. (2015) document the ways
in which sale prices behave differently from regular prices. In a similar way, the distinction
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between regular price changes and substitutions is made because a price change coming from
a product substitution could reflect the changes in product characteristics or in quality that
could be behind the substitution. Although it is possible in some cases to estimate the
contribution of quality or characteristic changes to a substitution price change (and the BLS
does for certain products), we prefer to use the product identifiers to focus on price changes
involving identical products.
In order to test the predictions that we presented in the previous section, we use the
data set to construct distributions of price changes for each month, and a few observations
on how these are constructed are in order. First, since the vast majority of prices do not
change in any given month, these distributions only include non-zero price changes (which
corresponds to what we look at in the theoretical results). Second, because estimates of
higher moments are very sensitive to outliers, we follow other empirical work in excluding
price changes whose absolute value is above a certain value (e.g. Klenow and Kryvtsov
(2008); Alvarez et al. (2014)), (our threshold is one log point). Third, Eichenbaum et al.
(2013) have shed light on problems with the methods of reporting and collecting prices in
some of the product categories of data sets such as the CPI. They show that this leads
to erroneous small price changes appearing in the data, price changes that come from the
price collection methods, and that do not reflect actual price changes. This is particularly
important for us, as estimates of dispersion and skewness will be sensitive to the relative
amounts of small and large price changes. We deal with this by constructing statistics that
exclude very small price changes (< 1% in absolute value) in the ELI’s that Eichenbaum et
al. flagged as problematic as a robustness check.
Finally, it has been pointed out by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008 and 2010) that there
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is significant heterogeneity of price change statistics across sectors. To report the average
overall frequency of price change, they estimate the frequency for each ELI, and then take
a weighted average of each frequency (with the expenditure weights that go into the CPI).
The same method is used by many of the other cited empirical studies. For the frequency
of price change, we use the same method, considering both the weighted median and mean
frequency4. For the dispersion and skewness, we follow a similar approach: we first estimate
each moment by sector-month. However, as ELI’s are fairly narrow categories, most of
them have a handful of price change observations in any given month, fewer than would be
necessary to estimate higher moments with any precision. We therefore do not use ELI’s
as our definition of sectors, but instead separate products into 13 “major groups”, which
are listed in the appendix. While this sectoral classification is fairly broad, it allows us to
separate goods and services into similar categories, while leaving enough observations in each
sector-month to obtain good estimates of the dispersion and skewness., and then for each
month take weighted averages of the statistics.
This approach then leaves us with monthly series of the different moments of the price
change distribution. We believe that our approach, following the empirical price setting
literature, gives us the most valid estimates to compare with those from model simulations.
Indeed, the models that we are testing involve “pure” price changes, and abstract from
temporary sales and product substitutions, which is why we try as much as possible to
4Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) highlight the difference between the mean and the median, arising from
the fact that the distribution of frequencies by ELI is very skewed to the right, with a few ELI’s having very
high frequencies. They argue that the median is a better measure of the average frequency in the sense that
a single-sector menu cost model calibrated to match the median frequency is a much better approximation
of a multi-sector model, of the kind described in Section 2.2. In this way, the median frequency is a statistic
that better describes the degree of price stickiness (as it relates to monetary non-neutrality). This is also
why we calibrate all the single sector models to match the median frequency.
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include only regular price changes in our empirical estimates. Perhaps more importantly,
the models do not allow for differences across sectors. Such differences, such as sector-
specific shocks, have the potential to strongly affect the shape of the overall price change
distribution (when all price changes across sectors are pooled together), in turn affecting
the higher moments of the distribution. Because of this, we might see the moments of the
“pooled” distribution of price changes vary over time due to such sector-specific shocks,
which would be unrelated to the mechanisms that are behind the predictions of the models
that we described in the previous section. For this reason, we attempt to “control for” these
kinds of effects by computing statistics sector by sector.
2.3.3 Results
The goal of our empirical work is to determine whether the theoretical patterns documented
above are borne out by the data. As in the theoretical section, we focus on the correlations
between aggregate inflation and price change dispersion, and between inflation and price
change skewness. The price change moments are calculated as described above, and our
preferred measure for aggregate inflation is monthly core PCE inflation. We prefer to use core
inflation because the sharp changes in headline inflation tend to be driven by changes in the
global market prices of food and commodities, which would not be well described by the price-
setting models that we are working with. However, we will also compute correlations with
headline inflation as a robustness check (as well as using estimates of the moments excluding
price changes from food and energy categories). Finally, to control for seasonality in the
inflation and moment series, we calculate the correlations after removing month dummies
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from the series, and after applying a moving average smoother to them.
The price data is monthly, and inflation series are monthly, so we can compute the corre-
lations at a monthly frequency. However, the drawback of using monthly series is that each
period’s moment estimates are based on relatively few observations, making them less precise
(this is especially important for higher moments such as the dispersion or skewness). The
alternative is to group price change observations by quarters or years (but still separating
them by sector) and to estimate the moments from these samples, which gives us more precise
estimates (as they are based on distributions with more observations), but only quarterly or
annual moment series. Since quarterly and annual inflation averages also have the advan-
tage of containing less noise than monthly inflation series, we consider monthly, quarterly,
and annual correlations. We present the results in two ways: first, with raw correlations
and scatter plots, as with the models, to give a simple illustration of the signs and strength
of the relationships in the data, and a qualitative comparison with the models. which we
correlate with inflation series of the corresponding frequency. Secondly, we estimate these
relationships with regressions. This allows us to more formally test for significance, and to
control for other variables that might conceivably affect the price change distribution.
Correlations
Our sample period for the price data is 1977-2014, and the early, high inflation, part of the
period is particularly important. We want to answer whether the dispersion and skewness
of price changes move inversely with aggregate inflation, as predicted by most sticky price
models, and in order to do this it is very helpful to see how the statistics change when inflation
was high. However, we first verify that the frequency of price change rises with inflation, as
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found by Gagnon (2009) and Alvarez et al. (2011a). Table 2.2 reports correlations between
the frequency of price change and inflation, and Figure 2.7 is the empirical counterpart to
Figure 2.1 from the simulations (scatter plots of the average frequency and inflation for the
months in the sample, for both the weighted mean and median frequency).
The table and figure confirm that there is a positive association between the frequency
and inflation, although this is considerably clearer for the median than the mean frequency.
As argued in the previous studies that had looked into this relation, this provides strong
evidence against the Calvo assumption of time-dependent price setting. Figures 2.8 and 2.9
illustrate the other correlations that are presented in Table 2.2: those involving quarterly
and annual averages of inflation and the frequency, and here the same pattern holds.
Next, we look at the results for the moments that our discussion has focused on: the
dispersion and skewness of price changes. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 report the correlations for the
dispersion and skewness respectively. Our main results is that while there does seem to be a
clear negative relationship between inflation and dispersion, there is no such relation between
inflation and skewness. Indeed, for both measures of skewness (moment skewness and Kelly
skewness; “Skewness” in the tables and graphs refers to moment skewness), the correlation
is either strongly positive (over the whole sample period) or close to zero (post-1984). This
can also be seen in Figures 2.13 and Figures 2.16, 5, which are scatter plots illustrating the
correlations (with each period corresponding to a month).
Figures 2.11-2.18 show these correlations with the quarterly and annual measures (includ-
ing the Kelly Skewness correlation using annual data), illustrating how the same patterns
5In the following figures, the left panel uses the statistics estimated using all available observations, while
the right panel uses the estimates that exclude price changes below 1% in absolute value in ELI’s deemed
problematic by Eichenbaum et al. (2013).
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hold.
Table 2.2: Corr(frequency, inflation)
Weighted Median
Monthly Quarterly Annual
1977-2014 1985-2014 1977-2014 1985-2014 1977-2014 1985-2014
Raw 0.575 0.399 0.671 0.536 0.764 0.618
Smoothed 0.769 0.552 0.785 0.628 -
Weighted Mean
Raw 0.311 -0.019 0.314 -0.216 0.374 -0.243
Smoothed 0.371 -0.337 0.36 -0.295 -
Table 2.3: Corr(IQR, inflation)
All Observations
Monthly Quarterly Annual
1977-2014 1985-2014 1977-2014 1985-2014 1977-2014 1985-2014
Raw -0.602 -0.446 -0.716 -0.665 -0.776 -0.751
Smoothed -0.675 -0.706 -0.719 -0.742 -
EJRS
Raw -0.666 -0.434 -0.711 -0.689 -0.775 -0.779
Smoothed -0.792 -0.701 -0.709 -0.769 -
Table 2.4: Corr(skewness, inflation)
All Observations
Monthly Quarterly Annual
1977-2014 1985-2014 1977-2014 1985-2014 1977-2014 1985-2014
Raw 0.265 0.084 0.345 0.067 0.473 0.122
Smoothed 0.506 0.136 0.474 0.133 -
EJRS
Raw 0.272 0.068 0.327 0.053 0.447 0.102
Smoothed 0.462 0.144 0.452 0.105 -
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Table 2.5: Corr(Kelly skewness, inflation)
All Observations
Monthly Quarterly Annual
1977-2014 1985-2014 1977-2014 1985-2014 1977-2014 1985-2014
Raw 0.584 0.069 0.674 -0.106 0.744 -0.165
Smoothed 0.696 -0.067 0.697 -0.199 -
































-.005 0 .005 .01
Core PCE Inflation, monthly


































-.005 0 .005 .01
Core PCE Inflation, monthly
Pre 1984 Post 1984
Weighted Mean; Corr=0.311
Figure 7: Frequency of Price Chane & Inflation, Monthly
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Figure 8: Frequency of Price Change & Inflation, Quarterly
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Figure 9: Frequency of Price Change & Inflation, Annual
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Figure 10: IQR & Inflation, Monthly
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Figure 12: IQR & Inflation, Quarterly
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Figure 14: IQR & Inflation, Annual
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Figure 11: Skewness & Inflation, Monthly
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Figure 13: Skewness & Inflation, Quarterly
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Figure 15: Skewness & Inflation, Annual
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Figure X: Kelly Skewness & Inflation, Monthly; Corr = 0.584
To summarize, we find first that the dispersion of price changes falls sharply with inflation
throughout the sample period. Second, the skewness, while varying over time, does change
with inflation in a systematic way for low levels of inflation. However, there does seem to
be a positive relationship when inflation is high. We see this from the different correlations
for the different sample periods (which roughly correspond to the high and low inflation
periods). Finally, all these patterns hold true regardless of whether we exclude potentially
spurious small price changes or apply seasonal adjustment and smoothing to the data series.
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Figure 16: Kelly Skewness & Inflation, Annual; Corr = 0.744
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Next, we formalize this analysis with linear regressions.
Regressions
Although the correlations and scatter plots provide a general picture of what the data shows
on the relationships in question, we turn to regressions to determine whether these correla-
tions are statistically significant, and to consider different control variables. However, the
question of interest for us is not merely whether they are statistically significant from zero,
but also whether they are significantly different from what the models predict. To do this, we
estimate regressions of the frequency, dispersion (inter-quartile range) and skewness (both
moment and Kelly skewness) of the price change distribution on inflation, with different
specifications allowing for different sets of controls and sample periods. As before, we run
the regressions both on the whole sample period and on only after 1984. This allows us
to see if the relationship looks different between the low and high inflation periods. The
regressions all take the following form:
yt = α + βπt + γControlst + et,
where yt denotes the different price change moments (frequency, dispersion, and skewness).
Controls are included to address the fact that many important changes occurred in the
U.S. monetary environment over our sample period, which could conceivably have a direct
effect on the price change distribution. Since expected inflation could affect firms’ price
setting decisions separately from present realized nominal shocks, we include expected in-
flation (measured by the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers) as a control. We
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also inlcude dummy variables for the different Federal Reserve chair’s times in office, to
control for differences in the conduct of monetary policy. The different specifications cover
different combinations of controls (no controls, Fed dummies only, or Fed dummies with
expected inflation) and the different periods. Tables 2.6 to 2.9 show the estimates for β
from these different specifications, with the standard errors below them. All standard errors
are calculated according to Newey and West (1987), and allow for serial correlation in the
residuals.
Table 2.6: Coefficients for frequency regressions
Weighted Median Weighted Mean
Specification 1977-2014 1985-2014 1977-2014 1985-2014
All 0.708*** 0.777*** 0.164 0.018
(0.071) (0.224) (0.203 ) (0.196 )
Fed Dummies 0.728*** 0.810*** 0.686*** 0.339**
(0.095) (0.208) (0.104 ) (0.167 )
Inflation Only 0.771*** 0.587** 0.438*** -0.087
(0.237) (0.252) (0.108 ) (0.236 )
Note: Significant at 1% level (** at 5% level; * at 10% level). This table reports
the correlation coefficients from regressions of the weighted average (median and
mean) frequency of price changes on aggregate CPI inflation. The regressions
are run using quarterly series, where quarterly inflation is defined the mean of
the 12-month log changes in the CPI for the three months in every quarter. The
different cells indicate different specifications, which change with respect to the
sample period used and inclusion exclusion of small price changes (columns), and
what controls are used. Standard errors that are consistent for heteroskedasticity
and auto-correlation of the residuals (Newey-West) are reported. The same
observations apply to the other regression tables, which report coefficients on
inflation in regressions with other dependent variables.
These results confirm what the correlations showed: the frequency of price change rises
with inflation (although for the mean frequency this is not so clear), the relationship between
dispersion and inflation is negative and statistically significant in all specifications and sample
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Table 2.7: Coefficients for IQR regressions
All Observations EJRS
Specification 1977-2014 1985-2014 1977-2014 1985-2014
Inflation Only -0.296*** -0.428*** -0.327*** -0.491***
(0.042) (0.070) (0.046) (0.082)
Fed Dummies -0.186*** -0.414*** -0.204*** -0.476***
(0.038) (0.077) (0.044) (0.089)
Fed & Expected Infl -0.257*** -0.222** -0.261*** -0.224***
(0.089) (0.086) (0.095) (0.092)
Table 2.8: Coefficients for skewness regressions
All Observations EJRS
Specification 1977-2014 1985-2014 1977-2014 1985-2014
Inflation Only 3.936*** 1.732 3.501*** 1.108
(0.827 ) (1.641 ) (0.828) (1.534)
Fed Dummies 4.309*** 1.541 3.928*** 1.130
(1.012 ) (1.857) (0.966) (1.705)
Fed & Expected Infl 2.665 3.634 1.947 2.963
(2.788 ) (3.279) (2.538) (2.985)
Table 2.9: Coefficients for Kelly skewness regressions
All Observations
Specification 1977-2014 1985-2014
Inflation Only 2.499*** 0.320
(0.354) (0.454)
Fed Dummies 2.439*** 0.710*
(0.363) (0.423)
Fed & Expected Infl 1.658 0.942
(0.948) (0.595)
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periods. The skewness correlation, however, is significantly positive for the whole sample,
but not significantly different from zero when the early, high-inflation period is excluded
(and this applies for both measures of skewness). This indicates (as we can also see from
the scatter plots), that this relation is close to flat for low inflation periods, but clearly
positive for high inflation periods. The fact that the skewness of price change is higher on
average in high inflation periods is important, because it also goes against the menu cost
models’ predictions at high values of steady-state inflation, as we showed in Figure 2.5. It
is also notable that the skewness coefficients change considerably when expected inflation
is included as a regressor. Since expected inflation is very highly correlated with realized
inflation, the estimates are much less precise (as shown by the high standard errors), so this is
not surprising. However, this makes little difference to the comparisons with the coefficients
predicted by the models, which we turn to with Table 2.10.
Table 2.10: Coefficients on inflation for price change moment
Model Frequency IQR Skewness
Golosov & Lucas 0.139 -0.937 -17.7
Multisector Menu Cost 0.143 -0.218 -5.39
Midrigan 0.348 -0.896 -9.84
Observation and Menu Costs 0.268 -0.071 -4.32
Calvo -0.003 0.040 2.93
Rational Inattention 0.001 0.007 3.03
Data + - +
The table presents the coefficients on inflation from regressions of the same type, but
run on simulated data from the different models. The last row summaries the signs of the
correlations in the data. The first four models (menu cost models) have negative coefficients
for the inter-quartile range, although for all but the multi-sector model, they are outside
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the 95% confidence intervals of the coefficients that we estimate. However, the disagreement
with the data is much starker with the skewness coefficients. These are all very far outside
the confidence intervals that we estimate for the skewness coefficients under all specifications.
Therefore, in the broad class of state-dependent price setting models that we consider, none
match the data in all the dimensions that we have presented. In particular, this highlights
the usefulness of the inflation-skewness correlation as a statistic to test the existing menu
cost models. As we have already argued, these models make a counterfactual prediction with
this statistic because of the state-dependence that underlies them. It is also worth noting
that the Calvo and rational inattention models have the same predictions, and therefore
disagree with the data in the same ways. In the next section, we consider a menu cost model
that weakens state-dependence and can be reconciled with the empirical correlations that
we find.
2.4 A Generalized Menu Cost Model
In this section, we present a model that fits into the general framework of Section 2.2: the
demand system and technology faced by the firm is the same, but we generalize the price
setting problem in the following way: the menu cost faced by each firm every period is
random. Formally, the period profit function of the firm takes on this form:
Πt(z) = pt(z)yt(z)−WtLt(z)− χt(z)WtI{pt(z) 6= pt−1(z)}, χt(z)
iid∼ G(χ).
The difference with the Golosov and Lucas model is that now the menu cost can vary over
time and across firms, the difference with the Midrigan model is that the distribution of
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menu costs is generalized, and as opposed to the Nakamura and Steinsson model, the menu
cost for any given firm here varies over time.6The assumption of random menu costs is similar
to that made by Dotsey et al. (1999), but we present it within the framework we have been
using until now.7
2.4.1 Background on random menu costs
We choose to modify the model in this way for several reasons. The first is that it gives
us a very general model that nests the menu cost models we have considered, as described
above. In addition, this approach has a close relation to another, even more general approach
already pursued by Caballero and Engel in a series of papers (1993, 2006a, 2006b). They
propose thinking about price adjustment through the price adjustment hazard function8,
which is the probability of a price change occurring as a function of the deviation of the
current price from its optimal value (p∗):
H(x) = P (∆p| p∗ − p = x).
6This set-up can replicate the Golosov and Lucas model, if the menu cost distribution is degenerate, and
the Midrigan model, if the distribution is discrete with two support points (one being zero, the other being
positive). The Calvo model is replicated when the higher support point is infinite. Since the Nakamura
and Steinsson model involves different firms facing different menu costs that are fixed over time, it is not
encompassed by our set-up.
7The key differences with Dotsey et al. (1999) are that their model does not include idiosyncratic shocks,
that it does include capital as an input to production, and that they did not have a way of using information
from price micro data to place restrictions on the menu cost distribution, which is what the present exercise
is about.
8It must be noted that this is distinct from the hazard function of price change estimated by Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), which is the function λ(t) that gives the probability
that a price will change after t periods, given that it has already stayed constant for t periods. This function
gets at timing of price changes, and at whether prices become more likely to change the longer they have
stayed constant. While this can also help to distinguish between models, we do not estimate the timing
hazard function in this chapter.
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Any of the models we have considered will imply a price adjustment hazard function, so
the hazard function can be a helpful object to summarize the important features of each
model. This function also describes the degree of the selection effect, as it indicates to what
extent prices have a higher chance of adjusting the more mis-aligned they are. Caballero and
Engel (2006b) show that, within this framework, aggregate price flexibility (or the inverse





where f(x) is the probability density of the desired price gap, x. The first term in this sum
is the frequency of price change, and the second is what Caballero and Engel refer to the
extensive margin, which incorporates the selection effect. To illustrate how this works, the
hazard function corresponding to the Calvo model is a constant (the average frequency of
price change), so that the first term is equal to that constant, and the second is zero. This
shows that in general, and as long as the hazard function is increasing in the absolute value
of the price gap (which is true for all models considered), the Calvo model gives a lower
bound on the degree of flexibility. In our random menu cost model, a particular menu cost
distribution will imply a particular hazard function, and will therefore determine aggregate
flexibility (and monetary non-neutrality) as shown by the expression above. In this way,
there is a very tight relation between these approaches9.
9It would naturally also be interesting to directly estimate this hazard function. In this chapter we
continue to work in the menu cost framework to maintain the structure of a General Equilibrium model and
obtain a quantitative response to the question of monetary non-neutrality. However, Caballero and Engel
(2006a) attempt to do this, although the price change moments that they had access to were limited in the
informational value they provided for this. By the same logic we have put forth in this chapter, the higher
moment price change correlations will be very informative to estimate the hazard function, and we do this
in a separate paper (Luo and Villar (2015)).
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A more structural approach to price stickiness that is also related to ours is Woodford
(2009)’s model of rational inattention. He shows that by varying the cost of processing
information, price setting under rational inattention in the style of Sims (2003) can also
nest, as extreme cases, the single menu cost model (free information) and the Calvo model
(infinitely costly information), as well as the spectrum in between, which he also describes
with the adjustment hazard function implied by different information costs. In addition,
there will also be a mapping between the value for the cost of information in that framework,
and a specific distribution of menu costs in ours. While we do not derive this mapping, we do
believe that the rational inattention framework (or another type of informational constraint)
could provide a micro-foundation for the distribution of menu costs that we assume to be
general at first, and then adjust to allow the model to fit the empirical facts that we have
presented10.
2.4.2 The distribution of menu costs
Introducing random menu costs allows us to determine the extent of state-dependence present
in the model, or to what extent firms choose when to change their prices. One extreme case
of this is of course perfect price flexibility, or firms being free to change their prices every
period without facing any kind of cost for doing so (although this is inconsistent with the
fact that most prices do not change on any given month). But right after this comes a menu
10As Woodford (2009) also points out, the direct empirical evidence on the actual costs of price adjuste-
ment put forth by Zbaracki et al. (2004) indicates that the most important part of those costs are related to
the process of gathering the necessary information for a price review. In addition, Anderson and Simester
(2010) give evidence on how price changes can antagonize consumers, which introduces costs to changing
prices. To the extent that the menu costs in the menu cost framework represent these costs, we believe
that it is plausible that the menu costs are random to some extent, and vary across firms and time. This
lends plausibility to our random menu costs assumption, although we leave the explicitly modelling of the
informational constraints or consumer considerations that underly it to future research.
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cost environment such as the one in Golosov and Lucas: firms are still able to choose when
to change their prices, but are subject to a fixed cost (that is small in typical calibrations,
to match the frequency of price change in the data). Adding randomness to the menu cost
makes the price change decision more exogenous to the firm, as an additional dimension of
the problem (how much changing the price will cost) is now outside the firm’s control (with
the extreme being the Calvo model, where the opportunity to change price is completely
exogenous). The Midrigan model (both in Midrigan (2011), and the simplification of it that
we present) goes in this direction, and as a result the degree of monetary non-neutrality in
that model is much higher. We interpret our results so far as indicating that a model would
need even more exogeneity (but less than the Calvo model) to match the empirical facts that
we have presented. Therefore, we parametrize the distribution of menu costs in a way that
enables us to do this.
There are two important features that the menu cost distribution will need in order to
achieve this: a positive probability of the menu cost being zero (of a free price change),
which eliminates the “Ss” band or inaction region in the price setting problem, as some
firms, facing a free price change, will choose to change their prices even if it is by a small
amount. However, the Midrigran model already includes this, and as we have shown it also
predicts a counterfactual inflation-skewness correlation. The other feature is that there must
also be a positive and considerable probability that the menu cost will be very high, so high
that firms will not choose to change their price when faced with these menu costs. This is
important, because in the existing models, the skewness of price changes falls with inflation
because a positive aggregate shock induces more firms that face a positive menu cost to pay
it, effectively pushing them over a threshold, leading to an important shift in the shape of
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the distribution. Having a positive probability of very high menu costs means that fewer
firms will be pushed over this threshold, weakening this effect. It is also helpful to note
that the Calvo model contains both of these features in the extreme, as it gives a positive
probability of a free price change, and in all other cases the menu cost is infinite. Because
of this, we say that the menu cost distribution in our generalized model will incorporate a
strong “Calvo feature”, without going all the way to the Calvo extreme.
In order to achieve this, we present a relatively flexible distribution for menu costs. We
assume that menu costs are iid across time and firms, so that every period each firm draws
a menu cost χ from a mixed distribution. First, with a certain probability, the menu cost is
zero, and otherwise it is drawn from a continuous distribution:
χ =

0, P rob = pz
χ̃, P rob = 1− pz
, where F (k) = P (χ̃ ≤ k) = 1− e−λkα .
In our version of the Midrigan model, the menu cost was either zero or a fixed positive value.
The difference here is that instead of the positive value being fixed, it is drawn from a non-
degenerate distribution. This distribution is a transformation of the exponential distribution
(it is the same when α = 1), and shares the important feature that the random variable is
always positive. The difference is that α governs the curvature of the distribution function,
which roughly corresponds to the fatness of the tails. Figure 2.19 shows how the shape of
the cumulative distribution function changes with α:
For our purposes, what is important is that for low values of α, the probability of very
low values is relatively high, but the probability of very high values is also quite high. When
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Figure 2.19: Shape of menu cost CDF for different α
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α is high, these extreme probabilities are low, and as α rises, the density concentrates on
one value, approximating the case of a unique menu cost.
2.4.3 Calibration and results
Our set-up has introduced new parameters, relative to the models we have been considering:
the inverse of the average menu cost (λ), and the curvature of the menu cost distribution
(α). The other parameters important for the firm’s price setting problem are the variance of
the idiosyncratic shocks (σ2ε ), the arrival probability of the shocks (pε), and the probability
of a free price change (pz) which was used in the Midrigan model. We set these parameters
so that the model can match the empirical facts that we have discussed so far, which we
divide into two categories:
1. From existing models: although these have not been the focus of our discussion, all
the existing models match the average monthly frequency of price change and the
average size of price change. Our model therefore matches the median of these statistics
measured in our data. In addition, our empirical work has confirmed that, as previous
studies had shown, the correlation between inflation and the frequency of price change
is positive, so our model also matches this fact.
2. New moments: like the existing menu cost models, and consistent with the data, our
model will imply a strongly negative correlation between inflation and the dispersion
of price changes. The novelty will be that the implied correlation between inflation
and the skewness of price changes will be non-negative, as in the data.
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Table 2.11 presents the parameter values that we choose to match these moments, and Table
2.12 shows the moments attained by the model, compared to their empirical values.
Table 2.11: Parameter values
Parameter Description Value
λ Inv. average menu cost 0.1925
α Fatness of tails of MC 0.27
pz P(zero MC) 0.056
pε P(idio. shock) 0.345
σε Size of idio. shocks 0.101
Table 2.12: Simulation results
Moment Model Data
Avg. Frequency 11.3% 11.3%




The first two moments are matched almost exactly. For the empirical value of the correla-
tions, we present the results for the quarterly correlations involving the raw data, including
all time periods, and excluding suspicious small price changes (for dispersion and skewness),
and the weighted median for the frequency. The model matches the dispersion and frequency
correlations quite closely. However, the skewness correlation in the model is close to zero,
while it is clearly positive in the data for the whole sample. Before explaining this in more
detail, we illustrate these correlations with scatter plots for the generalized model under the
calibration above in Figures 2.20-2.22.
108





























Figure 18: Frequency & Inflation in Generalized MC model, Corr =0.58613
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Figure 19: Dispersion & Inflation in Generalized Model, Corr =-0.45496
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Figure 20: Skewness & Inflation in Generalized Model, Corr =0.048446
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While the skewness correlation in this model is lower than in the data, for the range of
inflation that occurs in the simulations (0-6%)11, the correlation also appears to be close to
zero in the data. We carry out the same “long-run” analysis as in Figure 2.5 above: solving
the model for different values of trend inflation. We find that for higher steady-state inflation,
the average level of skewness in the price change distribution rises, and the correlation
between period-by-period price change skewness and inflation (the same correlations we
have been focusing on so far) also rises. This result makes our model even more consistent
with the data, as it shows that when steady-state inflation is higher (as it surely was in the
early, high-inflation part of our sample), we should expect to see the skewness rising with
inflation. In addition, this also makes our model stand out even more from the existing ones,
as the other menu cost models feature a declining average price change skewness as steady-
state inflation rises (and a period-by-period skewness correlation that is always negative).
Figure 2.23 below shows this clearly by plotting the steady-state skewness correlations for
the Midrigan model and our heterogeneous menu cost model separately.
This pattern highlights how the steady-state (or trend) inflation plays an important role
behind our model’s non-negative skewness correlation. Indeed, positive trend inflation leads
firms to expect positive future inflation when considering whether to re-set their prices.
This will lead them to be less likely to cut their prices, even when facing an idiosyncratic (or
aggregate) shock that would reduce their current desired price. This asymmetry in firms’
willingness to cut prices also means that the left tail of the price change distribution will
11Inflation is less volatile and moves within a narrower range in our generalized model than in the other
menu cost models, even though the parameters of the nominal aggregate demand process are the same. This
is a direct result of the differences in monetary non-neutrality in the models, as higher non-neutrality means
that the same nominal shocks have a greater effect on real consumption (and induce greater real variation),
leading to less variation in inflation. This is shown below.
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Figure 2.23: Steady-state skewness correlation
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Figure 21: Steady-State Skewness Correlation
be less responsive to aggregate shocks, weakening the mechanism that led to the negative
skewness correlation in the existing models.
What these results and figures make clear is that the generalized menu cost model that
we presented, in making menu costs random in a way that weakens the selection effect,
matches the important empirical facts that have been the focus of previous work on sticky
prices as well as the existing models, and overturns the counterfactual prediction of these
models that we have emphasized. We now show what this means for the degree of monetary
non-neutrality.
2.4.4 Monetary non-neutrality
Monetary non-neutrality in these models is defined as the variation in real consumption
induced by the nominal aggregate demand shocks, which are the only aggregate shocks, and
we compare this statistic for the Calvo model, the Golosov and Lucas and Midrigan menu
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cost models, and our generalized menu cost model. As we have explained, making the menu
cost distribution random in the way that we have proposed weakens the selection effect that
is at work in menu cost models, so it is to be expected that this model would imply a greater
degree of monetary non-neutrality. Table 2.13 below provides a quantitative illustration
of this. As Golosov and Lucas (2007) had famously shown, their model features a trivial
Table 2.13: Monetary non-neutrality
Model Var(Ct) ∗ 104
Golosov and Lucas 0.05778
Midrigan 0.17588
Generalized Menu Cost 0.33617
Calvo 0.47696
amount of monetary non-neutrality compared to the Calvo model. Between the menu cost
models, the major difference is between the baseline (Golosov and Lucas) and the others.
Allowing for small price changes, as the Midrigan model does, leads to a very large increase
in monetary non-neutrality, and this was emphasized by Midrigan (2011). However, our
generalized model goes further by giving firms a large probability of effectively not being
able to change their price, and yields an even higher level of non-neutrality. The Calvo model
still has a higher degree of monetary non-neutrality, but our model gets significantly closer
than the others. To further illustrate the differences between the models, in Figure 2.24 we
plot the impulse response of real aggregate consumption to a one percentage point increase
in nominal aggregate demand in the same four models:
Not only is the effect on real activity greater on impact in our random menu cost model,
but the effect is also considerably more persistent than in the existing menu cost models. It
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Figure 2.24: Impulse responses in models
Months after shock
































is clear that while in the Golosov and Lucas model the real effect of a nominal shock is small
and transient, it is not so in our model, which has used the inflation-skewness correlation
to evaluate the strength of the selection effect. Finally, the Calvo model gives a closer
approximation to monetary non-neutrality than the other menu cost models.
2.5 Conclusion
The literature on sticky prices has made extensive use of price micro data to discipline models
of price setting, and in this way the models have conformed more and more to important
aspects of the dynamics of price changes. This line of work has notably enabled the study
of monetary non-neutrality to be more grounded in data. However, an important limitation
of the work done so far is that it has mostly used data for low inflation environments. Since
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the models in question are designed to study how prices respond to aggregate shocks, it is
helpful to be able to observe the behaviour of price changes under large aggregate shocks
and high inflation.
Our chapter contributes to this by using price data from the U.S. going back to the
late 1970’s to compare how the price change distribution changes with inflation, to the
predictions of a wide range of sticky price models. Our main finding is that the menu cost
models that have been most used in the literature fail to match the positive relationship
between inflation and the skewness of price changes in the data, because they uniformly
predict a sharp negative relationship. In addition, we argue that this relationship, although
not obvious at first site, follows very intuitively from the selection effect that is central to
menu cost models. We also show how a model with random menu costs can overcome this
problem when the distribution of menu costs features a significant probability of very high
and very low menu costs, making it resemble a Calvo model and weakening the selection
effect. Finally, this model predicts a degree of monetary non-neutrality that is considerably
higher than what is predicted by the Golosov and Lucas model, and higher still than the
Midrigan model.
The distinction between menu cost and Calvo models, or between state- and time-
dependent pricing models has taken an important place in this literature. Much work has
been done to show how these two ways of modelling pricing stickiness yield such different
implications on monetary non-neutrality, and to determine which models are best at match-
ing empirical facts. Our chapter contributes to this line of work by introducing statistics not
previously considered that are very useful to discriminate between the different models. In
addition, we follow Woodford (2009) in presenting the distinction between time- and state-
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dependent models as a continuum, or spectrum. Woodford (2009) shows how different values
for the firm’s cost of processing information leads to a different point on this spectrum. In
contrast, our approach is agnostic as to what ultimately underlies the randomness of menu
costs that allows our model to span the time versus state dependent spectrum. Instead, we
determine what point on the spectrum is most consistent with the data. Future research
could combine these two approaches to gain a better understanding into the nature and
importance of the informational constraints that underly price rigidity. For now, along with
Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) and Midrigan (2011), we show that the assumption made
by Golosov and Lucas (2007) of firms facing a single, constant menu cost is starkly at odds
with many aspects of the price data, and that monetary policy can be expected to have
substantial and persistent effects on real economic activity.
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Chapter 3




Risk premium in the foreign exchange market has been a prominent research topic in in-
ternational finance for decades. The well-known interest parity puzzle in foreign exchange
markets finds that countries with high interest rates tend to experience currency appreciation
in the short run, as discussed in such classic studies as Hansen and Hodrick (1980), Cumby
and Obstfeld (1981), and Fama (1984).1 Risk premium estimation plays an important role
in explaining this puzzle and in investigating the foreign exchange market structure. How-
ever, as in the case of other asset markets, people do not directly observe a risk premium;
rather, it must be inferred from ex post returns. The conventional method of estimating risk
premium is VARs, which has been applied in such papers as Clarida and Gali (1994) and
Engel (2016).
Recently, Clarida (2012) has introduced a novel method for exploring the inflation-indexed
bond market structure in order to estimate the risk premium. This chapter offers a detailed
investigation of risk premium estimation using this approach. There are two main findings.
First, the estimated risk premium is able to forecast subsequent exchange rate changes.
Second, contrary to the original finding of Meese and Rogoff (1983) that, even given the ex
post realizations of fundamentals, exchange rate changes are difficult to explain, there are in
fact periods in which exchange rate movements are driven largely by fluctuation in the fair
values of the spot exchange rate.
Because risk premium can only be revealed from ex post returns, economists conven-
tionally use single equation regressions of realized currency returns on short-term nominal
1More recent references on the foreign currency risk premium include Backus et al. (2001), Brunnermeier
et al. (2008), Clarida et al. (2009), Backus et al. (2010).
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interest rate differentials or system estimation of VARs to estimate risk premium. For ex-
ample in Clarida and Gali (1994), risk premium is estimated using the difference between
the realized real exchange rate and the real exchange rate under interest parity from a VAR
system. Moreover, the recent VAR paper by Engel (2016) has garnered widespread attention
for its contribution to the literature of providing evidence that the currency in levels tends
to be relatively stronger in real terms when a country’s relative real interest rate exceeds the
average. Nevertheless, there are two senses in which the risk premium that is determined
using the VAR model is estimated. First, the parameters of VARs are estimated; second,
the real economy has more sophisticated methods for estimating the returns and therefore
obtains a more complete information set than economists are able to obtain. Therefore,
although the VAR model is a flexible and convenient econometric tool, the limitation of this
model derives from its restrictive assumptions and specification errors.
Clarida (2012), however, has as mentioned introduced a novel estimation model that
does not suffer from the problems of specification and the information set, which makes it
possible to read risk premium directly from the inflation-indexed bond market data. The spot
exchange rate can be decomposed into the risk premium and fair value of the spot exchange
rate. Both are estimated through the non-arbitrage relationship between investing inflation-
indexed bonds from two countries. The risk premium corresponds to the excess return for
the home investor who invests in foreign bond as opposed to the home bond. The fair value
is the level of the spot exchange rate that equates the known real return from investing in
the domestic inflation-indexed bond to the expected real return from investing in the foreign
inflation-indexed bond. The only factor that needs to be estimated in this approach is the
expected deviation of the long-run real exchange rate from its steady state. Clarida (2012)
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assumes that the long-run real exchange rate is constant and can be approximated based on
its long-run mean. I relax this assumption by allowing the long-run real exchange rate to be
time-variant. In this chapter, I refer to this class of methods as the “IIB” approach.
Applying the IIB method, this chapter contributes to the literature on time-varying prop-
erties of the spot exchange rate, risk premium, and fair values through the investigation of
three currencies (the pound, yen, and euro). The importance of a shock on the risk premium
and on fair value accounting for the change in the spot exchange rate is examined in a series
of empirical studies. A rise in the risk premium in favor of a foreign country results from a
combination of an increase in the real interest rate differential (foreign minus home) and an
appreciation of the dollar. On average, half of the change in the risk premium is reflected
in a change in the spot exchange rate, and the other half is reflected in a change in the real
interest rate differential. By implication, some of the ex ante risk premium is earned via
an expected future depreciation of the dollar. I in fact estimate that a rise in the foreign
currency risk premium helps to forecast dollar depreciation in the future.
Moreover, I use the sign restriction approach in order to identify the risk premium shock
in a two-variable VAR model, the two variables being the risk premium and the change in
the fair value of the spot exchange rate. In general, shocks are miss identified or cannot be
identified in small order VARs. Sign restriction is a natural way to identify risk premium
shock in my model. In this way, the impulse responses of the spot exchange rate to the risk
premium and variance decomposition can be examined. In contrast with the conclusions
of Meese and Rogoff (1983), it is here argued that economic fundamental values have some
explanatory power regarding the spot exchange rate.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 formally lays out the IIB method, and
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Section 3.3 presents data sources and historical plots of the estimation. Then Section 3.4
offers a comparison of the estimated risk premium with the FAMA risk premium, and Section
3.5 illustrates the forecastability of the risk premium on subsequent exchange rate changes.
In Section 3.6, the impact of risk premium shocks is discussed using a sign restricted VAR
model. Section 3.7 studies the impact of monetary policy shock on the foreign exchange rate
market. Conclusions are discussed in Section 3.8.
3.2 Risk Premium Estimation Using an Inflation-Indexed
Bond Market Structure
This section presents a risk premium estimation approach using the inflation-indexed bond
market structure following Clarida (2012). The key relationship in this model is that a rise
in the risk premium in favor of a foreign currency results from a combination of a rise in the
real interest rate differential in favor of the foreign country together with an appreciation in
the domestic currency.
The main idea is that the risk premium can be inferred from the non-arbitrage relationship
between investing inflation-indexed bonds of the home country and those of a foreign country.
For instance, a US investor could invest a US inflation-indexed bond. Let ρt denote the dollar
price of a zero coupon inflation-indexed bond that pays off one dollar in n years multiplied
by the cumulative realized inflation of the home country. Thus, the known, non-stochastic






where rt,n presents the real interest rate of the bond. Moreover, a US investor could also
invest in foreign inflation-indexed bonds, such as a UK linker. Suppose the non-stochastic
realized real return of a foreign investor who invests in the foreign inflation-indexed bond is
r∗t,n if held to maturity. Under these circumstances, the real return for the home investor







where Qt = St
P ∗t
Pt
is the real exchange rate; Pt is the price level of the home country, and
P ∗t is the price level of the foreign country.
2 The risk premium of the foreign currency can
be expressed as the excess return for the home investor who invests in the foreign bond as













When θt,n > 0, the expected real return on holding the foreign bond exceeds the known real
return on holding the domestic bond. To estimate the risk premium, all of the variables
on the right are observable from the market data, except for the expected long-run real
exchange rate E(Qt+n). Clarida (2012) solves this problem by assuming a constant long-run
real exchange rate, i.e. E(Qt+n) = Q, where Q is the constant unconditional mean of the real
exchange rate defined by the long-run relative PPP. Therefore, the risk premium without











As a result, the spot exchange rate can be expressed as the product of the fair value without
PPP adjustment S̃t and the risk premium without PPP adjustment exp(−θt,n), i.e.








Fair value is the level of the spot exchange rate that equates the known real return from
investing in the domestic bond to the expected real return from investing in the foreign bond.
Notably, the assumption that the real exchange rate is expected to converge fully with its
unconditional mean in n periods brings flexibility and cleanness into the model; but there
is room for improvement.3 I relax this assumption by using a time-varying, long-run real
exchange rate, and thus a slower pace of real exchange rate adjustment.
Assumption 1. lnQt is an AR(1) process with autocorrelation ρ and variance σ
2,
lnQt+1 − E lnQ = ρ(lnQt − E lnQ) + ut+1, ut ∼ N (0, σ2).
The autocorrelation ρ controls the adjustment speed of the real exchange rate. For ex-
ample, when ρ = 0.87, the half-life of the PPP deviation is 5 years. Hence, the risk premium
3In Clarida (2012) as in this chapter, zero-coupon inflation-indexed bonds with ten-year maturity are
used. The approach by Clarida (2012) thus assumes that the real exchange rate converges fully with its
unconditional mean in ten years.
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exp[ρn(lnQt − E lnQ)] exp[σ2(1 + ρ2 + ...ρ2(n−1))].
(3.3)
Multiplying through by Qt and re-arranging, I obtain,
St =
˜̃St exp(−θ̃t,n),
where ˜̃St is the fair value with PPP adjustment. Thus, the spot exchange rate is the product
of the fair value ˜̃St and the risk premium exp(−θ̃) conditional on the half-life of the PPP






E(lnQ) exp[ρn(lnQt − E lnQ)] exp[σ2(1 + ρ2 + ...ρ2(n−1))]. (3.4)
Correspondingly, after taking logs, the change in the spot exchange rate is a combination of
the inflation differential (πt − π∗t ), the change in the linker yield differential n∆(r∗t,n − rt,n),
the change in the risk premium with PPP adjustment ∆θ̃t,n, and the change in the real
exchange rate deviation from its long run mean ρn∆(lnQt − E lnQ)−∆θ̃t,n:
∆st = πt − π∗t + n∆(r∗t,n − rt,n) + ρn∆(lnQt − E lnQ)−∆θ̃t,n. (3.5)
A rise in the endogenous θ̃t,n represents an increase in the risk premium on a foreign invest-
ment that is simply an increase in the expected excess return that a home investor earns on
an investment in a foreign inflation-indexed bond compared with the known real return such
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an investor earns on a domestic investment. Thus, from Equation (3.5), a rise in the expected
real return on the foreign investment must be brought about by some combination of a rise
in the foreign-home real interest differential and a contemporaneous real appreciation of the
domestic currency relative to the foreign currency.
The most important feature of the IIB method is that it provides an econometric free mea-
sure of the relevant risk premium given observed yields on inflation-indexed bonds and the
real exchange rate. A comparison between the risk premium estimated using the inflation-
indexed bond market structure and the VAR approach is discussed in Appendix C.1. More-
over, this convenient risk premium estimation procedure cannot be recovered using a nominal
bond market structure.4
3.3 Empirical Results
I now use the framework developed above to interpret the behavior of the euro, pound, and
yen.
Data. I use the data set provided by Clarida (2012), which is composed of daily obser-
vations of spot exchange rates and inflation-indexed bond yields, and monthly observations
of consumer price indexes for the US, UK, and euro area. The sample covers the period of
January 2001 through January 2011 for the US and UK, November 2003 through January
2011 for the euro area, and December 2004 to January 2011 for Japan.5 The monthly CPI
4A detailed discussion of the superiority of the inflation-indexed bond market structure over the nominal
bond market structure in risk premium estimation is available upon request.
5In the euro area, Jean-Claude Trichet became President of the European Central Bank in November
2003. I therefore begin the sample for the euro study from this month. In Japan, inflation-indexed bonds
were introduced in December 2004.
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level has been converted to daily observations via interpolation.6 I further assume that the
half-life of the real exchange rate PPP deviation is 5 years, so ρ = 0.87. Q is estimated using
the average real exchange rate during the sample period depicted.
I present the estimated fair value and risk premium of the three currencies in Figure 3.1
in daily frequency. For each exchange rate, I resolve the spot exchange rate into the fair
value and risk premium conditional on the half-life of PPP deviation and plot them in each
sub-figure. This exercise can be used to identify as well as quantify the importance of shocks
to the fair value and to risk premiums in accounting for exchange rate fluctuations over
different periods.
In Figure 3.1, the black solid line depicts the spot exchange rate; the blue dashed line
plots the fair value (S̃t) defined by Equation 3.2 without PPP adjustment; and the red dotted
line represents the fair value ( ˜̃St) defined by Equation 3.4 conditional on the half-life PPP
deviation. The risk premium is illustrated as the gap between the spot exchange rate and
the fair value. When the exchange rate of the euro or pound exceeds fair value, the risk
premium is in favor of the dollar. For the yen, the risk premium is in favor of the dollar
when the spot exchange rate is lower than the fair value, since the yen is denoted as yen
price per dollar.
It is clear that the risk premium conditional on the half-life PPP deviation is smaller
than the risk premium without PPP adjustment in general. This relationship makes sense
intuitively because the assumption of a constant, long-run real exchange rate would include
6The yield of the zero coupon US Tips is provided by Barclays. In the US, there is a market in which
inflation-indexed coupon Tips are stripped of their coupons and traded in zero coupon form. The yield of
the zero coupon UK linker is provided by the Bank of England. The yield bond in the euro zone is estimated
using the zero coupon French and German inflation-indexed bond that is provided by Morgan Stanley. For
Japan, the observed yield on coupon-bearing, inflation-indexed bonds is used.
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Figure 3.1: Spot exchange rate and fair value
(a) Decompose pound







































spot rate fair value with PPP deviation fair value without PPP deviation
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assuming the change in the long-run real exchange rate to be part of the risk premium.
However, the difference between ˜̃St and S̃t, or the difference between θ̃t,n and θt,n, is not
significant, especially in first difference terms.
Indeed, I find periods in which shocks to the risk premium are large and die out slowly,
and other periods in which exchange rate movements are mainly driven by the fluctuation of
the fair value. The latter scenarios (such as the broad changes in the value of the euro from
the summer of 2005 to the spring of 2008 or of the pound from the summer of 2002 to the
end of 2003) are contrary to the original finding of Meese and Rogoff (1983) that exchange
rate changes are difficult to explain even given ex post facto knowledge of the fundamentals.
Another interesting finding is that, during the global financial crisis and its aftermath in
the sample (09.2008-01.2011), risk premium shocks are the main driver of the spot exchange
rate fluctuations.
3.4 Comparison with the Fama Risk Premium
Fama (1984) is the classic study of the exchange rate risk premium for holding a long position
in a foreign nominal bond. This section connects the risk premium estimated using the IIB
method with the Fama’s conception of the risk premium, which is usually defined by the
first order log approximation,
Ft = E(st)− st−1 + i∗t−1 − it−1, (3.6)
where i∗t−1 − it−1 is the nominal interest rate differential between the foreign and home
countries. Notably, Famas risk premium is not comparable to the risk premium estimated
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using the inflation-indexed bond for two reasons: 1) it includes the inflation risk; and 2) it
includes the per-period rolling risk for short-term bonds. Nonetheless, we can reconfigure



























where dt is the nominal interest rate differential, which is equal to the foreign interest rate
minus the home interest rate (i∗t − it). Fair value ˜̃st (in logarithm) is the level of the spot
exchange rate that equates the known real return on investing in the US TIP to the expected
real return on investing in a foreign inflation-indexed bond. I use this VECM structure in
order to overcome the unit root issue of the spot exchange rate and the fair value series.
Using 3.7 and 3.6, the Fama risk premium can be estimated using,



























This relation generates the one-month Fama risk premium. To estimate the ten-year Fama
risk premium, I demean and accumulate Ft for ten years; thus the long-run risk premium
is F 10yrt =
∑120
i=0 Et(Ft+i). Figure 3.2 depicts the Fama risk premium F
10yr
t and the risk
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premium estimated using the IIB method θ̃t−1,n in monthly frequency.
7
Figure 3.2: IIB risk premium versus Fama risk premium
(a) Pound risk premium
GBR: IIB and 10 year Fama Risk Premium
IIB_RP ACCUMRP






(b) Euro risk premium
EUR: IIB and 10 year Fama Risk Premium
IIB_RP ACCUMRP











(c) Yen risk premium
JPN: IIB and 10 year Fama Risk Premium
IIB_RP ACCUMRP










7In this exercise, dt is estimated using the LIBOR rate.
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3.5 Does the Risk Premium Forecast Subsequent Ex-
change Rate Changes?
As shown in the serial correlation study by Clarida (2012) and in the dynamic conditional
correlation study presented in Appendix C.4, only about half of a shock to the risk premium
on the foreign currency is reflected in linker yield differentials. This implies that some of the
ex ante risk premium is earned via an expected future depreciation of the dollar even though,
as Clarida (2012) demonstrates, on average the dollar appreciates contemporaneously when
the risk premium rises. I now explore whether in the dataset I in fact estimate that a rise
in the foreign currency risk premium helps to forecast dollar depreciation.
In order to forecast the subsequent period spot exchange rate in response to a contempo-
raneous risk premium shock, I run the following regression on the monthly data:
st+j − st = ζθ + βjθ θ̃t + ut+j j ∈ {1, 2, , 12}. (3.9)
My interest is in estimating the sign and significance of the coefficient βjθ .
However, regressions of the form Equation 3.9 suffer the complications of overlapping data
as well as small sample bias, since θt,n, while pre-determined, is not exogenous. On the one
hand, the explanatory variable θt,n is persistent in the data. On the other hand, the shock to
the regressor is correlated with the shock to the exchange rate. Therefore, I implement the
augmented regression method introduced in Hjalmarsson (2008) in order to correct for small-
sample bias. I compute robust standard errors following the GMM proposed by Hansen and
Hodrick (1980).
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Using the augmented regression method and the auto-correlation robust standard errors,
I plot the estimated βjθ and its 90% confidence interval in Figure 3.3. The solid black line
depicts βjθ , while the dashed black lines represent the 90% confidence interval. The x-axis is
the forecast horizon j. Also, I estimate β0θ and plot it in the chart in order to capture the
contemporaneous effect of the risk premium shock. β0θ is the coefficient of the regression ∆st
on θ̃t. As is evident in Figure 3.3, the bias-adjusted regression coefficients indeed show the
expected positive value and are statistically significant. During a month in which the risk
premium on the foreign currency rises, on average the dollar appreciates, but in subsequent
months dollar tends to depreciate, which trend represents an ex-ante source of expected
return identified by the risk premium.
In the context of the Fama regression, researchers usually regress the subsequent change
in the spot exchange rate on the lagged short-term interest rate differential but not on the
estimate of the lagged risk premium per se. I instead regress the change in the spot exchange
rate on the estimated risk premium. I also note that the existence of a risk premium does not
in and of itself imply that exchange rate changes are forecastable. Rather, if the exchange
rate were not forecastable, fluctuations in the risk premium would be reflected entirely in
inflation-indexed yield differentials.
3.6 The Impact of Risk Premium Shocks
Another approach to studying the impact of the risk premium shock or the shock on fair
value is VAR. Reduced-form VAR models have been examined by many authors for the study
of the foreign exchange market. Risk premium, however, is not a direct input. With the help
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of the inflation indexed bond structure approach, I can use the risk premium to construct
the structure model directly (refer to Appendix C.5 for detail). I use a VAR model with two
variables, risk premium and the change of fair value. Nonetheless, identifying risk premium
shocks is challenging. In general, shocks are miss identified or cannot be identified in small
order VARs. Cholesky decomposition is not a good approach, because both variables in
the system are endogenous. Instead, sign restriction is a natural way to identify the risk
premium shock. According to Clarida and Luo (2015), risk premium appreciates dollar
contemporaneously and rises fair value of the foreign currency. I use a sign restriction
approach following Uhlig (2005).8 First, I construct innovations based on the reduced-form
residual of the VAR. Second, I impose sign restrictions and select the components of the
orthogonal innovation vector that have economic interpretations meaningful for identifying
risk premium shock. Let the Wold MA representation of the system be,






and Ψ(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator. For any orthonormal matrix T ,
Σ = V TT ′V ′ = AA′ is an admissible decomposition of Σ, where A = V T and V is the
Cholesky factor.
Definition 3.6.1. The vector a ∈ R2 is called an impulse vector, iff there is some matrix
8The sign restrictions approach has also been discussed by Canova and Nicoló (2002), Mountford and
Uhlig (2009), Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2010), etc.
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A, so that AA′ = Σ and so that a is a column of A.
Thus, ut vector can be transformed to Aεt where εt ∼ (0, I). Thus,
Yt = Φ(L)εt, εt ∼ (0, I), (3.10)
where Φ(L) = Ψ(L)A. The identification problem of the structure VAR model is that A
is not unique. In order to choose among various decompositions and identify risk premium
shocks with interpretable disturbance, I impose the following sign restrictions.
Assumption 2. A risk premium impulse vector is an impulse vector a, so that the impulse
responses to a of the change of spot exchange rate is negative at horizon k = 0, and the
impulse responses to a of the level of the fair value is positive at horizons k = 0, 1, 2.
First, a positive risk premium shock generates a contemporaneous appreciation of the











Let φka(x) denote the impulse response of variable x to impulse vector a at horizon k and
φk∗a (x) denote the sign restriction on the impulse response of variable x to impulse vector a
at horizon k, where φk∗a (x) = 1 if the sign restriction is positive and φ
k∗
a (x) = −1 if the sign
restriction is negative. Thus, the first restriction means that the spot exchange rate appreci-
ates contemporaneously after a positive risk premium shock, φ0∗s (a) < 0. Second, fair value
increases in the first three periods after the shock, φk∗˜̃s (a) > 0 for k = 0, 1, 2. Next, I search
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for a set of a that can generate impulse responses consistent with the restrictions. Then,
I compute the impulse response functions (IRF) and variance decomposition of {∆s,∆˜̃s}
and {s, ˜̃s} from this VAR approach. Results are plotted in Figures 3.4 to 3.9 using monthly
data.910 As already mentioned, when the risk premium on the foreign currency rises, the
dollar on average appreciates contemporaneously, but in subsequent periods the dollar tends
to depreciate, which is an ex-ante source of expected return identified by the risk premium.
This result is consistent with the long horizon forecastability test presented in Section 3.5.
However, using a pure sign restriction approach, I obtain a set of decompositions with
interpretable disturbances. Unlike the Cholesky decomposition, this approach does not pro-
vide an exact identification. Instead, a penalty function approach can narrow down the
search of f . The penalty-function approach finds a to minimize a function that penalizes
impulse vectors that fail to satisfy sign restrictions, i.e.
min
a








a (x) = −1 and φka(x) < 0;
100φka(x)/σx, if φ
k∗
a (x) = −1 and φka(x) > 0;
−φka(x)/σx, if φk∗a (x) = 1 and φka(x) > 0;
−100φka(x)/σx, if φk∗a (x) = 1 and φka(x) < 0.
I choose b = 1/n, where n is the total number of restrictions on the IRF of ˜̃s. b equals to
9My Matlab code is developed from the sign restriction package by Ambrogio Cesa-Bianchi, 2014, “VAR
Toolbox”.
10Notably, the variance decomposition behaviour of the fair value of euro is different from that of the
other two currencies. This might come from the fact the sample covers the financial crisis and the euro crisis
period.
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1/3 in this case. The penalty function is an additional identification restriction in addition
to the sign restrictions. The impulse response and the variance decomposition suggested by
this approach are also plotted in Figures 3.4 to 3.9.
Most papers find it difficult to explain exchange rate movements using fair value shocks.
For example, Evans (2012), using a 5-variable VAR model, claims that fundamental variables
represent a very minor driver of the exchange rate fluctuation, specifically arguing that,
across the G-7 countries, less than 10% of the variance in the real exchange rate is attributable
to variance in the real exchange rate. By contrast, the variance decomposition estimated
using the IIB estimated risk premium and fair value indicates that the variance contribution
of fair value shocks has a wide range (as shown in Figures 3.4, 3.6, 3.8) and could be as high
as 40% (as shown in Figure 3.6). Moreover, fair value shocks are the main driver of the spot
exchange rate change in the long run, while risk premium shocks play minor roles in the
change of long run spot exchange rate (as shown in Figures 3.5, 3.7 and 3.9). This finding is
consistent with the empirical results by Mark (1995) that long-horizon changes in exchange



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.7 The Impact of Monetary Policy News Shock on the
Foreign Exchange Market
With the daily risk premium thus made available, the impact of a monetary policy shock on
foreign exchange rate variables is taken up in this section. This study exploits two kinds of
policy shock series constructed by Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) using identification based
on a heteroskedasticity-based estimator: one (Table 3.1) uses a 30-minute window around
scheduled Federal Reserve announcements arises from news about monetary policy, and the
other one (Table 3.2) uses a daily window. In both tables, the left panel reports standard
errors with bootstrapping and the right reports simple OLS regression results on FOMC
days.
This study shows that monetary policy shock has a significant impact on the spot exchange
rate and risk premium. The shock of an increase in the US interest rate would have a negative
impact on the foreign currency risk premium. This result is identified by a negative coefficient
on the risk premium change for the pound and euro and a positive coefficient for the yen,
again given that the latter currency is denoted as yen price per dollar. The monetary policy
shock also appreciates the dollar and decreases the real interest rate differential in favor of
the foreign country. Notably, these results are consistent with the finding by Faust et al.
(2007). Further, for the pound, the impact is mainly on the real interest rate differential
and the risk premium. For the euro, the impact is mainly on the spot exchange rate and the
real interest rate differential.
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Table 3.1: Responses of exchange rate variables on monetary policy shock (30-min window)
Bootstrap Rigobon OLS
∆s ∆˜̃s ∆n(r∗t,n − rt,n) ∆θ̃ ∆s ∆˜̃s ∆n(r∗t,n − rt,n) ∆θ̃
GBR 0.00 -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 0.00 -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06***
EUR -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.07** 0.01 -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.07*** 0.00
JPN 0.08* 0.08** 0.06* 0.00 0.08** 0.08** 0.06* 0.00
Note: this table reports the coefficients of regressing ∆s, ∆˜̃s, ∆n(r∗t,n − rt,n), and ∆θ̃ on monetary
policy shocks identified by the 30-min FOMC window.
Table 3.2: Responses of exchange rate variables on monetary policy shock (daily window)
Bootstrap Rigobon OLS
∆s ∆˜̃s ∆n(r∗t,n − rt,n) ∆θ̃ ∆s ∆˜̃s ∆n(r∗t,n − rt,n) ∆θ̃
GBR -0.00 -0.06* -0.06** -0.06** -0.00 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***
EUR -0.04 -0.06** -0.05** -0.02 -0.04** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.02
JPN 0.04 0.05* 0.04 0.01 0.05** 0.06*** 0.05** 0.01
Note: this table reports the coefficients of regressing ∆s, ∆˜̃s, ∆n(r∗t,n − rt,n), and ∆θ̃ on monetary
policy shocks identified by the daily FOMC window.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter uses the novel structure relationship of the inflation-indexed bond market in
order to estimate risk premium. Although the VAR model is convenient and has been
popular for decades, its drawbakcs include the need to specify a particular information set,
as well as specification errors, which introduce uncertainties into empirical studies. The main
advantage of the IIB method is that risk premium can be inferred from inflation indexed
bond market data without restrictive assumptions. The daily series constructed from market
data offer important insights for the study of international finance. Nonetheless, the VAR
method is restricted owing to its strict assumptions, while the IIB method is constrained
by the availability of the inflation-indexed bond market across countries. Although neither
of the two methods is perfect, this chapter contributes to the literature by comparing them
empirically and providing time-varying properties for the exchange market.
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Moreover, this exercise implies some sort of correlation between the change in the spot ex-
change rate and that in fair value. In the world of Messe-Rogoff, there is no such correlation.
A random walk model performs as well as other in terms of its out-of-sample forecasting
accuracy. Not only is the exchange rate difficult to forecast using fundamental variables, but
it is also difficult to correlate with the actual realized values of future explanatory variables.
The time-varying properties in this chapter nevertheless show that the fair value has a strong
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Trade Credit
Trade credit is a short-term loan a supplier provides to its customer upon a purchase of its
product. It is the single most important source of external finance for firms (Boissay and
Gropp (2007)). Two types of trade credit rules are common (Nilsen (2002)). One type is a
one part contract, Net-30. Suppliers give buyer 30-day interest free loans. The other type
is a two part contract, 2/10 Net 30. If customers pay within 10 days of delivery, then they
qualify a 2% discount; otherwise they can pay up to 30 days after delivery.
Empirical evidence shows that the implicit interest rate in a trade credit agreement is
usually very high as compared with the rate on bank credit.1 Peterson and Rajan (1997) for
example, conservatively estimate trade credit cost and find it more expensive than 99.8% of
the loans. The high interest rate on trade credit arises because of an insurance premium and
a default premium. Suppliers provide financing help through trade credit or defer payments
1Be aware that price may be in the form of intrinsic interest.
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Table A.1: Trade credit (Compustat)
AP/COGS AP/S AR/S AP/TA AR/TA
Agriculture 0.43 0.30 0.41 0.05 0.04
Mining 1.00 0.50 0.60 0.05 0.05
Utilities 0.49 0.36 0.51 0.04 0.06
Construction 0.43 0.34 0.88 0.10 0.20
Manufacturing 0.49 0.32 0.57 0.07 0.13
Wholesale trade 0.44 0.33 0.41 0.18 0.21
Retail trade 0.42 0.28 0.09 0.14 0.05
Transportation 0.30 0.22 0.37 0.04 0.09
Information 0.64 0.26 0.57 0.05 0.09
FIRRL 60.42 25.68 0.68 0.56 0.07
PBS 0.37 0.23 0.66 0.06 0.20
Educational 0.25 0.16 0.57 0.05 0.15
Arts 0.21 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.01
Other services 0.37 0.23 0.22 0.06 0.07
Table A.2: Trade credit (QFR)
AP/S AR/S AP/TA AR/TA
Mining 0.49 0.64 0.05 0.06
Manufacturing 0.31 0.45 0.07 0.10
Wholesale trade 0.33 0.36 0.20 0.22
Retail trade 0.28 0.14 0.16 0.08
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when customers have already exhausted their bank credit line. In my model, I do not consider
trade credit interests. However, my results about the propagation of financial shocks still
hold in a set up with positive trade credit interest rates.
Several theories have been put forth to explain why suppliers provide credit to customers
even though those firms cannot get additional banking credit. On the one hand, suppliers
would like to keep business relationship as the cost of losing customers is high. On the other
hand, suppliers may have an information advantage over banks and have a comparative ad-
vantage in liquidating collateral that the borrower may put up to secure the loan. Moreover,
the transaction argument states that trade credit reduces the transaction cost of paying bills.
Also, there are papers study the role of trade credit in mitigating supply chain moral hazard.
This paper does not focus on explaining the existence and the optimal choice of trade credit,
but it studies the impact of trade credit on the propagation of shocks.
Notably, a trade credit debtor in bankruptcy almost surely default on the claims held by its
trade creditors (Boissay and Gropp (2007)). Shocks to the liquidity of some firms caused by
the default of the customers, may in turn cause default or postponement of accounts payables
on their suppliers and propagate upstream through the production chain. A distress at a
single firm may induce a cascade of defaults throughout the production chain. The trade
credit propagation mechanism will amplify the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on aggregate
output. Thus, this mechanism creates a big multiplier effect. Although this feature is not
included in this paper, it is worth investigating in my future research.
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A.2 Simple Network Models
A.2.1 Equilibrium results:
The horizontal economy:
Notably, the labor demand function in this economy follows,
αipimi = Riwli, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. (A.1)







αi , i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. (A.2)
The equilibrium aggregate output becomes,
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The labor allocation is,
l1 =
{
ζ1 + (1− α2)
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The aggregate output is,
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A.2.2 Propagation of shocks
Supply shocks: I begin the analysis of supply shocks by analyzing their transmission. In par-
ticular, I want to consider technology shocks in the network economy. Clearly, the technolo-
gies employed by upstream firms have significant impact on the outputs of their downstream
firms (according to Equation A.4-A.6).
Proposition 5. In the network model with financial frictions, supply shocks generate strong
downstream propagation. Moreover, downstream firms with larger shares of intermediate
inputs (1−αi+1) are more affected by this downstream propagation. The elasticity of sectoral
















Technology shocks mainly generate downstream propagation because they lead to sig-
nificant changes in intermediate input prices. Moreover, the share of intermediate inputs
in the production function ((1 − αi)) controls the power of this downstream propagation.
Intuitively, the larger the intermediate input usage of a firm, the more sensitive the firm is
to shocks that flow down the production chain.
Demand shocks. To explain the propagation of demand shocks in a production chain, I mod-
ify the non-production side of the model slightly, as follows: 1) the aggregate consumption





a government that collects lump-sum taxes to finance its expenditures {g1, g2, g3} is posited.
The budget constraints of households thus become
∑
i pici + T = wL + Ψ. The budget
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constraint of the government becomes
∑
i pigi = T . The market clearing conditions become
m1 = m21 + c1 + g1, m2 = m32 + c2 + g2, m3 = c3 + g3.





























Normalize w to be 1. I have sectoral prices, p1, p2, p3 are independent of the demand shock.
Consumption {c1, c2, c3} is independent of the demand shock. m3 doesn’t change. ∆m2
equals ∆g2.
From this starting point, the impact of demand shocks such as government expenditure
shocks (gi shocks) to the economy can be analyzed. Solving for the equilibrium of this
economy generates the following result.
Proposition 6. In the network model, when government expenditure is taken into account,
demand shocks generate strong upstream propagation. Moreover, firms that have a larger
proportion of output purchased by the impacted firms (ρi ≡ mi+1,imi ) are naturally more sen-
sitive to the demand shock. The sensitivity of firm outputs to the government expenditure














Consumption and price levels of the economy remain constant. The affected firms adjust
their production levels, and thus their input demands, after the government expenditure
shock. As a consequence, demand-side shocks mainly create upstream propagation. More-
over, the share of sectoral output used as intermediate inputs ρi governs the strength of this
upstream propagation. Intuitively, the larger this share is, the more sensitive the firm is to
shocks that flow up the production chain.







(1− α2)ζ2[θ2 + (1− θ2)R1]
[θ2 + (1− θ2)R2]2
[
−(1− θ2) + (1− α3)ζ3 θ2−θ3[θ3+(1−θ3)R3]
]
R2{
ζ1 + (1− α2) [θ2+(1−θ2)R1][θ2+(1−θ2)R2]
[






= −α2 − (1− α2)
(1− θ2)R2
θ2 + (1− θ2)R2
+
(1− α3)ζ3(1− θ3)R2








α2 + (1− α2)
(1− θ2)R2
θ2 + (1− θ2)R2
− (1− θ3)R2
θ3 + (1− θ3)R2
]
.








































A.2.3 The influence vector
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Assume αi = αj, thus
α1w̃ = z− [I1 − I2Ω]R + (I − Ω)p,
where 1 is a column vector of N ones.
Multiplying this equation by ((I − Ω′)−1ζ)′ obtains
w̃ = v′[z− (I1 − I2Ω)R].
with
v ≡ (I − Ω′)−1ζ.
ζ ′p corresponds to the aggregate price index P , which is constant.
From households’ optimization problem, we have Y = w. Thus,
Ỹ = v′[z− (I1 − I2Ω)R].
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Solve yi and mi. Henceforth, I solve for yi and mi. From firms’ first order conditions I
obtain,
(1− θij)Ri + θij
(1− θij)Rj + θij
pjmij = (1− αi)ωijpimi,
wliRi = αipimi.
From the final producer’s first order conditions I have,
piyi = ζiY = ζiw.
Log linearize the production function and substitute the first three equations, I obtain,
m̃i = z̃i + αi(m̃i + p̃i − w̃ − R̃i) + (1− αi)
∑
j
ωij[m̃i + p̃i − p̃j
− (1− θi)R̄
[(1− θi)R̄ + θi]
R̃i +
(1− θi)R̄
[(1− θi)R̄ + θi]
R̃j],
⇒





ỹj − ỹi −
(1− θi)R̄
[(1− θi)R̄ + θi]
R̃i +
(1− θi)R̄





y = [I − Ω]−1[z− (I1 − I2Ω)]R,
where y is a vector of ỹi.
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From goods market clearing condition, I obtain
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
Thus
t = [I − Ω̂′]−1[I∑ − Ω̂′I2]R,
where I∑ is a diagonal matrix with diagonal element ∑j(1− αj)ω̂ji (1−θj)R̄[(1−θj)R̄+θj ] . Given that,

























































































t̃i = m̃i − ỹi, so t = m− y.
Thus, the vector of the log deviation of firm output from the steady state (m̃i) follows,
m = [I − Ω]−1z−
{
[I − Ω̂′]−1[−I∑ + Ω̂′I2] + [I − Ω]−1(I1 − I2Ω)]
}
R. (A.11)
The first term in the brace captures upstream propagation of the interest rate shock, while the
second term captures downstream propagation. This equation indicates that financial shocks
propagate both upstream and downstream, while supply side shocks (such as technology
shocks) only propagate downstream.
A.3 Empirical Results & Robustness Checks
A.3.1 The U.S. input-output matrix
Figure A.1 plots the input-output matrix (Ω) of the U.S..
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A.3.2 Empirical results
Table A.3: UP vs. DOWN - panel
dependent variable: m̃it (2002.09-2014.12)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
monthly quarterly 6-month yearly
UPit−1 -0.0876** -0.1704*** -0.0929** -0.1108*
[0.0338] [0.0301] [0.0441] [0.0564]
DOWNit−1 0.0479 0.1779 0.1645 0.0374
[0.0605] [0.1252] [0.1687] [0.1927]
Shockit−1 0.0685 -0.0917 -0.4395*** -0.2775**
[0.0480] [0.1058] [0.1221] [0.1230]
m̃it−1 -0.1270*** 0.0027 0.0891* -0.0851
[0.0358] [0.0424] [0.0502] [0.0701]
Observations 8,673 2,832 1,357 649
Group 59 59 59 59
Notes: Estimations include time and sector fixed effects, report stan-
dard errors clustered by sector and are unweighted. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.5: UP vs. DOWN: additional lags
dependent variable: m̃it (2002.09-2014.12)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
monthly quarterly 6-month yearly
L.upshock -0.0557 -0.1963*** -0.1029** -0.0985*
[0.0358] [0.0343] [0.0415] [0.0576]
L2.upshock -0.0905** 0.0281 -0.0612 0.0454
[0.0352] [0.0341] [0.0421] [0.0392]
L.downshock 0.0428 0.2187 0.1686 0.0610
[0.0670] [0.1327] [0.1747] [0.2002]
L2.downshock -0.1389** -0.1045 -0.0254 -0.0164
[0.0655] [0.1106] [0.1149] [0.1471]
L.ownshock 0.0479 -0.0641 -0.4374*** -0.3317**
[0.0489] [0.1189] [0.1238] [0.1362]
L2.ownshock 0.0778 -0.2173** -0.0790 -0.1668
[0.0659] [0.0859] [0.0902] [0.1218]
L.dip -0.0078 0.0087 -0.0804** -0.0473
[0.0277] [0.0412] [0.0364] [0.0418]
L2.dip -0.1306*** 0.0394 0.0768 -0.1039
[0.0385] [0.0291] [0.0509] [0.0724]
Observations 8,673 2,832 1,357 649
Group 59 59 59 59
Notes: Estimations include time and sector fixed effects, report
standard errors clustered by sector and are unweighted. ∗, ∗∗, and




A.4.1 Derivation of Philips’ curve















































































































































































Dt = (1− γ)π∗−επε + γDt−1πε
Yw = DY
A.4.3 Financial intermediary
The intermediary balance sheet of banks in group i is,
QitSit + Lit = Nit +Bit. (A.12)
Their net worth evolves according to:
Nit+1 = (Rik,t+1 −Rt)QitSit + (RiL,t −Rt)Lit +RtNit (A.13)
Thus,









(1− τ)τ jβj+1Λt,t+1+j(Ni,t+1+j), (A.14)
Thus, it can be written as,
Vit(Nit) = νkitQitSit + νlitLit + ηitNit
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with
νkit = Et[(1− τ)βΛt,t+1(Rik,t+1 −Rt) + βΛt,t+1τxkit,t+1νkit+1],
νlit = Et[(1− τ)βΛt,t+1(RiLt −Rt) + βΛt,t+1τxlit,t+1νlit+1],
and
ηit ≡ Et[(1− τ)Λt,t+1Rt+1 + βΛt,t+1τzit,t+1ηit+1].
xkit,t+j ≡ Qi,t+jSi,t+jQitSit and xlit,t+j ≡
Li,t+j
Lit
are the gross growth rate in assets between t and
t+ j, and zit,t+j ≡ Nit+jNit is the gross growth rate of net worth. νit is the expected discounted
marginal gain of expanding assets by a unit, holding net worth constant. It is an increasing
function of the risk premium. ηit is the expected discounted value of having an additional
unit of net worth, holding asset constant.
Given the binding incentive constraint,
Vit(Nit) ≥ λi(QitSit + Lit),
I obtain leverage ratio,
φit =
ηit
λi − ditνkit − (1− dit)νlit
. (A.15)
Proof of the non-arbitrage condition
Vit(Nit) = (1− τ)βE(Λt,t+1Nit+1) + τβE(Λt,t+1Vit+1)
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I have,
[νkitditφit + νlit(1− dit)φit + ηit]Nit =
βΛt,t+1[(1− τ) + τ(νkit+1dit+1φit+1 + νlit+1(1− dit+1)φit+1 + ηit+1)]
·[(Rik,t+1 −Rt)ditφit + (RiL,t −Rt)(1− dit)φit +Rt]Nit
Denote Ht,t+1 = βΛt,t+1[(1− τ) + τ(νkit+1dit+1φit+1 + νlit+1(1− dit+1)φit+1 + ηit+1)]. Thus,
νkit = Ht,t+1(Rik,t+1 −Rt)
νlit = Ht,t+1(RiLt −Rt)
ηit = Ht,t+1Rt
Denote hit as the Lagrangian multiplier. The bankers’ problem can be written as,
max
dit,φit




















Value of bank’s capital
νkit = Et[(1− τ)βΛt,t+1(Rik,t+1 −Rt) + βΛt,t+1τxkit,t+1νkit+1]
νlit = Et[(1− τ)βΛt,t+1(RiLt −Rt) + βΛt,t+1τxlit,t+1νlit+1]
Value of banks’ net wealth




λi − ditνkit − (1− dit)νlit
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Growth rate of banks’ capital
zit,t+1 = [(Rikt −Rt−1)dit−1φit−1 + (RiLt−1 −Rt−1)(1− dit−1)φit−1 +Rt−1]









Aggregate capital , net worth
QitSit + Lit = φitNit (A.18)
Sit = kit (A.19)












Nit = Neit +Nnit (A.21)
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Existing banks’ net worth accumulation
Neit = τ [(Rikt −Rt−1)dit−1φit−1 + (RiLt−1 −Rt−1)(1− dit−1)φit−1 +Rt−1]Nit−1eNei (A.22)
New banks’ net worth
Nnit = ω(QitSit−1 + Lit−1) (A.23)
The return of the capital
Rik,t+1 = e
ψt+1























[[(1− θijt)RiLt + θijt] + ς(θijt − θ̄i)2]pij,tmij,t = γiωijpi,tmit (A.27)
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pijt = pjt/[(1− θijt)RjLt + θijt] (A.28)
Trade credit:


















































Ft = YtPmt + βγΛt,t+1π
εFt+1
Zt = Yt + βγΛt,t+1π
ε−1Zt+1
Price index















mij + yi = mi (A.36)















lit = lt (A.38)
Fisher equation


















Gt = Ḡeg (A.41)
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A.4.5 Calibration of labor share and capital share
αi and βi are calibrated using the BEA GDP by Industry Value-added Components Table
(1998-2013) and the calibration method follows Su (2014).
Labor share = Compensation of employees +1/2 of the noncorporate part of other gross
operating surplus.
Capital share = Gross operating surplus + taxes on production and imports less subsidies
−1/2 of the noncorporate part of other gross operating surplus.
A.4.6 Propagation of financial shocks
Table A.6: UP vs. DOWN - model simulation
m̃it one quarter 6-month 3-quarter one year
UPi,t=0 -0.1895*** -0.1979*** -0.1970*** -0.1887***
DOWNi,t=0 -0.0894*** -0.1293 *** -0.1818*** -0.2397***
Shocki,t=0 -0.3961*** -0.4360*** -0.4968*** -0.5684***
Notes: ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1% levels. The dependent
variables are the first quarter output change m̃i,t=1q, the first 6-month output
change m̃i,t=6m and the first year output change m̃i,t=1y respectively. Shocki,t=0
is the borrowing cost RiL change upon the impact of εNe5. The constructions
of UPi,t=0 and DOWNi,t=0 follows Equations 1.11 and 1.12.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Data Set and Statistics
As mentioned in the main text, the data set we use for our empirical analysis is the micro
data underlying the U.S. CPI for the period 1977-2014, with the previously unavailable
period being 1977-1986. One of us (Daniel Villar) worked intensively in the process of
re-constructing this data set from the micro film made available by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. This process is described in detail in Nakamura et al. (2015), and it leaves us
with a large data set that tracks the prices of individual, narrowly-defined products in a
monthly or bi-monthly frequency. We then combine this data set with the existing CPI data
(1987 onwards), and that forms the data set for our analysis. Figure B.1 below shows the
size of our sample month by month. We plot both the number of non-missing available prices
each month, as well as the number of price change observations available. The distinction is
important, because we are always interested in price change statistics. The number of price
observations is greater than the number of price change observations because for the price
186
change to be observed in a particular month, we need both the current month’s price, and
last month’s price. So when a product has a missing price for some month, the price change
will be missing for that month and the following month.











1980 1990 2000 2010
Price Obs Price Change Obs
Figure A1: Number of Observations by Month
The BLS makes a considerable effort to ensure that the prices of individual products
are tracked, so that the price changes cannot be attributable to changes in any product
characteristics. This conforms with our goals very well, as we are also only interested in
price changes of identical products. An individual product could be, for example, a two
quart bottle of Diet Coke in a particular supermarket location in New York City, or a
specific futon model in a particular furniture store in Los Angeles. The BLS also identifies
whenever a product substitution occurs, or when a new “version” of a particular product
is introduced. Since a change of version indicates that some characteristic of the product
has changed, we treat a new version as an entirely new product, and only compute price
changes by comparing price changes within identical versions. We compute price changes as
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As discussed in Section 2.3, we exclude observations for which there is any indication that
the price was not actually observed but imputed, and for which the product was on sale.
There are therefore missing observations in the price spells that we use. To compute the
price change for any given month, we compare the price for that month to the previous
month’s price, when it is available. When the previous month’s price is not available, we
compare the current price to the price from two months before. Without this, we would have
to drop a significant amount of data, as many prices are only sampled every two months.
Since price changes are relatively infrequent, we believe that it is overwhelmingly likely that
if a price changed between any two months, it only changed once, which means that we are
observing the true price change, whether it occurred in the current or previous month. This
is then not extremely important, as for much of our analysis we combine the price changes
by quarter or year.
With the price change observations, we then form distributions of these price changes,
keeping only the non-zero changes, for each period (either month, quarter, or year). For
the dispersion and skewness statistics, we first separate observations into categories that we
label major groups. There are thirteen of these, and table B.1 below provides a list, along
with the share of expenditure weight that they represent.
Services represent the lion’s share of the weight. We then compute the dispersion and
skewness statistics from each major group, and for each time period we then take an
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Table B.1: CPI group weight














expenditure-weighted average of the statistics, which represents the value of the statistics
that we will use. If, for example, Skewkt is the skewness of the distribution of price changes






We follow the same method for the dispersion, and thus obtain time series for the skewness
and dispersion of price changes. This also applies for the frequency, but there we calculate the
frequency first by ELI, which is a much narrower category. That is because the frequency is
merely an average of the dummy variable indicating whether a price has changed or not, and
it is calculated based on the number of price change observations (zero or non-zero), while
the other moments are only calculated based on the non-zero changes (which gives fewer
observations). This means that the frequency can be estimated with reasonable precision
by ELI. Finally, the expenditure weights that we use are those from the 1998 revision of
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the CPI, which are the latest ones available. Different weights were used for 1977-1987 and
1988-1997, but we keep the weights constant throughout the sample so that changes in the
weights do not induce changes in the statistics that we estimate.
B.2 Computational Procedure and Calibration
We solve the sticky price models in this paper by value function iteration, following the
method described in Nakamura and Steinsson (2010). The main difficulty with this method
applied to this type of problem is that an important variable entering the firm’s profit
function is the aggregate price level. Since its future evolution depends on each firm’s
price, every firm’s current state is, in principle, a state variable for all firms, making the
problem intractable. To get around this, we follow the example of Krusell and Smith (1998)
and approximate the law of motion of the price level with a finite number of moments,
as in Nakamura and Steinsson (2010). In particular, we impose that firms perceive future
inflation to depend only on future nominal aggregate demand (St, which is exogenous), and








Under this assumption, the state space can be reduced to three dimensions: the firm’s
idiosyncratic productivity (exogenous), the firm’s relative price (choice variable), and real
aggregate demand (Ct, which determines the real wage in equilibrium). The latter is endoge-
nously determined, but the probability distribution of its future value is known fully with
the law of motion of nominal aggregate demand, and the assumed law of motion of inflation.























where V (·) is firm z’s value function, ΠRt (z)1 is firm z’s real profits at time t, and DRt,t+1
is the real stochastic discount factor between time t and t+1. Our procedure to solve the
model then closely follows Nakamura and Steinsson (2010): First, we discretize the state
variables and propose a guess for the function Γ( St
Pt−1
) on the grid. Then, we solve for the
firm’s policy function, F2, by value function iteration, using the proposed Γ(·) function, the
stochastic processes for the exogenous variables (applied using the Tauchen (1986) method),
and the menu cost structure of the firm’s problem. We then check whether F and Γ are
consistent, by computing the price level (and inflation) implied by F for each value on the
St
Pt−1
grid and comparing it to the value given by Γ. If they are consistent, we stop and use
F to simulate the models. If they are not consistent, we update Γ and go back to the value
function iteration step and continue. To determine whether they are consistent, we compare
the inflation values, grid point by grid point, and consider that they are consistent when the
difference is smaller the difference in values between grid points.
The method described above applies to all the menu cost models (including the Calvo
model). However, the imperfect information models are markedly different in several ways,
and therefore require different methods. We solve these models using the same methods and
1It can be shown that the profit function under CES preferences and linear production using only labor
can be written as ΠR(A, p̃, C) = Cp̃−θ[p̃− ωCA ]
2Because the value of the menu cost in our general model is stochastic, the policy function is also a
function of the menu cost. However, because we assume that the menu costs are iid over time, they are not
a state variable.
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parameter values used in the original papers (Alvarez et al. (2011b) for the observation costs
model; Woodford (2009) for the rational inattention model), and use the policy functions to
simulate the models.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the existing menu cost models and the Calvo model are
calibrated to match the median frequency of price change and the median average size of
price change in the data. The way we compute these moments is by first calculating the
frequency of monthly price changes and the mean absolute value of price change by ELI-
year. We then compute the median across the ELI frequencies for each year (to obtain an
annual series for the median frequency) and to then take the mean across years. The average
frequency that we obtain is 11.3%, and the average size of price change is 8.0%. For the
Midrigan model (as well as our random menu cost model), we also target the fraction of
price changes that are small (less than 1% in absolute value). We compute this as with
the frequency and average size: evaluate fractions by ELI-year, and take weighted medians
across ELI’s. WE find a value of 12%. Table B.2 below shows the model-implied moments
for the Golosov and Lucas, Midrigan, and Calvo models, as well as our random menu cost
model, and compares them to their empirical values:
Table B.2: Model implied moments
Model Average Frequency (%) Average Size (%) Fraction Small (%)
Golosov and Lucas 11.1 8.0 0
Midrigan 11.0 8.0 12.4
Calvo 11.0 7.9 17.3
Random MC 11.3 8.0 12.2
Data 11.3 8.0 12.0
All the models match the frequency and size moments almost exactly, and the Midrigan
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and random menu cost models match the fraction of small changes very closely. The Calvo
and Golosov and Lucas models over- and undershoot the empirical value, respectively, as
they do not target it. Table B.3 below shows the parameter values that we choose for these
models.
Table B.3: Parameter values for models
Parameter Golosov and Lucas Value
χ Menu cost (as share of steady state revenue) 0.019
σε Std. dev. of idiosyncratic tech. shocks 0.042
Midrigan
χHigh Menu cost (when positive) 0.034
σε Std. dev. of idiosyncratic tech. shocks 0.076
pz Probability of free price change 0.037
pε Probability of receiving idio. shock 0.153
Calvo
α Probability of price change 0.111
σε Std. dev. of idiosyncratic tech. shocks 0.197
For the multi-sector model, we use the same parameter values as in Nakamura and Steins-
son (2010), which make the model match the average frequency and size of price change for
each of 14 sectors.
B.3 Additional Empirical Results
In Section 2.2, we presented results on the empirical result between inflation and various
price change moments, using both scatter plots and regressions. For the scatter plots, the
measure of inflation that we used was Core PCE inflation, which excludes food and energy
prices that tend to be quite volatile (and that could be influenced by sectoral shocks that we
do not consider in the models). In addition, since the PCE index is chained, it tends to yield
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a lower value for inflation than the CPI. However, for the regressions, we used CPI inflation
because we include expected inflation as a control, and the survey of inflation expectations
asks about expectations of CPI inflation specifically. We therefore used CPI inflation to
make the two variables more comparable. In Figure B.2 below, we plot the twelve month
log change for both indexes. They both co-move very strongly, although the peak is much










1980 1990 2000 2010
CPI Core PCE
Figure A2: Inflation
In this section we show that our results do not depend on which inflation measure we
use, so we present scatter plots with CPI inflation, and regression results with Core PCE
inflation as the regressor. The only difference that this makes is that in the regressions, the
absolute value of the coefficients on inflation are slightly larger, because core PCE inflation
does not attain as high a value, so the estimated slope of the moments on inflation is smaller.
We also present results using series filtered by a moving average smoother and seasonally
adjusted by removing quarterly dummies. Again, the the same results hold, but they come
out a bit more clearly. For all of these results, we focus on using the quarterly inflation and
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moment series, although the same results would hold with the monthly and annual series.
Figures B.3-B.6 below present scatter plots of the smoothed moment and inflation series.
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Figure A3: Frequency of Price Chane & Inflation Smoothed, Quarterly
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Figure A4: IQR & Inflation, Quarterly Smoothed
Figures B.7-B.10 are scatter plots using CPI inflation.
The patterns in these scatter plots are the same as in the ones presented in Section 2.3.
We further confirm these results with the regression tables below.
What these tables show is that while the size of the coefficients varies somewhat across
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Figure A5: Skewness & Inflation Smoothed, Quarterly
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Figure A6: Kelly Skewness & Inflation Smoothed, Quarterly; Corr = 0.734
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Figure A7: Frequency of Price Change & CPI Inflation, Quarterly
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Figure A8: IQR & CPI Inflation, Quarterly
Table B.4: Core inflation as regressor - frequency
Coefficients for Frequency Regressions
Weighted Median Weighted Mean
Specification 1977-2014 1985-2014 1977-2014 1985-2014
All 0.906*** 1.362*** -0.046 -0.231
(0.271) (0.313) (0.244) (0.305)
Fed Dummies 1.248*** 1.503*** 0.978*** 0.281**
(0.220) (0.214) (0.223) (0.258)
Inflation Only 0.877*** 1.083*** 0.374** -0.580**
(0.122) (0.253) (0.173) (0.296)
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Figure A9: Skewness & CPI Inflation, Quarterly
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Figure A10: Kelly Skewness & CPI Inflation, Quarterly; Corr = 0.674
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Table B.5: Smoothed and seasonal adjusted series - frequency
Coefficients for Frequency Regressions
Weighted Median Weighted Mean
Specification 1977-2014 1985-2014 1977-2014 1985-2014
Fed & Expected Infl 0.711*** 0.796*** 0.462 0.326*
(0.125) (0.210) (0.138) (0.189)
Fed Dummies 0.778 *** 0.889*** 0.723*** 0.284*
(0.075) (0.207) (0.109) (0.163)
Inflation Only 0.716*** 0.824*** 0.437*** -0.178
(0.062) (0.223) (0.105 ) (0.240)
Table B.6: Core inflation as regressor - IQR
Coefficients for IQR Regressions
All Observations EJRS
Specification 1977-2014 1985-2014 1977-2014 1985-2014
Inflation Only -0.412*** -0.676*** -0.461*** -0.803***
(0.060) (0.081) (0.068) (-0.086)
Fed Dummies -0.354*** -0.686*** -0.401*** -0.824***
(0.082) (0.095) (0.095) (0.099)
Fed & Expected Infl -0.366*** -0.485** -0.429*** -0.594***
(0.127) (0.117) (0.142) (0.128)
Table B.7: Smoothed and seasonal adjusted series - IQR
Coefficients for IQR Regressions
All Observations EJRS
Specification 1977-2014 1985-2014 1977-2014 1985-2014
Inflation Only -0.301*** -0.493*** -0.330*** -0.561***
(0.043) (0.073) (0.047) (0.086)
Fed Dummies -0.241*** -0.495*** -0.249*** -0.556***
(0.048) (0.084) (0.054) (0.097)
Fed & Expected Infl -0.164** -0.377** -0.178** -0.431 ***
(0.069) (0.073) (0.075) (0.083)
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Table B.8: Core inflation as regressor - skewness
Coefficients for Skewness Regressions
All Observations EJRS
Specification 1977-2014 1985-2014 1977-2014 1985-2014
Inflation Only 4.537*** 2.131 4.315*** 1.658
(1.306) (2.062) (1.285) (1.895)
Fed Dummies 7.546*** 3.716 6.997*** 3.396
(1.686) (2.270) (1.572) (2.087)
Fed & Expected Infl 4.683 6.224* 4.039* 5.991
(2.870) (3.316) (2.657) (3.136)
Table B.9: Smoothed and seasonal adjusted series - skewness
Coefficients for Skewness Regressions
All Observations EJRS
Specification 1977-2014 1985-2014 1977-2014 1985-2014
Inflation Only 3.656*** 1.208 3.263*** 0.699
(0.776) (1.222) (0.776) (1.148)
Fed Dummies 3.683*** 0.925 3.404*** 0.688
(0.689) (1.349) (0.680) (1.245)
Fed & Expected Infl 0.969 0.453 0.785 0.152
(1.206) (1.504) (1.182) (1.367)
Table B.10: Core inflation as regressor - Kelly skewness
Coefficients for Kelly Skewness Regressions
All Observations
Specification 1977-2014 1985-2014
Inflation Only 2.973*** -0.603
(0.537) (0.512)
Fed Dummies 4.035*** 0.504
(0.713) (0.606)
Fed & Expected Infl 2.066** 0.136*
(1.047) (0.721)
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Table B.11: Smoothed and seasonal adjusted series - Kelly skewness
Coefficients for Kelly Skewness Regressions
All Observations
Specification 1977-2014 1985-2014
Inflation Only 2.465*** -0.088
(0.342) (0.394)
Fed Dummies 2.479*** 0.282
(0.329) (0.435)
Fed & Expected Infl 1.636** 0.204
(0.731) (-0.430)
specifications, the results presented in Section 2.2 still hold: the frequency of price change
rises with inflation, the dispersion falls, and the skewness does not fall with inflation (the
relationship is positive but not significant in the low inflation period, and positive and mostly
significant in the whole sample).
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 IIB Versus VAR
Vector auto regression (VAR) is a conventional econometric tool to estimate risk premium
(Clarida and Gali (1994), Engel (2016)). Generally, the standard VAR model misses nonlin-
earities, conditional heteroskedasticity, and breaks in parameters. On the contrary, the IIB
method is more result robust than VARs in terms of specification errors and the dependence
on information set.
Firstly, the IIB method works on the market information set and is not constrained by
the assumption of the information structure. The key to estimate risk premium using VARs
is the forecast of the future path of real interest rate, which will depend on the assumed
information set. Even if the underlying specification is correct, different information sets
will have different specifications, which will generate different risk premium estimations. For
instance, an estimation of a three-variable VAR model will be different from a five-variable
VAR model. Nonetheless, the IIB estimation is constructed through the market data. There
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is no assumption on the information set investors have except the estimation of the real
exchange rate at the long run horizon.
The second critic of VARs is that the specification itself might change during the sample.
For example, the autoregressive properties of the real interest rate probably have changed
over the past 50 years. Without modification, VAR models will apply the same structure
relationship or parameters across the whole sample period, which is a strong assumption.
The superiority of the IIB method over the VAR method can be confirmed in the following
empirical studies. This section constructs the VAR estimated risk premium and ex ante real
interest rates by replicating Engel (2016).1
The VAR is constructed using real exchange rate qt, nominal interest rate differential it−i∗t ,
and ex post real interest rate differential rt−1 − r∗t−1 = it − i∗t − (πt+1 − π∗t+1), in log levels.2
After running the VAR, the ex ante real interest rate differential can be constructed using
expected inflation rates, i.e. r̂t−1 − r̂∗t−1 = it − i∗t − (π̂t+1 − π̂∗t+1), . In this section, variables
with hat represent expected values under the VAR estimation. Afterwards, the long run ex
ante real interst rate differential, R̂t ≡ Et
∑∞
i=0(r̂t+i− r̂∗t+i), can be estimated using standard
projection formula. Furthermore, in each period, risk premium is λ̂t = −(qt− q̂t+1)−(r̂t− r̂∗t ).
And the long run risk premium Λ̂t =
∑∞
i=0 λ̂t+i = −R̂t−qt−q̄ where qt−q̄ is the real exchange
rate deviation from its long run mean. Notably, both the VAR method and the IIB method
without PPP adjustment use the long run mean of the real exchange rate to approximate
1Engel (2016) examines risk premium across six countries, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and
U.K., with sample from 1979:6 to 2009:10. It presents two VARs. One uses the variables real exchange rate,
nominal interest rate differential, and ex post real interest rate differential; the other one uses the variables
real exchange rate, nominal interest rate differential and inflation differential. I replicated both VARs and
the results are very close. Thus only the result of the first VAR is presented and discussed in this paper.
2Notably, Engel (2016) uses the US interest rate minus foreign interest rate as the interest rate differential,
while the interest rate differential in this paper is represented by the foreign interest rate minus the US interest
rate (following Clarida (2012)). Nonetheless, this doesnt affect the comparison study.
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its long run steady state level. Furthermore, in the IIB estimation, risk premium is the
excess return of a 10-year investment. In order to compare the two methods, risk premium
and ex ante real interest rate differential of the VAR estimation at a ten year horizon are
constructed: Λ̂10yrt =
∑12n−1




i=0 (r̂t+i − r̂∗t+i).
Then, the empirical properties of risk premium and interest rate differential constructed
using the two estimation methods are discussed. Specifically, I compare θ̃t with Λ̂
10yr
t , and
n(r∗t,n − rt,n) with R̂
10yr
t . The results show that the IIB estimated risk premium is mostly
consistent with economic intuitions.
C.2 Historical Plot and Decomposition
Data. I use the dataset provided by Engel (2016) to estimate risk premium using the VAR
approach. In order to compare with the estimation of the IIB approach for the same time
period, this dataset is extended to be from 1979:06 to 2012:12 for the US, UK, Euro area
and Japan.3
Historical Plot. Figures C.1 to C.3 plot risk premium (θ̃t,n and Λ̂
10yr
t ) and ex ante long
run real exchange rate (n(r∗t,n − rt,n) and R̃
10yr
t ) estimated using the two methods over the
common sample period. The VAR estimated real interest rate differential is transformed




t+i − r̂t+i), which
equals to negative R̂10yrt . Thus, it is directly comparable with the inflation indexed bond yield
differential, n(r∗t,n − rt,n). As illustrated in the figures, the estimations of the two methods
have similar upward and downward trends. Nonetheless, they still perform differently.
The most important difference is that the risk premium of the VAR estimation is more
3For the euro, I use German data as baseline.
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Figure C.1: Pound: IIB versus VAR
	   27	  
Figure 5a British Pound VAR Estimation versus Get Real Estimation 
 
 
Note: scaled by 100 
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Figure C.2: Euro: IIB versus VAR
	   29	  
Figure 5c Euro VAR Estimation versus Get Real Estimation 
 
 
Note: scaled by 100 
 
  
Figure  4  Exponential  smoother  of  Daily  Change  (ρ=0.9)  
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Figure C.3: Yen: IIB versus VAR
	   28	  
Figure 5b Japanese Yen Estimation versus Get Real Estimation 
 
 




volatile than the risk premium of the IIB estimation, while the volatility of the real interest
rate differential of the VAR estimation is smaller than the volatility of the inflation indexed
bond yield differential. Notably, on the long run ex ante real interest rate, the IIB method
uses the inflation indexed bond yield n(r∗t,n − rt,n) which is directly observable. Thus the
gap between n(r∗t,n − rt,n) and R̃
10yr
t can be considered as a proxy of the estimation errors
of VARs. Another importance notice is that the real interest rate differential of the VAR
estimation barely fluctuates, because the auto regressive process converges quickly to the
unconditional mean, which generates low variation. The risk premium and the real interest
rate differential are the two key components of the spot exchange rate. As a consequence,
most of the spot rate fluctuation appears in the risk premium, under the VAR estimation.
The next decomposition exercise also confirms this property.
Additionally, the risk premium estimations of the two methods are different significantly,
especially for yen and euro. On yen, there is a significant gap between the two estimations
from 2004 to 2008 while the difference shrinks for years later than 2008. On the other hand,
the euro study shows that the risk premium estimated using the IIB method is consistently
higher than the VAR estimation.
Decomposition of Spot Exchange Rate Change. On the one hand, according to
Equation 3.5, Figures C.4 to C.6 decompose the change in spot exchange rate into the change
in inflation differential, the real interest rate differential, the PPP deviation and the level of
risk premium. On the other hand, using the VAR method, the change in spot exchange rate
is decomposed into the change in inflation differential, the change in estimated real interest
rate differential and the change in risk premium. In the IIB model, the only parameter I
need to estimate is the level of real exchange rate at long horizon. Both the IIB and the
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Figure C.4: Pound: ∆s decomposition
	   30	  
Figure 6a Decomposition of GBR Spot Exchange Rate Change 
 
(i) Decomposition using inflation indexed bond market data 
 
(ii) Decomposition using data generated from VARs 
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Figure C.5: Euro: ∆s decomposition
	   32	  
 
Figure 6c Decomposition of EUR Spot Exchange Rate Change 
 
(i) Decomposition using inflation indexed bond market data 
 
(ii) Decomposition using data generated from VARs
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Figure C.6: Yen: ∆s decomposition
	   31	  
Figure 6b Decomposition of JPN Spot Exchange Rate Change 
 
(i) Decomposition using inflation indexed bond market data 
 
(ii) Decomposition using data generated from VARs 
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VAR model estimates this variable using the sample mean of the real exchange rate. Taking
difference and comparing results of the two estimations, the difference would be the result
of the VAR specification errors or the information set problem.
As illustrated in Figures C.4 to C.6, one obvious feature is that the fluctuations of the
three currencies generally come from the movements of their risk premium (the blue bar)
and the change in real interest rate differential (the red bar), under the IIB estimation. In
contrary, only risk premium change plays a big role in the decomposition using the VAR
estimation. There is merely any red bar shown up in panel (ii) of Figures C.4 to C.6. This
is a fact consistent with the discussion in the historical plot study, in which VAR estimated
real interest rate converges quickly to the unconditional mean and generates low variation.
C.3 OLS Regressions
This section presents regression comparison studies using the change in risk premium re-
ferred from the two methods. Specifically, the change in the inflation indexed bond yield
differential, the change in the VAR estimated real interest rate differential and the change in
spot exchange rates are regressed on the change in the IIB estimated and the VAR estimated
risk premium separately.
C.3.1 Regress the change of the inflation-indexed bond yield dif-
ferential on the change in risk premium
The key difference comes from the first regression: the change in the inflation indexed




Table C.1: Regress the change in IIB yield differential on the change in risk premium
∆n(r∗t,n − rt,n) = ζθ + βθ∆θ̃t,n + uθ













GBR(2001:1-2011:2) 0.542 -0.034 -0.034
(0.468, 0.616) (-0.216, 0.148) (-0.216, 0.148)
EUR(2003:11-2011:2) 0.284 -0.199 -0.199
(0.219, 0.349) (-0.319, -0.080) (-0.319, -0.080)
JPN(2004:12-2011:2) 0.681 -0.268 -0.265
(0.577, 0.785) (-0.442, -0.093) (-0.437, -0.092)
90% confidence interval is in the parentheses (Newey-West).
Notice that the inflation indexed bond yield differential is the market data, which has no
estimation errors. Intuitively, people would expect that a rise in the risk premium of the
foreign country would result an increase in the real interest rate differential in favor of that
country. Surprisingly, Table C.1 shows that the VAR estimated risk premium ∆Λ̂10yrt predicts
a decrease in the real interest rate differential while the IIB estimated risk premium ∆θt,n
is consistent with the intuition. This is a common result among the three currencies. For
example, a 1% increase in the IIB estimated risk premium of the euro would result a 0.28%
increase in the real interest rate differential in favor of the euro zone. On the contrary, a 1%
increase in the VAR estimated risk premium would impact the real interest rate differential
by -0.74%. Therefore, the resulting discrepancy shows that the risk premium estimated from
VARs is less empirically appealing than the estimation using the IIB method.
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j=0 Êt(rt+j − r∗t+j − r̄)
∆R̂ = ζθ + βθ∆θ̃t,n + uθ
∆R̂ = ζΛ + βΛ∆Λ̂t + uΛ
∆R̂10yr = ζθ + β
10yr
θ ∆θ̃t,n + u
10yr
θ












GBR(2001:1-2011:2) 0.071 0.081 0.071 0.081
(0.002, 0.140) (-0.035, 0.197) (0.002, 0.140) (-0.035, 0.197)
EUR(2003:11:2011:2) 0.081 0.107 0.081 0.107
(0.060, 0.102) (0.095, 0.119) (0.060, 0.102) (0.095, 0.119)
JPN(2004:12:2011:2) -0.050 -0.117 -0.048 -0.110
(-0.184, 0.085) (-0.207, -0.027) (-0.180, 0.084) (-0.199, -0.021)
90% confidence interval is in the parentheses (Newey-West)
C.3.2 Regress the change in the VAR estimated real interest rate
on the change in risk premium
Next, the change in long run ex ante real interest rate differential estimated from VARs
(∆R̂10yr) is regressed on the change in risk premiums, ∆θt,n and β̂
10yr
Λ . Different from the
previous regression, the real interest rate differential estimated using VARs has estimation
errors and is denoted as foreign level minus home level. People would expect a negative
coefficient, because the real yield of foreign country should go up if the foreign currency is
risker. However, Table C.2 shows that the regression of euro data gives a positive coefficient
while for pound and yen the results are negative. The euro regression contradicts peoples
expectation. Therefore, even if I use the VAR estimated real interest rate differential in the
regression, the VAR estimated risk premium still gives an unexpected result at least for one
currency. In addition, the coefficient is much smaller in Table C.2 than that in Table C.1.
A 1% increase of the VAR risk premium of yen would result a 0.035% increase of ∆R̂10yr
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Table C.3: Regress the change in spot exchange rate on the change in risk premium














GBR(2001:1-2011:2) -0.607 -1.087 -1.087
(-0.699, -0.515) (-1.196, -0.978) (-1.197, -0.978)
EUR(2003:11:2011:2) -0.920 -1.088 -1.087
(-1.019, -0.821) (-1.115, -1.060) (-1.115, -1.060)
JPN(2004:12:2011:2) -0.421 -0.862 -0.856
(-0.544, -0.299) (-0.949, -0.775) (-0.945, -0.767)
90% confidence interval is in the parentheses (Newey-West)
in favor of Japan, while a 1% increase of the IIB risk premium would increase ∆R̂10yr by
0.68%. Notably, this result is consistent with the feature of Figures C.1 to C.6, in which
VAR estimated real interest rate differential barely fluctuates compare with IIB estimation.
Again, the second regression implies that the VAR estimation generates counter intuitive
empirical results.
Regress the change in spot exchange rate on the change in risk premium
Finally, the change in the spot exchange rate ∆st is regressed on the change in risk premiums,
∆θt,n and ∆Λ̂
10yr
t . Intuitively, a rise in the risk premium in favor of the foreign currency
would result an appreciation of the dollar. This is confirmed across the three currencies
using either of the two estimation methods. Table C.3 shows that the coefficients of this
regression study are all negative. Nonetheless, the IIB estimation shows that a 1% increase
in the pound risk premium would result a 0.52% appreciation of the dollar, while the VAR
estimated risk premium reports a 0.9% appreciation of the dollar. Using the VAR estima-
tion, the magnitude of this impact is larger across the three currencies and the coefficient
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is very close to −1. It indicates that almost a hundred percent of a given rise in the VAR
risk premium is reflected in a rise in an appreciation of the dollar. Contrarily, both the
regression using the IIB estimation reported in Table C.3 and the study in Clarida and Luo
(2015) confirm that, for all the three exchange rates, roughly half of a given rise in the IIB
risk premium is reflected in a rise in an appreciation of the dollar and the remaining half is
reflected in a rise in the inflation indexed bond yield differential. Again the VAR regression
result is consistent with the feature that VAR estimated real interest rate differential barely
fluctuates, thus all the variation of the spot exchange rate is explained by the variation of
the risk premium. Consequently, this regression study further confirms that VARs is less
empirically appealing than the IIB method.
In conclusion, the IIB method could construct risk premium with less estimation errors
and performs better empirically than the VAR method. Additionally, daily risk premium
could be estimated using inflation indexed bond market data, while the VARs is restricted
by macro variables and is at monthly or quarterly frequency in general.
C.4 Dynamic Conditional Correlation
This section studies the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) of the key variables in the
IIB model to answer the most important question: how is a risk premium achieved? It could
be realized either from the spot exchange rate or be through the interest rate differential.
Equation (3.5) indicates that a rise in risk premium comes from a combination of a rise in
the real interest rate differential and an appreciation of the dollar. One way to testify the IIB
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model is the correlation study of the three important variables: the change in spot exchange
rate (∆st), the change in risk premium (∆˜̃st), and the change in the linker yield differential
(∆n(r∗t,n − rt,n)). Nonetheless, it is important to notice that all the variables studies here
are endogenous. In this section, I am studying the correlation between these endogenous
variables and not getting inference to cause and effects.
Clarida (2012) as well as Clarida and Luo (2015) report the correlation between daily changes
in the spot exchange and the change in fair value over rolling 60-day window. Nonetheless,
DCC study is more robust and rigorous because the assumption on the time series correlation
is relaxed. The methodology of the integrated DCC follows the discussion in Engel (2016),
which uses a multivariate GARCH model. Additionally, exponential smoother method is
used to calculate correlation for robustness check.4 DCC result is reported in Figure C.7
while exponential smoother correlation result is illustrated in Figure C.8.
Firstly, there is a negative correlation between the change in risk premium and the change in
spot exchange rate, i.e. cor(∆θ̃t,n,∆st) < 0, and a positive correlation between the change in
risk premium and the change in real interest rate differential, i.e. cor(∆θ̃t,n,∆n(r
∗
t,n−rt,n)) >
0. A rise in the foreign currency risk premium would come from an appreciation of the dollar
that is consistent with Equation (3.5) and the model. cor(∆θ̃t,n,∆st) is constantly below
zero for the pound at around -0.7 over the sample period. For yen and euro, the correlation
4Exponential smoothing dynamic conditional correlation is constructed using a geometrically weighted
average of the sequence, cor(∆θ̃t,n,∆n(r
∗














ρ = 0.9. I also tried different values of ρ, such as 0.94, 0.99. As ρ increases, the correlation is more like a
random walk, but the qualitative feature of the figure preserves.
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level is negative for most of the sample period as well. Secondly, a rise in the foreign currency
risk premium might come from an increase in the real interest rate differential in favor of the
foreign country. As illustrated, cor(∆θ̃t,n,∆n(r
∗
t,n − rt,n)) is positive for the whole sample
period across the three currencies. The level is quite high: for the pound, the correlation
is around 0.6, while the level is around 0.75 for the euro and the yen. Thirdly, there is a
positive correlation between the change in spot exchange rate and the change in fair value,
i.e. cor(∆st,∆˜̃st) > 0. Thus, the three correlation studies are consistent with the prediction
of Equation (3.5). Furthermore, correlation results using exponential smoother (Figure C.8)
are also consistent with the DCC study (Figure C.7).
Hence, the DCC study confirms the relation that a rise in foreign risk premium would come
from a combination of an increase in the real interest rate differential in favor of the foreign
country and an appreciation of the dollar. Notably, the strong positive correlation between
spot exchange rate and fair value contradicts with Meese and Rogoff (1983): the funda-


















































































































































C.5 Identify Risk Premium Shocks















∆θ̃t = −(λ+ λ̃)θ̃t−1 + (a11 − a21)∆˜̃st−1 + (a12 − a22)(∆˜̃st−1 −∆θ̃t−1) + errors.
So we can always write first order error correction models with error correction term
θ̃t = (1− λ+ λ̃+ (a12 − a22))θ̃t−1 − (a12 − a22)θ̃t−2 + (a11 − a21 + a12 − a22)∆˜̃st−1 + errors.
On the other hand,





 (a11 + a12) (−λ+ a12)







0 −(a12 − a22)

 ∆˜̃st−2
θ̃t−2
+ errors.
221
